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**THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF CHINESE  
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AS OF 1952**

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**Research accomplished  
under contract with  
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama**

**Research Memorandum  
NUMBER 39**

***H R R I PROJECT***  
**"Chinese Documents Project"**

**PUBLISHED BY AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AND TRAINING RESEARCH CENTER  
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**THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF CHINESE  
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AS OF 1952**

by


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## P R E F A C E

### THE CHINESE DOCUMENTS PROJECT

This report is one of a series of studies prepared by the staff of the Chinese Documents Project, under the direction of Dr. Theodore H.E. Chen of the University of Southern California. The Project was initiated in 1951 by the Human Resources Research Institute, of the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, to help meet Air Force needs for knowledge regarding both the probable psychological effects of air weapons and the potentialities of psychological operations linked to the use of air power. For evaluating the contribution of the studies toward these ends, some understanding of the background and history of the Project is necessary.

*Objectives.* Ideally, research in support of the psychological potential of air operations would provide (1) specific recommendations regarding the psychological employment of air power, and (2) specific estimates of the psychological effects to be expected in planned uses of air weapons. Unfortunately, these recommendations and estimates are in turn dependent upon far more intimate knowledge of the culture, organization, and current psychology of the "target populations" than presently exists. The Chinese Documents Project was undertaken to help remedy this deficiency in the case of Communist China. Specifically, the objectives set forth in the contract were:

To produce "an integrated series of preliminary project reports" on major segments, undertakings and aspects of the Chinese Communist regime and on reactions of the Chinese populace to these.

From these preliminary studies, to produce an overall analysis of the regime and reactions to it, indicating in particular its strengths and vulnerabilities.

*Resources.* Two chief resources were considered essential and made available for carrying out the aims of the Chinese Documents Project. The first was Chinese language documents from behind the Bamboo Curtain. The second was social scientists of Chinese descent and with long years of experience in China.

*Evaluation of Documents.* The shortcomings as well as the values of documents from behind the Bamboo Curtain were calculated from the start. It was realized that Communist reports of numbers and quantities, and Communist accounts of specific behavior, events, and conditions might be accurate, approximate, or distorted—depending upon which degree of veracity the Communists regarded as the most expedient. The operational code of the Chinese Communist Party makes this unmistakable and inevitable. On the other hand, it is recognized by social scientists and laymen alike that even the most biased documents can be made to yield highly valuable information.

*General Procedure and Staff.* The fact that the documents from which such information was to be drawn were in the Chinese language and necessarily included a steady flow of newspapers and periodicals, made imperative the continuous rapid scanning of a vast amount of material in Chinese. Two alternative procedures were available, neither of them entirely ideal. One was to give a list of topics to translators and have them select and translate appropriate items from the documents. The translations would then go to experienced American social scientists for analysis. This procedure, however, was regarded as cumbersome, and certain to yield misinterpretations. The alternative procedure involved the use of scholars whose native language was Chinese but who had also had American graduate training in the social sciences. It required that they scan the original Chinese language documents and employ whatever insights, general methods, and techniques they possessed both in the selection of items and in the production of analyses in English. This latter general procedure was adopted as the more efficient one. How it operated is indicated in the Introduction below.

*Project Termination.* The studies by individual staff members, which were produced during the first two years, were to have been supplemented by further studies and capped by an up-to-date analysis of the Chinese Communist regime as a whole. However, the Project was terminated in the summer of 1953 before these could be produced, and before the studies already made had been critically appraised and revised. Nevertheless it has been decided to publish and reproduce with a minimum of editorial revision those considered worthy of dissemination.

*Suggested Uses of Reports.* In the case of the earlier of these preliminary reports, a score or so copies of an advance unedited edition have already been distributed in Air Force and other government offices. The responses received from this very limited circulation indicate that it would be useful to have suggestions on the possible uses and limitations of the reports for field operations, short-range policy planning, longer-range intelligence estimates, and future intelligence research. The following are therefore offered.

For direct use in psychological field operations, parts of the reports have been and will be suitable, although as a whole they were not intended for such use without checking and integrating with other intelligence studies. For short-range policy planning, the same should be said, particularly since many parts of the reports have continuing current relevance. For use in long-run intelligence estimates, these reports are "dated"; the Chinese Communist regime itself, however, has been dynamic and changing and can only be understood in the light of its dated changes, particularly those since the Communists came to power in 1949. As to use in the planning of future intelligence research, such dated research as this assumes (1) that future periodic reassessments be made on each significant aspect of the Chinese Communist regime, and (2) that, in these, the traits and trends set forth hypothetically in earlier studies be used as base lines and checked, sharpened, and extended, or if necessary revised, for purposes of estimate and prediction. Such data as are available from behind the Communist "curtains" obviously need critical reworking as later disclosures are made.

While certain uses can be made of studies like these on separate aspects of a regime, other uses, particularly on the strategic level, are dependent on integrating those segmentary studies into overall analyses of the regime as a whole. Research has certainly not accomplished this satisfactorily for the China of the recent past and present, and cannot do so until gaps in the segmental studies are identified and filled, whether by documentary or other investigations. So far as use of these research reports is desired on the confidential governmental level, moreover, it must, of course, assume prior "coordination" with "classified" information. For, to the end of their work, most of the participants in the Chinese Documents Project were foreign nationals. On a strictly unclassified level on the other hand, the Air Force, in making these studies available to scholars outside the government, allows them to be added to that common fund of knowledge which scholars in turn can use to help assist the government as well as enlighten the public.

*Administration of the Contract.* The Chinese Documents Project was administratively launched in 1950 by Dr. Frederick W. Williams, then Program Director of the Psychological Warfare Research Directorate, and Dr. Raymond V. Bowers, then Director of the Human Resources Research Institute. Research contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 with the University of Southern California covering the Project work became effective in May 1951. Dr. T. H. E. Chen became the Principal Investigator and Dr. Williams the Contract Monitor. In January 1952 Major Clarence N. Weems, Jr. spent about seven weeks with the Project staff while the first four preliminary reports were being completed. In July 1952, when the next set of preliminary reports was being completed, responsibility for monitoring the Project fell upon the newly created Far Eastern Branch of the Division and its chief, the undersigned, who is now Project Officer.

## THE PRESENT STUDY

This study is the sequel to the author's earlier study, *The Propaganda Machine in Communist China*. The discussions of Orientation, Uses, Author's Studies, Author, and Editorial Policy, in the preface to that study, are applicable here also.

Necessarily, however, the present study ties in with certain policies and undertakings of the Chinese Communist regime much more intimately than the preceding one. Being concerned with objectives, broad principles of manipulation, and step-by-step measures, it links closely into corresponding objectives, principles, and overt measures in major concrete programs launched upon the people. For instance, it takes one into the intimate person-to-person and group processes of typical steps in the agrarian revolution as the Communists are instigating it among the peasants; it does the same in the case of typical steps in the attempt to train cadres and to utilize the intellectuals. By implication also, though not through any single extended detailed treatment, the reader sees how the Chinese people are induced to "support" the regime's international undertakings.

At the same time the study does put major stress upon generalizable principles of both strategy and tactics of propaganda as a whole.

MAURICE T. PRICE  
Project Officer



## INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT STUDIES

*Objective and Tasks.* The general goal assigned to the Chinese Documents Project was the delineation of the psychological and sociological vulnerabilities of the Chinese Communist regime. Sub-goals could be designated in general terms, but, because of the Bamboo Curtain, only tentatively in much detail. It was accordingly planned by the chief investigator that the research would be concerned with two main tasks:

To depict the structure and organization of the Chinese Communist state and regime, and to portray the organs and methods they use to control the population; and

To evaluate the successes and failures of the Communist program in China in order to assess the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the regime as a whole.

These two tasks were elaborated and somewhat modified as the materials accumulated and the work progressed. According to the original plan, the Project was to run for three years, culminating in a comprehensive estimate of the vulnerabilities of the Chinese Communist regime as a whole. The unexpected termination of the Project after two years, however, not only prevented that overall evaluation but cut off a number of the projected specialized studies. During the two years in which the contract actually operated, the overall objectives and tasks remained practically as stated above. They implied, of course, a knowledge of Chinese society prior to the inauguration of the Chinese Communist regime in 1949; and they were illuminated by comparisons, where feasible, with Soviet Russia's Communist regime.

*Data and Methods.* The main body of data for both initial orientation and research analysis was extracted, not from already selected and translated excerpts published in English on the periphery of China, but directly from such primary sources in the Chinese language as government laws and regulations, official programs, leaders' pronouncements, special instructions for different groups and organizations under Communist control, expositions of objectives in different Communist-sponsored campaigns and of their implementation and success or failure, criticisms of deficiencies and of persons allegedly responsible for such deficiencies, illustrative incidents from factory, farm, and community, and readers' letters and editorials in Chinese Communist and non-Communist periodicals. These source materials were inspected by the chief investigator for general relevance both to the objectives of the Project as a whole and to specific studies undertaken or contemplated; and by each staff member for detailed relevance to his own selected research topics. As the materials were fundamentally historical documents, the initial approach and methods used were necessarily historiographic. They had to be viewed in their historical context and judged on the basis of their internal or textual nature. At the same time, they were examined from the standpoint of whatever preliminary conceptualization and frames of reference the individual had adopted for his special study and topics. Their data were classified and processed in accordance with whatever methods and techniques he judged most appropriate. Yet each research project, from the preliminary plans down to the methods and procedures, and finally the report itself, was discussed critically not only with the chief investigator but also with a staff committee in a staff conference. No outside substantive or methodological experts were called in to assist in shaping up individual studies. In summary, each report was therefore primarily the product of the individual scholar working under the guidance of the chief investigator.

*Difficulties, Limitations, and Strengths.* The problem of estimating how far a country's laws and regulations are actually enforced, how far state and group programs are carried out, and objectives are attained, and in what manner obvious propaganda is to be evaluated, is not new; but the problem is acute in an Iron or Bamboo Curtain regime where propagandic purposes permeate so many documents, statements, and activities. Fortunately the Communists' criticism and self-criticism, and their resort

to purges, result in indirect disclosure of the degrees of compliance with laws, programs, and objectives, and in indirect information on the reactions of the population to the new regime. Again, the geographic and statistical distribution of any given behavior among government agencies, party echelons, or the non-Communist population, is often most obscure; but, on the other hand, the significance of such distribution may sometimes be estimated roughly by the nature of the consequent policies adopted to deal with it. Sometimes, therefore, the broad outlines of law and official policy become most significant; at other times, the vivid representation of personal or group reaction to individual organizational measures is the orientation of a report. In spite of the difficulties and limitations of inadequate data, of distance and inability to make direct observations on the spot, it is believed that the reports produced under the contract—reports grouped around such major topics as party and government, rural economic conditions, propaganda and coercive campaigns, reactions in the family, school, farm, factory, and community—open up perspectives and disclose successive patterns of behavior, which make significant contributions to our knowledge and understanding of Communist China. And in so doing they give the context, often the distinct outlines, and oftener still the pulsing feeling, if we may say so, of the vulnerabilities of the regime.

*Personnel.* This kind of product was made possible only because the researchers, themselves of Chinese ancestry and of many years' experience in China, were aware of the overtones in the Chinese-language materials and could visualize the behavior portrayed or implied, as well as relate it to the concepts and modes of analysis which they had assimilated in their social science training. All had been through Ph.D. graduate training in leading universities of the United States, with all but one having received this degree. Moreover, practically all had had post-collegiate experience in China relevant to their major research interests. They differed, of course, in their experience in applying recent Occidental research techniques and in communicating their ideas to English-reading publics. The result on the whole, however, is that their studies are believed to have an authentic quality which we feel is a major requirement for understanding Chinese communism and its impact on the Chinese people.

THEODORE H. E. CHEN  
Principal Investigator

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## SUMMARY, AND CONCLUSIONS AS TO "STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES"

### Summary

Propaganda plays a conspicuous part in the total policy of the Chinese Communist regime. In the lexicon of the Chinese Communists, propaganda is "ideological warfare" and the "fundamental form of class struggle." It encompasses all feasible vehicles of human expression and means of influencing attitude and behavior.

In any study of the dynamics of the Chinese Communist society, of the "strengths or weaknesses" of the Peking regime, or of the direction of the so-called proletarian revolution, it would be inconceivable to neglect propaganda.

The Communist revolution is a "class struggle" and is consequently based on tensions or conflicts between classes. The Communists intensify tensions that exist; they create tensions when lacking. Their weapon: propaganda. Its mission: to manufacture and magnify class antagonism, which they choose to call "class consciousness" or "political consciousness."

By the use of incessant propaganda the Chinese Communists teach the people what, whom, and how to love and hate, to applaud and accuse; they turn children against parents, wives against husbands, and pupils against teachers; they mobilize young men to "volunteer" to die in Korea; they make the whole nation work, weep, sing, dance and play to the tune of communism.\* That many of the so-called "people's actions" are instigated, even compelled at times, by Communists, is a fact well known. One can not deny, however, that on the surface at least, there is the appearance of popular mass support rather than the mere execution of government decrees.

This study describes how propaganda is designed and manipulated in Communist China, probes into the ways of the Party in "reforming" the minds of men, examines the methods used to arouse mass emotions and enlist mass support, and analyzes the Party's strength and weakness in propaganda. It is closely geared to the Party's fundamental strategy and tactics.

The Chinese Communists do not follow any cut and dried policy in propaganda. Generally speaking, however, Communist propaganda operates within the framework of the Party's "united front policy." At the present time, "the fundamental force of the united front" is supposed to be the working class, of which the Party is the "vanguard." The peasantry is said to be the "firm ally," the petty bourgeoisie a "reliable ally," and the national bourgeoisie an ally "to unite with as well as to struggle against." The "enemies" of the united front, as named by Mao Tse-tung, are the "imperialists, feudalists, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen." One may say that the chief strategic aim of Communist propaganda is to strengthen the Party's power position by uniting or organizing the "allies" or "friends" and isolating or attacking the "enemies" or "foes."

As some Communists define it, "strategy, briefly, is to decide during a special revolutionary stage what classes the proletariat must aim to unite with, to isolate, or to overthrow, and what main objectives the proletariat must achieve." Two strategic principles are generally followed by the Communists in their propaganda warfare: (1) to attract as many people as possible into the so-called "proletarian revolution" by offering, and sometimes actually providing or doing, the things that the masses most urgently need, and by using the slogans that can most easily be understood by the masses; and (2) to help, participate in, and lead all revolutionary movements that can best serve the interests of the working class. In other words, the proletariat may have to join hands temporarily with its "enemies"; but as long as the interests of the working class are directly or indirectly served, such action will be justified.

\* Although in this study communism is printed with a small letter in accordance with the *Manual of Style* of the U.S. Government Printing Office, it is used only for the current communism of the international Communist movement and/or its parties.

The term "tactics" refers to the approaches and methods used in different propaganda campaigns or "ideological battles." Tactics vary in different campaigns and among people of different educational, economic, or professional categories. Although specific tactics are often designed by local propaganda authorities, the general tactical principles still come from the top Party leaders in Peking. The most important tactical principles are briefly as follows:

1. "Investigation first, propaganda next." Once Mao said: "Without investigation, no comrade has the right to speak."
2. Combine general or universal slogans with actual local tasks.
3. Always test the use of slogans in a small locality before they are nationally applied.
4. "Policies must come from the masses and go back to the masses." (In other words, make the ideas of the Party sound as if they were ideas of the people.)
5. Try to discover the "activists" or "aggressive elements" in every mass movement or propaganda campaign and use them to agitate or stimulate the moderate and backward elements in the locality.
6. Thoroughly educate the cadres before carrying out any propaganda campaign.
7. Carry out only one pivotal "mass movement" or propaganda campaign at a given time, supported by other secondary or lesser "movements."
8. Carefully review or examine the successes and failure of a propaganda campaign after it is completed.

Methods or techniques of Communist propaganda are so subtle and diversified that it is impossible to list them all here. For the purpose of indoctrination or "re-education," *hsüeh hsi* [study, teaching, training] along with "criticism" and "self-criticism" is extensively used. So far as mass agitation is concerned, the working formula is what the Communists call "to transform grievance into power." This means to explore the people's grievances or hatreds and turn them into a driving force against the defined enemies.

To win over the masses of Chinese workers and peasants, the Party depends mainly upon two measures: (1) a specially-designed "educational" or indoctrination program to raise both the cultural and the political levels of workers and peasants; and (2) special campaigns or "mass movements" to make workers and peasants learn and actually participate in *tou cheng* (struggle). *Tou cheng*, according to the Communists, "is the best form of education of the masses."

The propaganda tactics used against the intelligentsia and particularly the intellectuals necessarily differ from those applied to workers and peasants. Criticism and self-criticism are extensively used. This particular group of the bourgeoisie is taught (1) to understand and accept the leadership of the working class, (2) to respect instead of look down on labor, (3) to eradicate all "feudalistic, imperialistic, and other erroneous thoughts," and (4) to support, both in deeds and words, the policies and programs of the Party and government. To achieve these political objectives, an "ideological remoulding campaign" was inaugurated in the autumn of 1951 among the Chinese intellectuals.

#### *Conclusions as to "Strengths and Weaknesses"*

What are the "strengths and weaknesses" of Chinese Communist propaganda? This is not easy to answer, because a strength can also be a weakness at the same time. Consider the simple matter of repetition in Communist propaganda. It is true, of course, that the more frequently a slogan is repeated, the more likely it is to be perceived, remembered, and constantly reinforced. One can even support this view by quoting a great master of propaganda, Hitler, who wrote in *Mein Kampf*: "The intelligence of the masses is small, their forgetfulness is great. Effective propaganda must be confined to merely a few issues which can be easily assimilated. Since the masses are slow to comprehend, they must be told the same thing a thousand times." One can not neglect the fact, however, that to repeat the same theme or slogan day in and day out often invites boredom on the part of the masses and thus brings punishing results. This means that the technique of repetition is itself a weakness as well as a strength in propaganda. One must keep this point in mind in an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Communist propaganda.



The following are some of the strengths of the Communist propaganda:

1. Communist propaganda is pervasive. There is probably no living soul in China today who can possibly escape from the far-reaching arms of the Party's propaganda.
2. The Communists have an effective system for transmitting the messages from Peking and the doctrinal formulas of the Party to every segment of the Chinese population. Employing many crude methods of communication and placing the greatest emphasis on daily face-to-face contact between the masses and propagandists, this system greatly minimizes the handicaps of illiteracy, poor communications, and insufficient press activities.
3. The Communists require all their propagandists to keep in close touch with the masses and to become familiar with the background and prevailing attitudes of their subjects. The propagandists are supposed to know the "psychological climate" of the masses and to keep their fingers on the pulse of public sentiments and reactions. They are constantly urged to gather accurate information in regard to the attitudes, the likes, and the dislikes of the masses. Such information helps the Party to plan its forthcoming propaganda programs and to counteract the "erroneous belief" of the people or any opposing propaganda.
4. The Communists are shrewd in turning grievance into a driving force. It admits of no argument that there are few completely contented human beings in the world and that there are fewer such people in China. Social injustice, economic sufferings, and outworn traditions are sufficient to produce, with or without outside instigation, recalcitrant feelings among the people in a country like China. When given a proper outlet, these suppressed feelings can generate a tremendous power, although they can also lead to disastrous or terrifying results. All Communist accusation meetings or "struggle meetings" are dexterously controlled and staged with precise co-ordination. The Communists have developed a system to "dig out the root of bitterness of the people" and make the people "struggle" against the defined "enemies."
5. The Communists use a constant array of glittering slogans to attract the attention and favor of the masses. They try to offer different things to different people at different times. They "give" land to poor peasants and farm laborers; they transfer authority from the "big bourgeoisie" to workers; and they promise "marital freedom" to women. Whether the Communists keep their promises may be questionable, but it cannot be denied that the slogans sound attractive and convincing to the broad masses.
6. The Communists are careful to find allies who accept Communist leadership. That the Party needs the support of the workers, peasants, and the bourgeois class is obvious. While enlisting the support of these "allies," the Party always stands firmly as the highest authority. The Communists urge the whole nation to follow the leadership of the working class, but maintain that the Party is the "vanguard" of the workers.
7. Communist propagandists are shrewd in using "aggressive elements" or "activists" to work for them. The "activists" are acquainted with the people who are to be won over or "struggled" against, understand their problems, and know the most effective methods of taking into consideration the immediate environmental conditions and circumstances of each person, group, or type, and of winning them over.
8. Communist propaganda shuts off opposing views and ideas. The Communist propaganda screens all public information before it reaches the people and makes it almost impossible to have any free exchange of ideas among men. Moreover, by the distortion of truth and constant repetition of the Party line, the Communists gradually paralyze individual thinking and destroy the will to resist.
9. Communist propaganda is backed by violence or force. Should persuasion fail, the Communists do not hesitate to resort to the use of violence. The force behind the Communist propaganda leaves an individual with no other alternative but to accept the Party line, however reluctant he may be to do so.

So much for the strengths of the Communist propaganda. Following are some of the weaknesses that are admitted by the Communists themselves:

1. Many, if not most, of the cadres are not seriously concerned with propaganda. The *Jen Min Jih Pao*, for instance, reports that when the propaganda network was started in the Northeast Administrative Area, many cadres took the attitude of "contempt and opposition."<sup>1</sup> The fact that almost every so-called "mass movement" has to start with a "thorough indoctrination" of the cadres to "convince" them of the importance of propaganda strongly suggests that there may exist indifference or even opposition to propaganda among cadres.

2. Although the Party has a huge army of propagandists, they are not all effective. Numerous articles and stories in the Communist press complain of the "low educational quality," "inefficiency," "lack of initiative," or "laziness" of the propagandists. According to Fu Cheng-sheng, the Party's propaganda chief in the Northeast, only 23.3 per cent of the propagandists in Heilungkiang are "effective," 47.6 per cent are "sometimes but not always effective," and the rest (about 30 per cent) are "not effective at all."<sup>2</sup>

3. Exposure of the masses to the Communist propaganda does not necessarily mean their acceptance of the propaganda. The Communists admit that many people participate in the *hsieh hsi* movement simply because they have to. A definite proof of the Party's failure in the indoctrination program is the current affairs examination given to middle school students in Peking.<sup>3</sup> According to the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the People's Municipal Government in Peking, 48,065 students, representing 79 public and private middle schools in Peking, participated in the examination in the winter of 1951. Only 13,162 students (27.3 per cent) passed! The story released by the bureau also points out that there exist "serious problems" in the minds of the students, many of whom still "misunderstand" the Soviet Union and "lack sincerity" in the study of current affairs. The story reveals that many students do not know the persons and happenings that are widely publicized in the press. For instance, only 7.7 per cent know of Ho Chien-siu, a "national model worker" whose name has appeared almost every day in Communist newspapers.

If current affairs studies in the schools are not successful, one could expect even less success from the "study of current affairs" by workers, peasants, soldiers, and the broad masses of the Chinese people.

4. There are indications that the Communist propaganda is not received by the people with open arms. First, Party cadres, especially those responsible for the organization of "newspaper-reading groups," are repeatedly urged to "do their very best" to "arouse the interest of the masses." This implies that there probably exists a certain amount of indifference on the part of the masses. Otherwise, there is no need to "arouse their interest." Second, the Party has difficulties in soliciting subscribers to the newspapers. Many schools and institutions cancel their subscriptions, giving a limited budget as an excuse.<sup>4</sup> Party secretaries at all levels are even urged to "carefully investigate and correct" the "wrong tendency of cancelling subscriptions to newspapers under the excuse of austerity."<sup>5</sup> Third, the fact that postmen are "mobilized" to solicit door-to-door subscriptions to newspapers,<sup>6</sup> and the charge made by Postmaster General Chu Hsueh-fan that the task of newspaper circulation is not successfully carried out,<sup>7</sup> both strongly suggest that the Communist newspapers are probably not popular among the Chinese people.

5. There is considerable "formalism" in Communist propaganda. Take the system of propaganda networks in the Northeast, for instance. The propaganda chief there charges that in certain areas the Party cadres simply round up a large number of people and call them propagandists.<sup>8</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily, Peking), March 14, 1951.

<sup>2</sup> Fu Cheng-sheng, *Tung Pei Ch'u Chien Li Hsüan Ch'üan Wang Ti Ching Yen* (Experiences in Building up Propaganda Networks in the Northeast Region), (Mukden: Tung Pei Jen Min Ch'u Pan She, 1951) pp. 15-16.

<sup>3</sup> *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), November 23, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> *Jen Min Chiao Yu* (People's Education, Peking), Vol. II, No. 3, June, 1951, p. 57.

<sup>5</sup> *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao* (Yangtze Daily, Hankow), May 15, 1952.

<sup>6</sup> *People's China* (English bi-weekly in Peking), Vol. IV, No. 7, October 1, 1951, p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> *Ta Kung Pao* (daily newspaper in Shanghai), June 17, 1951.

<sup>8</sup> Fu Cheng-sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

other areas, he complains, responsible Party secretaries merely pass on the order to other departments, sometimes even to the recreational centers. The *Jen Min Jih Pao* points out that in some cities the Party's propaganda departments "completely ignore the *Propagandists' Handbooks*, which are delayed for as long as two months before they are distributed to operational propagandists." Cadres of propaganda departments have even used Party newspapers and propaganda materials for decorations.<sup>10</sup> The matter of "formalism" is perhaps most frequently brought up in the propaganda of "Patriotic Pacts."<sup>11</sup> One *yang-ko* dance group spent \$14,000,000 (*jen-min-p'iao*)\* for costumes merely "to impress people." Some workers in stores had to "study" from 8:00 p.m. till midnight and thus lost efficiency in work.<sup>12</sup> In one town, the content of "blackboard newspapers" was left unchanged for as long as 45 days.<sup>13</sup> There is no doubt that such "formalism" is detrimental to the effectiveness of the Party's propaganda.

6. The Party has considerable difficulty in the indoctrination of the intelligentsia, especially the intellectuals. In fact, the Party openly admits the existence of the "seriously erroneous thoughts of the bourgeois class" among the intelligentsia. These thoughts include preference of American democracy to Communist dictatorship, "misunderstanding" of the Soviet Union, and many other "feudalistic" ideas. Almost every story dealing with the "ideological remoulding campaign" for professors reveals the Party's difficulties in its attempt to "wash the brains" of the intellectuals.

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\* The Chinese Communist paper dollar (people's bank-note, check, or bill).—Editors.

<sup>9</sup> *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*, Peking), February 21, 1951.

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*, Peking), August 15, 1951; July 21, 1951; July 14, 1951.

<sup>12</sup> *Wen Hui Pao* (daily newspaper in Shanghai), July 20, 1951.

<sup>13</sup> *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*, Peking), February 21, 1951.

## THE OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

### *Objectives of the Study*

This is an analytical study of the strategy and tactics of Chinese Communist propaganda. Attention is called to the close relation between this study and a previous study of Chinese Communist propaganda.<sup>14</sup> The latter was a study of the propaganda machine in Communist China. The present study proposes to examine the propagandic methods and means used by the Chinese Communist Party to mobilize the population for the attainment of specially prescribed goals, to eradicate beliefs disapproved by the Party, to inculcate new ideologies upon the minds of the people, to mould new patterns of motivation, and to strengthen the power position of the Party in the country. To be specific, this study is undertaken to answer the following questions:

1. What are the general strategic and tactical principles of Chinese Communist propaganda?
2. What is the relationship between the Communist propaganda practices and the Marxist-Leninist theories?
3. How is the *hsüeh hsi* (learning or study) movement conducted as a means of sharpening the "class consciousness" of the masses?
4. How is Communist propaganda used to mobilize and organize the so-called "allies" of the proletarian revolution (workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie) against defined "enemies" (mainly imperialism and feudalism)?
5. What measures are taken by the Communists to "re-educate" or "remould" the intelligentsia, particularly the intellectuals?<sup>15</sup>
6. What are the different kinds of appeals, approaches, and techniques used to arouse mass emotions of the people?
7. What are the indications, if any, of the people's resistance to the Communist program of political control?

### *Scope of the Study*

To try to cover all phases of the Communist propaganda in one study would certainly be a fruitless attempt, indeed an impossible task, because propaganda is an ever-present feature of virtually every program or measure of the Peking regime. Vice-Minister of Propaganda Chen Po-ta says, "The first question to which every Communist Party member should pay daily attention is politics; the second question is politics; and the third question is still politics."<sup>16</sup> According to

<sup>14</sup>*The Propaganda Machine in Communist China*, 1955, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.

<sup>15</sup>The Chinese term *chih shih fen tze* (literally, "knowledgeable elements") is usually translated as "intelligentsia." In this paper, however, the writer considers it helpful to make a distinction between intelligentsia and intellectuals. The term "intelligentsia" used here and hereafter refers to all people who have received some education. Those in this group range from literate persons to scholars or writers of note. The term "intellectuals" refers to professors, scholars, writers, journalists, artists, doctors, engineers, or anyone who is either well-learned or has established himself in academic or professional fields.

<sup>16</sup>*Hsüeh Hsi* (Study Magazine, Peking), Vol. III, No. 12, March 16, 1951, p. 13.



the Communist leaders, politics is mainly propaganda and organization.<sup>17</sup> In other words, practically everything done by a Communist has to do with propaganda.

A major portion of this study is concerned with the Party's political or ideological indoctrination of the masses. There are several reasons for emphasizing this phase of Communist propaganda:

1. The Communists have always emphasized ideological indoctrination. One leading Communist propagandist states: "All propaganda tasks of the Communists are ideological tasks, that is, ideological struggle or struggle in thought."<sup>18</sup> One must always keep in mind that the whole course of the Chinese Communist revolution is actually a "class struggle," and that "ideological struggle," according to Marx and Lenin, is the "fundamental form of class struggle." Some Communist writers consider "ideological struggle" a "sentinel battle" of all political and economic struggle.<sup>19</sup> Mao wrote in 1937:

We advocate a positive struggle in thought, for this weapon brings solidarity between the Party and revolutionary organizations, a solidarity that is beneficial in the conduct of war. Every Communist Party member and every revolutionary should seize this weapon.<sup>20</sup>

2. The Communists are now fighting an all-out war on the ideological front. A proposal to carry out a nation-wide "ideological remoulding campaign" was passed by the People's Political Consultative Conference in 1951, and this campaign is considered one of the main tasks of the Communist government in 1952. Communist leaders constantly warn against the "ideological corruption" of the cadres and the masses.

At present we are indeed too weak on the ideological front. Strictly speaking, we have not formed a powerful ideological front. Our ideological tasks fall far behind the actual living and other struggles. Moreover, in many of our tasks there exists a state of ideological paralysis and confusion. This is a serious danger.<sup>21</sup>

3. Ideological indoctrination is inseparable from mass agitation. One has to realize that ideological indoctrination in Communist China does not mean merely the study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought. It aims to convert the minds of the Chinese people, to win their hearts and, as some Catholic missionaries put it, "to change their souls." The Communists often refer to the process of indoctrination as "ideological reform" or "the war of liberation in thought," because it is a kind of *tou cheng* (struggle) against old and "incorrect" conceptions of society, history, work, and life. What further complicates the understanding of the Communist ideological indoctrination program is the fact that Communists demand actions or actual results from indoctrination. It is not enough, for instance, for a farm laborer to "believe" that he has been "exploited." It is not enough for him to say or shout that he loves communism, that he hates the landlords, and that he resents "American imperialism." He has to show by deeds that he has actually "benefited" from indoctrination. This means that the farm laborer has to "accuse," "attack," or "eliminate" his masters, to "pour out his grievances against feudalistic landlords and reactionary Nationalists," or to "contribute" his

<sup>17</sup> Ai Ssu-ch'i, the most authoritative theoretician in Communist China, writes: "Politics, to put it briefly, is nothing but a centralized form of class struggle; it is just a relationship of oppression and control of one class by another class." He further states: "There are only two kinds of political tasks; one is the task of propaganda and education, and the other is the task of organization. Both aim at raising the level of political consciousness of the revolutionary class. . . ."

These quotations are from Ai Ssu-ch'i, *Li Shih Wei Wu Lun—She Hui Fa Chan Shih Chiang I* (Historical Materialism—Lectures on History of Social Development) (Peking: Kung Jen Ch'u Pan She, 1951), first revised ed., pp. 83-6.

<sup>18</sup> T'eng Kuo, "To Strengthen Ideological Tasks, To Develop Ideological Struggle," *Hsüeh Hsi* (Study, Peking), Vol. IV, No. 9, August 16, 1951, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> Yu Kuang-yuan, "To Develop the Ideological Education of Marxism-Leninism from the Discussions on the Story of Wu Hsueh," *Hsüeh Hsi*, Vol. IV, Nos. 6 & 7, June 1, 1951, p. 59.

<sup>20</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Opposing Liberalism," *Cheng Feng Wen Hsien* (Documents of the Party's Ideological Remoulding Movement) (Hong Kong: Hsin Min Chu Ch'u Pan She, 1949), p. 163.

<sup>21</sup> T'eng Kuo, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

money or effort to the government to express his "gratitude" to Chairman Mao and his Party. In other words, the so-called ideological indoctrination actually has much to do with agitation, as the word is commonly understood.

The fact that this study pays special attention to the Party's propaganda among workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia (particularly the intellectuals) also calls for a brief explanation.

First, workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, according to the Communists, represent the fundamental force of the proletarian revolution. They have to be won over, mobilized, and organized under the banner of communism. This is generally supposed to be the major task of the Party's "united front policy."

Second, the so-called "united front," the Communists say, represents the fundamental general policy of the Party. The method of approach in this study is to relate propaganda to the fundamental policy of the Party and thus to determine how propaganda is manipulated as an instrument of total policy.

Third, the Communists claim that they do not follow any cut and dried, detailed policy in their political tasks and that they have different strategy and tactics of propaganda toward workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie, and petty bourgeoisie. It is therefore significant to compare the tactics or techniques used by the Party as they are applied to different groups.

Fourth, the reason that the intelligentsia is singled out from the bourgeoisie for a careful study is mainly because this class has always occupied a position of leadership and commanded high respect in Chinese society.



## THE GENERAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS

It is important at the outset to make a clear distinction between strategy and tactics, both military terms. According to Mao Tse-tung, "a study of the laws for directing a whole war situation comes within the scope of the science of strategy; a study of the laws for directing a partial war situation comes within the scope of the science of campaigns and tactics."<sup>22</sup> Strategy in this study refers to the overall plan of the Communist propaganda; it is concerned with such problems as the selection of goals to be achieved, the definition of "enemies" to be eliminated and "allies" to be won over at particular periods, the planning of different campaigns and the consideration of the interrelationship between campaigns and between operational phases, the decision on timing and tempo in carrying out a certain movement, and the decision of general tactics to be used in different campaigns. Tactics refers to specific methods, techniques, or approaches used in different propaganda campaigns. In an operational sense, the highest level of the Party in Peking decides on the propaganda strategy and tactical principles while the Party organs and propagandists at lower levels work out the details of suitable tactics.

As pointed out previously, the whole course of the Communist revolution in China is a "class struggle," or, as the Communists choose to say, a "political warfare." In every warfare there are always two problems involved: the enemies or foes to be eliminated, and the allies or friends to be won over. "Friends" and "foes" do not always remain constant. A foe today may be a friend tomorrow. The shifting of friends and foes and the choice of targets for attack form the basis of the strategy of Communist propaganda.

The fundamental guiding principle of the Communist political warfare is the following oft-repeated Party slogan: "To unite with the majority, to attack the minority, to divide the enemies and to destroy the enemies one by one." Essentially the same view is reflected in the following

In order to gain the victory in political struggle, we have to unite with all the people that can be united around us, to win over the neutrals so that they will not help the enemies, to make use of the conflicts among enemies and thus to disintegrate the enemy camp. Only in this manner can we strengthen ourselves, put the enemies in an isolated, hopeless position and concentrate our power to give the vital blows to the major enemies. After the enemies are eliminated, we can push our movement one step further. Following such fundamental principles of strategy and tactics, the Communist Party will never commit mistakes in the political struggle.<sup>23</sup>

But who are the friends to be united with? And who are the foes to be eliminated? Mao Tse-tung defined them in June 1949:

Except for the imperialists, feudalists, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen, all persons are our friends. We have a broad and consolidated revolutionary united front which is so broad that it includes the working

<sup>22</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, (Tung Pei Hsin Hua Shu Tien, 1949), p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Hu Sheng, Yu Kuang-yuan and Wang Hui-teh, "Strategy and Tactics of the Communist Party," Series No. 27 of the Lectures on the Fundamental Knowledge of Social Sciences, in *Hsüeh Hsi*, No. 1, 1952, February 10, 1952, p. 41.

class, peasant class, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, and which is so consolidated that it has the powerful will and inexhaustible capacity to vanquish all enemies and conquer all difficulties.<sup>24</sup>

### *Propaganda and the "United Front"*

This matter of "united front" is of great importance in the study of Communist propaganda, a large part of which is designed to consolidate the front. The united front, Mao writes, "is the most basic political platform of the People's Liberation Army as well as of the Chinese Communist Party."<sup>25</sup>

According to the Communists, the fundamental force of the united front is the working class, the peasantry is the "firm ally," the urban petty-bourgeoisie is a "reliable ally," and the national bourgeoisie is important only, as Mao says, "at the present stage." Without an understanding of the Communist united front, it is impossible to account for the zigzags of the Communist policy in the past 20 or 30 years and the seemingly inconsistent nature of the Communist propaganda strategy. In 1939, Mao wrote:

During the past 18 years, the united front of the Chinese proletariat with the bourgeoisie and other classes has developed under three different situations and in three stages, viz., the stage of the First Great Revolution (1925-27), the Ten Years' Civil War (1927-37) and the present Anti-Japanese War. In these three stages the following laws have been established:

- 1) Because the great oppression suffered by China is national oppression, the Chinese national bourgeoisie can, in certain periods and to a certain extent, participate in the struggle against imperialism and feudal warlords. Therefore, the proletariat should, in such periods, form a united front with the national bourgeoisie and maintain it by all means.
- 2) Yet because of the economic and political weakness of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, it will waver and desert to the enemy under certain historical circumstances, hence the content of China's revolutionary united front cannot remain constant but is subject to change. At a certain period it may include the bourgeoisie and at another it may not.
- 3) Due to its vacillation, the bourgeoisie (especially the big bourgeoisie), even when it has joined the united front with the proletariat and is engaged in struggles against the common foe, will still regard the ideological, political and organizational development of the proletariat and the proletarian political party as detrimental to it. It will try to restrict this development and use such undermining policies as deception, enticement, disruption and attacks, with which it prepares for its capitulation to the enemy and the splitting of the united front.
- 4) The firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry.
- 5) The urban petty bourgeoisie is also a reliable ally.

... Therefore, on the question of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie (especially the big bourgeoisie), the party of the proletariat must carry on a resolute and stern struggle on two fronts.

On the one hand, it must oppose the "leftist" "closed-door-ism" which ignores the fact that the bourgeoisie has certain revolutionary possibilities to a certain

<sup>24</sup>Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship and Speech at the Preparatory Meeting of the New PCC* (Peking: English Language Service, New China News Agency, 1949), p. 26.

<sup>25</sup>Mao Tse-tung, *Turning Point in China* (New York: New Century Publishers, 1948), p. 19.

extent at certain periods, and which makes no differentiation between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries. . . . On the other hand, it must oppose the view which regards the revolutionary qualities and revolutionary programme, policy, ideology and practice of the proletariat, and those of the bourgeoisie, as the same thing. It must oppose the view which ignores the differences in principle between the two and which ignores the fact that bourgeoisie is making every effort to influence not only the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry but also the proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party, thus trying hard to obliterate the latter's ideological, political and organizational independence and to turn the proletariat and the Communist Party into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its political party, and thus trying hard also to expropriate the fruits of the revolution for the cliques or factions of the bourgeoisie. It must oppose the view which ignores the fact that as soon as the revolution runs counter to the interests of bourgeois cliques or factions, the bourgeoisie betrays the revolution.<sup>26</sup>

Mao's design of the "united front" has an important bearing upon the course of the Communist propaganda. The present so-called "political struggle" in Communist China follows very closely the "laws" of the united front laid down by Mao as early as 1939. Take, for instance, the case of the bourgeoisie. When the Communists first gained control of the mainland, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie each held a place of honor in the Communist society. Communist propaganda at that time concentrated its attack on landlords and "counter-revolutionaries." The national bourgeoisie were praised for their effort to help the new regime and were assured of their being needed. Important industrialists and businessmen were offered high positions in the government; they also took the lead in the "study movement" to "change their brains." Those good days, however, did not last very long for the national bourgeoisie. Came the "Democratic Reform Movement" in mines, factories, and business enterprises, and many officials first felt the punches of the working class. Then came the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns early in 1952, and thousands upon thousands of once-praised businessmen and industrialists began their lamentable days. The campaign against the business people was perhaps one of the biggest propaganda shows ever put on by the Communists in the Party's entire history. All the mass media on the mainland were utilized to push these two campaigns.

Perhaps the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns were really necessary to put a stop to the corruption and waste in the country. At the same time, it was conceivable that the Chinese Communists had become economically desperate because of the strain of the Korean War and wanted to get as much as they could from the business people. Another reasonable guess is that the campaign was meant to whitewash the doings of the corrupt and inefficient cadres and to shift the blame to businessmen and merchants. It is perhaps much closer to the mark to say that the useful days of the national bourgeoisie were about over and that the regime was now ready to move one step closer to its ultimate goal of the class struggle. The Chinese Communists had wiped out the "landlord class," the "big bourgeoisie," and the "bureaucratic capitalist" class; they were now probably ready to eliminate the national bourgeoisie to make way for the dictatorship of "the proletariat."<sup>27</sup>

The "enemies" of the united front, as pointed out previously, are the "imperialists, feudalists, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen." According to the Communist analysis, there are actually only two major enemies: "imperialism" abroad and "feudalism" at home. Both "Kuomintang reactionaries" and "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" are held responsible for bringing in "imperialism" from abroad and for promoting "feudalism" at home.

<sup>26</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Introducing 'The Communist,'" in Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, *Lessons of the Chinese Revolution* (Bombay: People's Publishing House, Ltd.), pp. 5-6.

<sup>27</sup> For a fuller analysis of the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns, see Wen-Hui C. Chen, "Mass Movements" in *Communist China—A Study of Nation-wide Campaigns in Support of the Korean War*, Chaps. VII and VIII. Preliminary hectographed edition, Series II, No. 4, 1952, "Studies in Chinese Communism," produced under Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 through the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (Supply exhausted. To be published in re-edited form by the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center.)

There is unquestionably a spark of genius in Mao's definition of the "enemies." By opposing imperialism, Mao can ride on the tide of strong nationalism, which is an element one must never overlook in studying the dynamics of the Chinese and other Asiatic peoples as a whole. By identifying the United States with the British and Japanese brands of imperialism, which the Chinese people cannot easily forgive, Chinese Communists can manipulate their propaganda to transfer the traditional national hatred of Japan and the dislike of Britain to hatred of the United States. Moreover, by naming Chiang Kai-shek as a "running-dog of America" and by elaborating on the "aggression against Korea by America," Chinese Communists can paint a really black picture of the United States.

The attack on "feudalism" helps Chinese Communists carry out their land policies and eradicate any traditional influence they do not like. Any ideology or belief that runs counter to the Communist doctrine can easily be branded as "feudalistic."

The term "feudalism" is, of course, no invention of the Chinese Communists. It was very commonly used by the Chinese people under the Nationalists, but it was never played up as a sin or crime as it is by the Chinese Communists today. One American scholar has this to say:

Viewed scientifically, the feudal interpretation of China is absurd. Politically, however, it proved extremely useful to the Chinese Communists. It diverted the attention of their followers from the primary long-range danger of all great Asiatic societies, the danger that there would arise a new ruling bureaucracy, which, though reminiscent of traditional conditions, would be infinitely more managerial, more powerful, and more oppressive than any of its historical predecessors. Insistence on the 'feudal' quality of Chinese society permitted a maximal stress on the land problem, which in traditional China, as in many other Oriental countries, constitutes a grave, if secondary, issue. The attack on the 'feudal' landlords built up mass support for an agrarian revolution, while it discreetly hid the ultimate (bureaucratic) beneficiaries of the Communist-induced civil war.<sup>28</sup>

The Communist attack on "imperialism" and "feudalism" is synchronized with the fight against the "bureaucratic bourgeois class." Chen Po-ta describes the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" as the "big bourgeoisie" which represents the interests of "imperialism and feudalism." Chen writes:

The bureaucratic bourgeois class, on the one hand, robs the peasants and petty workers; on the other hand, it opposes national and free industry. . . . It is different from capitalist monopoly in foreign countries in nature, development, and activity. It is only a subordinate to the capitalist monopoly in foreign imperialist countries. . . . Therefore, it can also be called 'compradore capitalism.' It is a mixture of China's compradore system and feudalism, or an economic combination of big compradores and landlords.<sup>29</sup>

Another category of "foes" defined by Chinese Communists includes the "Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen." The term "reactionary" is confusing. Only the Communists are in a position to decide whether or not a person is a "reactionary." A synonym of "reactionary" is "counter-revolutionary." They both mean the people that are against the Communist revolution. Thus the Chinese Communists have a list of the "foes" of the revolution—the imperialists, feudalists, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, Kuomintang reactionaries, and their henchmen. The elimination of these foes is the goal of the Communist political struggle.

<sup>28</sup> Karl A. Wittfogel, "The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 277, September, 1951, p. 24.

<sup>29</sup> Chen Po-ta, *Chung Kuo Ssu Ta Chia Tsu (China's Four Big Families)*, quoted in Teng Ch'u-min, *Chieh Chi, Chieh Chi Tou Cheng Kai Lun, (Principles of Class and Class Struggle)* (Kweilin: Wen Hua Kung Ying She, 1950), pp. 112-3.

### *Some Principles of Communist Propaganda*

The above discussion is an attempt to get a general picture of the Communist political warfare with the united front on one side and the defined foes on the other. The discussion has an important bearing upon Communist propaganda, which is to help consolidate the united front and to win a decisive victory over the foes or enemies of the Party.

From the above discussion, a few general conclusions can be drawn with regard to the principles of Communist propaganda.

1. The working class, led by the Chinese Communist Party, is declared to be the leading force of the proletarian revolution. This means that the "class consciousness" of the working class must be raised to a higher level. In other words, workers must be educated to assume the leadership; they must not be afraid of the capitalists anymore; they are the "masters" in factories, mines, and other business enterprises; they must work harder than before because "they are now serving themselves." To make the working people accept these views is not easy and requires very thorough, intensive political indoctrination. As one pro-Communist professor remarks in an English-language magazine in Shanghai, "Some workers say [after the Thought Reform Movement] that they don't want to have the responsibilities of being the leading class!"<sup>30</sup>

The Chinese Communists seem to be cognizant of this problem. "Be the real master" is an often-stressed slogan in the Communist press and is used to urge the workers to wrest power and leadership from the bourgeoisie. Communist leaders criticize the present situation as *Tang Chia Pu Tso Chu*, which means "being masters but making no decisions." To correct this situation, the Party in August 1951 launched in the Central-South Region the so-called "Democratic Reform Movement" in factories, mines, communication enterprises, and different professional guilds in cities and the countryside. This movement, as pointed out in an official directive of the Party, "is an unavoidable historical period for the working class to change from their position of oppression to the position of real masters."<sup>31</sup> This movement will be discussed later.

2. As the "firm ally of the proletariat," the peasantry is to be taught (1) to participate actively in the revolution, and (2) to follow the leadership of the working class. A high-ranking Communist says:

We should never cease for a single second to carry out the political education among the peasants to make them have confidence in the leadership of the working class, and in the worker-peasant alliance and to make them support the Communist Party and the People's Government in all policies and programs. . . .<sup>32</sup>

This is no easy task for the Communist propagandists for several reasons. In the first place, most of the Chinese peasants are of low educational level and consequently a large-scale literary movement is required in order to facilitate the task of propaganda. Secondly, Chinese peasants are traditionally conservative in thinking and indifferent to politics. Many of them, admit the Communists, are still friendly to landlords and are reluctant to treat the latter as foes. Thirdly, to ask the peasants to follow the leadership of the working class seems to mean a change in the former Chinese Communist policy of an "agrarian revolution" with the peasantry as the main force of the revolution. The huge peasant population in China and the fact that most of the Communist leaders and cadres have a background of peasantry rather than working class make it even harder for the Chinese peasants to accept the leadership of the working class. These are some of the ideological blocks in the minds of peasants, which Communist propaganda tries to overcome. Mao Tse-tung must have had these diffi-

<sup>30</sup> Chen Ren-bing, "New China's Thought Reform Movement," *China Monthly Review*, Vol. 122, No. 2, February, 1952, p. 125.

<sup>31</sup> *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton), August 11, 1951.

<sup>32</sup> Hsi Chung-hsün, "To Struggle for the Consolidation of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought," *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily, Peking), September 9, 1951.

culties in mind when he said, "The grave problem is that of educating the peasants."<sup>33</sup> How the Communists meet this problem will be discussed in a later chapter in connection with the propaganda on land reform.

3. The urban petty bourgeoisie, which is assigned the position of "reliable ally" in the Communist united front, is a class which the Communists believe must be thoroughly re-educated. This class is accepted at the present stage of the revolution because "it has deeply suffered from the oppression of imperialism and feudalism."<sup>34</sup> The most important elements of this class are the intellectuals and students. Mao explains that this class is in a way "revolutionary," but at the same time it contains "poisonous elements" of "liberalism," "individualism," and "heroism." Mao further says that before this class is harmoniously mixed with the peasants and workers and before it is determined to serve the interests of peasants and workers, its ideologies are vague and its actions are uncertain and shaky.<sup>35</sup> In order to make the intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie useful to the Communist regime, the Communist propaganda is designed to achieve the following goals:

a. The petty bourgeoisie must be taught to understand and accept the leadership of the working class.

b. They must learn to respect labor because "labor creates the world."

c. They must realize they are being exploited and oppressed by the imperialists, feudalists, and the big bourgeoisie and must fight against these "foes."

d. The national bourgeoisie, who are accepted as friendly allies of the proletariat at the present time, must be thoroughly indoctrinated and constantly watched to make sure that they serve the interests of peasants and workers. The "national bourgeoisie," however, are in a precarious position. Mao explicitly says:

To cope with imperialist oppression, and to raise our backward economic status one step higher, China must utilize all urban and rural factors of capitalism which are beneficial and not detrimental to national economy and the people's livelihood and unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle. . . . But the national bourgeois class cannot be the leader of the revolutionary united front and also should not occupy the main position in the state. This is because the social and economic status of the national bourgeois class has determined its feebleness; it lacks foresight, lacks boldness, and in part fears the masses.<sup>36</sup>

In dealing with the bourgeoisie as a whole, Mao advocates a method which is "to unite with, as well as struggle against, the bourgeoisie." Mao explains:

Here unity means the united front; struggle means, during the time of unity, 'peaceful' and 'bloodless' ideological and organizational struggle, which will be transformed into an armed struggle when the proletariat is forced to break with the bourgeoisie. If the Party does not know how to unite at a certain period with the bourgeoisie, it will not be able to advance, and the revolution will not develop. If the Party does not know how to carry on a resolute, stern, 'peaceful' struggle against the bourgeoisie in time of unity, it will disintegrate ideologically, politically and organizationally, and the revolution will end in failure; and if the Party, when forced to break with the bourgeoisie does not carry on a resolute, stern, armed struggle against the latter, it will also disintegrate and the revolution will fail. . . .<sup>37</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Mao, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, p. 14.

<sup>34</sup> Teng Ch'u-min, *Chieh Chi, Chieh Chi Tou Cheng Kai Lun (Principles of Class and Class Struggle)* (Hong Kong: Wen Hua Kung Ying She, 1950), p. 104.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>36</sup> Mao, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, p. 17.

<sup>37</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Introducing 'The Communist,'" pp. 6-7.



## Two Strategic Principles

The above discussion is intended to point out the united front and the direction of the Communist political warfare. In doing this it also sets forth the general pattern of the Communist propaganda strategy. As some Communist writers point out "Strategy, briefly, is to decide during a special revolutionary stage what classes the proletariat must aim to unite with, to isolate, or to overthrow and what main objectives the proletariat must achieve."<sup>38</sup>

How do the Chinese Communists educate and organize the people belonging to the united front? And how do they lead these people in actual struggle against the defined enemies? The Chinese Communists offer two strategic principles which are discussed in the official *Hsüeh Hsi* magazine and frequently referred to in Communist literature.<sup>39</sup>

First, to try to attract as many people as possible into actual struggle by offering things likely to meet the most urgent needs of the masses and by using the slogans that can most easily be understood by the masses of a certain "level of [class] consciousness" at a given place and time. Take the slogan "We must protect wages," for instance. In offering this slogan, the Communists have an intention which is not easily discovered by ordinary workers. The Communist propagandists explain:

It is true that the slogan, 'We must protect wages,' cannot solve any fundamental problems in revolution. But when the workers have not yet reached a high level of class consciousness, this slogan can make the masses gradually realize their interests and to unite together for the struggle. Properly led, they may gradually reach a higher level of consciousness and understand that the protection of wages alone cannot solve their poverty and suffering and that there are things more significant than the protection of wages, i.e., to engage in the anti-capitalist struggle and to overthrow the capitalist authority. It is true that political struggle is far more fundamental than economic struggle. But in certain places and at certain times, the Party has to offer such slogans and lead the people for economic struggle. Otherwise, the Party will be separated from the masses and the masses cannot become revolutionaries.<sup>40</sup>

Second, to help, participate in actively, and lead all revolutionary movements "that can contribute to the liberation of the working class." Sometimes, the proletariat, so far as the Communist strategy is concerned, may have to join hands temporarily with the enemies, but as long as the interests of the working class are directly or indirectly served, such action will be justified. To quote the Chinese Communists themselves:

There are now large-scale, powerful peace campaigns in capitalist countries. Those participating in these campaigns represent all kinds of people, including petty bourgeoisie and even capitalist elements. Although such campaigns are not socialistic in nature, they are against imperialism, the deadly enemy of the working class. The development of such campaigns is undoubtedly helpful to the liberation of the working class. Therefore, the Communist Party must participate in and lead such peace campaigns.<sup>41</sup>

These two principles underlie all Communist propaganda operations in China. They serve as the guiding principles for all the "mass movements" launched by the Communists. Take the propaganda of the "New Marriage Law," for instance. Immediately after the law was made effective by the government on 1 May, 1950, the Communists put on an enormous propaganda campaign throughout the

<sup>38</sup>*Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking) No. 1, 1952, February 10, 1952, p. 42.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 41-2.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 42.

country to mobilize the people to support the law. Government officials were directed to give lengthy talks on the law; newspapers and magazines for two or three months were flooded with news and stories about the law; oral agitators were told to publicize the law and to see to it that the "oppressed women" really "take advantage of the new regulations." To a casual observer it might seem that the Communist regime was sincerely interested in the "emancipation" of women. Actually, there is very little difference in principle between the Communist Marriage Law and that of the Nationalist government.

But why should the Chinese Communists attach such great importance to the Marriage Law? Let us look at the matter for a moment from the propaganda angle. The law was made public at a time when the Agrarian Reform Movement was in full swing. The real purpose of the movement is elimination of the landlord class, which the Chinese Communists have believed to be the symbol of feudalism. In their fight against the landlord class and feudalism, the Chinese Communists, to use their own terminology, had to "eradicate the remains of the people's feudal ideologies" and to "raise their political consciousness to a higher level." As pointed out previously, peasants and country folks are conservative in thought and generally scoff at new ideas or drastic social changes. This problem is extremely serious, so far as women are concerned. The best way to "wake up" the women would be to start a program which apparently serves their interests. It admits of no argument that many, if not most, of the Chinese women have long been in a disadvantageous position in comparison with men and that most of the "feudal practices" charged by the Communists, such as concubinage, matrimonial arrangement by parents, child betrothals, and ill-treatment of women are still prevalent in China, especially in the country, despite the fact that the position of women in China has greatly improved since the overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty. By urging the victims of such "feudal practices" to participate in the "new liberation movement for women," the Chinese Communists manage to kill several birds with one stone. First, they have given more substance to the anti-feudalism propaganda. Second, they have found a way to arouse the traditionally conservative women into aggressive action and thus bring about a "turn-over" of classes. Third, the parental authority, which the Chinese Communists cannot tolerate, is challenged. Fourth, the Communist propagandists cleverly link up the Marriage Law with the Party's basic platform of class struggle and even with the introduction of Soviet marriage law and family system.<sup>42</sup> Fifth, the Communist propagandists could urge women to take an "active part" in economic production as a symbol of their liberation from the inequality of the past.

It seems that in most of the propaganda literature concerning the New Marriage Law the emphasis is on the condemnation of the old, feudal societal values rather than the explanation of the new law. Many of the key symbols and slogans of the Party are brought in. Take, for instance, an editorial on the law in the official *Jen Min Jih Pao*.<sup>43</sup> The editorial is entitled "To Enforce the New Democratic Marriage Law." In this 2,600-word editorial, the word "marriage" occurs 42 times. It is used 28 times in an "approved" sense or "plus" character, where it appears with the word "law" or such expressions as "freedom of marriage." It is used 10 times in an "unapproved" manner or "minus" character where it is associated with the system or values opposed by the Communists.<sup>44</sup> The word is used 4 times in a neutral sense. But the word "feudalism" alone appears 23 times. Even "imperialism" and "bureaucratic capitalism" find their way into this editorial. The symbols representing ideology opposed by the Communists in this editorial include: feudalism (23), husband authority (5), clan authority (6), authority of God (3), landlord control (2), imperialism (2), bureau-

<sup>42</sup>In the Communist propaganda literature dealing with the Marriage Law, propagandists often urge the people to "study the model examples of the Soviet Union" and propaganda favorable to the Soviet Union also finds a way to enter here.

<sup>43</sup>*Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily, Peking), April 16, 1950.

<sup>44</sup>By "plus" and "minus" the author refers to the technique used in content-analysis to classify symbols according to "direction." Harold A. Lasswell defines: "A plus presentation of a symbol puts it in a favorable light (an 'indulgence'); a minus presentation puts it in an unfavorable setting (a 'deprivation')." The criterion used here, of course, is the approval or disapproval according to the Communist standard. Hence, "marriage under the New Democracy" is plus; "feudal marriage" is minus; and "marriage relationship" is neutral. (See Harold D. Lasswell, "World Attention Survey," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, No. 3, 1941).

cratic capitalism (2), superstition (1), Kuomintang reactionaries (2), superficial concept of chastity (1), and old Chinese Society (2).<sup>45</sup> This analysis, though very superficial as it may seem, serves to indicate that the propaganda of the New Marriage Law is not merely a publicity campaign to make the law known to the people, but the regular Party line in a different setting. In a nation-wide radio speech, Shen Chün-ju, President of the Supreme People's Court, asked:

How can we guarantee that the Marriage Law be fully and correctly carried out? First, we must engage in propaganda and education among the broad masses of people to make the law understood in every family. . . . So far as the women are concerned, they must understand to break decidedly with the traditional concept of dependence, to participate actively in production, to gain economic independence, to engage in political study, to raise the political and cultural level, to learn to work and to take part in all kinds of social construction.<sup>46</sup>

Shen's remarks indeed reveal some of the Party's real political objectives in the propaganda of the Marriage Law. Among many other things the Party wants the Chinese women as well as the whole country to understand the "evils" of feudalism, to fight against "feudalistic" landlords and all "evils" associated with them, to break away from the old traditions, to replace the love of family with that of the Party, government, and country, and to participate in all tasks prescribed by the Party. All these intentions of the Party are hidden under the glittering slogan of "fighting for the liberation of women."

It must be remembered that the propaganda of the Marriage Law is only a small part of the Communist overall propaganda plan. It is hard to determine how much success the Communists have achieved in this particular phase of propaganda.\* One thing, however, is certain. If the Communist propagandists have not convinced the Chinese women with their propaganda, they have at least successfully exposed the women to the ideology and goals of the Party. The Communists have not only familiarized the women with ideas and programs wholly new to them but also made them participate in a form of "class struggle." There is no doubt that even a full realization of the Marriage Law would not solve the fundamental problems of the Communist revolution. But at a time when the land reform was in progress and feudalism was under heavy fire, especially in the countryside where "feudal" practices were still prevalent, the Communists had to offer slogans and launch programs that could best serve the interests of the people to be won over. By urging the women to participate in the class struggle under the slogan of "Emancipation of Women," the Party was able to mobilize another force against what they call feudalism.

So far as propaganda strategy is concerned, it is important to note that Chinese Communists do not follow any cut and dried policy. The Communists, in fact, are often proud to point out the high degree of flexibility in their policies. In his book, *On the Party*, Liu Shao-ch'i, Vice-chairman of the Party, writes:

The organizational forms and methods of work of the Party are determined by the Party's internal and external conditions and by its political tasks, and must be allowed a certain degree of flexibility. . . . That our Party is a creative Marxist political party is due to the fact that at no time have we tied ourselves ideologically or politically to any dead formulas, or regarded the organizational forms of our Party or any other organizational forms as hard and fast rules that cannot be altered.<sup>47</sup>

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\* After this was written, one study of the Chinese Documents Project was devoted to the family and took up the Marriage Law. See Wen-Hui Chen's *The Family Revolution in Communist China*, 1955, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.—Project Officer.

<sup>45</sup> The figures in the parentheses refer to the frequency of occurrence of the terms in the editorial.

<sup>46</sup> Shen Chün-ju, "To Guarantee the Enforcement of Our Marriage Law," Commission on Legal and Legislative Affairs of the Central People's Government (ed.), *Hun Yin Fa Chi Ch'i Yu Kuan Wen Chien (Marriage Laws and Related Documents)* (Peking: Hsin Hua Shu Tien, 1950), p. 99.

<sup>47</sup> Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), p. 5.



This is an important feature of the Chinese Communists. To overlook this point may lead to the erroneous conclusion that Chinese Communists are inconsistent in their propaganda strategy, since the Party often changes points of emphasis or shifts centers of attack at various stages and in different places. For instance, there were days when church groups in China were promised complete freedom of religion and intellectuals were guaranteed full scholastic freedom. Shortly after these offers, churches began to feel the tight control of the government, and college professors were asked to "reform their mind." In all propaganda campaigns, however, the most important key symbols and slogans of the Party remain more or less constant. Such themes as the inevitability of class struggle, the leadership of the proletariat, the ultimate victory of communism, and many others are ever-present in almost all propaganda maneuvers in China.<sup>48</sup>

### *Communist Propaganda Tactics*

Although specific tactics are often designed by local propaganda authorities, general practical principles still come from the top Party leadership in Peking. Generally speaking, the Party elite in Peking assign the general propaganda tasks, select the appropriate slogans for each campaign, and recommend suitable or effective forms, approaches, and methods of propaganda.

It may be appropriate at this point to examine the general principles of the Party in leading the masses and organizing them for action. On 1 June 1943, the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee passed the "Resolutions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership."<sup>49</sup> These resolutions, though made by the Party nearly 10 years ago, are still followed by Communist cadres as guiding principles. In the handbooks for operational propagandists and other Communist literature, such resolutions are frequently referred to or quoted. To apply these resolutions to propaganda work, we can draw the following tactical principles:

1. *Combine the general slogan with actual local tasks.* In other words, general slogans decided upon by the Party must be made understandable and meaningful to the people through their own experience and work. Take, for instance, the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign. It is not enough for people simply to shout such general slogans as "hate America, condemn America and despise America," or "to oppose decidedly America's aggression in Japan." The Communist propagandists are told to make the people understand why they should hate America. Local residents are urged to relate their grievances against America. They are also urged to show what they can actually do to "oppose America's aggression," and this generally means increase of economic production, improvement of work, or donation of money to buy airplanes and artillery.

2. *Always test the use of slogans in a small locality before they are nationally applied.* When a new propaganda campaign is designed, it is first tested out in a city or province and the experience is used for future grievance. Take, for instance, the establishment of the propaganda networks. The project was first tried in the Northeast Region before it was introduced into other parts of the country.<sup>50</sup>

3. *Make use of "activists."* This technique is referred to by the Chinese Communists as *chia cheng ken tzu*, which literally means "to lay firmly the foundation." That is, before carrying out any campaign or "mass movement" an effort is made to discover "activists" or "aggressive elements" and make them agitate or stimulate the moderate and backward elements in the locality. This technique is used in all accusation meetings, confession meetings, and the recent three-anti and five-anti campaigns. Take the land reform propaganda, for instance. Before certain landlords are accused in an open meeting, propagandists have already planted a few people in the audience to start the accusation.

<sup>48</sup>This at least can be considered as a hypothesis to be verified in a later stage of content-analysis.

<sup>49</sup>See Appendix A for a resume of the resolutions.

<sup>50</sup>Frederick T. C. Yu, *The Propaganda Machine in Communist China*. Preliminary hectographed edition, Series I, No. 3, 1951, "Studies in Chinese Communism," produced under Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 through the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (Supply exhausted. To be published in re-edited form by the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center.)

4. *Make the ideas of the Party sound as if they were ideas of the people.* This may be too cynical an interpretation of what the Communists have often said that "their policies must come from the masses and go to the masses." It is much closer to the mark to say that the Communists always try to transform the feeling or sentiment of the masses into an idea which, on the one hand, seemingly represents what the people want, but on the other, expresses what the Party actually intends. A good illustration is again the propaganda of the New Marriage Law. There are, undoubtedly, women in the countryside grumbling over inequalities with men and suffering from injustice. Such sentiments are "concentrated," to use the Communist terminology, and then "systematized." Then the slogan "to emancipate all women" is offered as an answer to these sentiments. Using this slogan, the Party then tries to carry out its real intentions such as the ones discussed previously.

5. *Cadres must thoroughly understand the principles concerning the relationship between leadership and the masses.*

6. *Carry out one major propaganda campaign at a time.* In other words, emphasize only one major campaign at one time. This principle seems to have been strictly followed by the Communist propagandists if one takes a look at the Communist propaganda record since the establishment of the Peking regime. At the very beginning, there was the nation-wide *hsüeh hsi* or "study" movement. Next came the propaganda of the land reform. Following this in order were such major campaigns as Resist-America Aid-Korea, "world peace," "suppression of counter-revolutionaries," "increase production and austerity," "donation for buying airplanes and artillery," and more recently the three-anti and five-anti campaigns.

In a discussion of the Party's tactics in revolution a group of Communists write:

It is always important to grasp every opportunity which can push our revolution one step further. Always give full support to complete one central task, mobilize the broad masses and attract them to the general slogan at the time. We must know that revolution is a mass movement, and that actions of the masses must concentrate only on one or at most a few definite and clearly-expressed objectives. . . . After one central task is completed, replace it with another central task. Substitute one general slogan for another new slogan. This is the forward-going law of revolution. It is also the law of gradually elevating mass consciousness and organizational ability.<sup>51</sup>

A very important tactical principle in propaganda not clearly brought out in the above discussion is the importance of investigation or research in the Communist propaganda. It is Mao's formula: "Investigation first, propaganda next." To investigate, according to the Communist interpretation, is to become familiar with the conditions of enemies and allies. All propagandists are urged to spend considerable time in "studying the objective situation," before actually carrying out any plan of "struggle." Mao is so convinced of the importance of investigation in propaganda that he once said: "Without investigation no comrade has the right to speak."<sup>52</sup> Continues Mao:

. . . Take our propaganda work for instance. If we do not understand the real propaganda situation of the enemy, allies, and ourselves, we cannot correctly determine our propaganda plan. In all tasks of every department we should first have an understanding of the existing conditions so that we can do our work well.<sup>53</sup>

Take the propaganda of land reform, for instance. In most cases the propagandists or members of the land reform work teams are well equipped with information about the leaders, the "activists," and the general situation of the community where they are to work. After arriving at the place, they

<sup>51</sup> *Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking), February 10, 1952, p. 44.

<sup>52</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "The Reform of Learning," *Cheng Feng Wen Hsien* (Documents of the Party's Ideological Remoulding Movement), op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 51-2.

immediately start the first step in propaganda — publicity of the program. This is done by speeches, meetings, study groups, publication of reading materials, and other so-called “cultural” activities. In the meantime, the propagandists begin to dig out facts about the landlords to be eliminated, the crimes these “reactionary” elements have supposedly committed, the enemies they have made, their personal relations, temperaments, hobbies, etc. They also round up the so-called “activists” or “aggressive elements,” who are to be used later in accusation meetings against the designated enemies. Sometimes propagandists even move into the homes of poor peasants to try to bring out their grievance or hatred against the landlords to be accused.<sup>54</sup> After all the necessary information is gathered and the “allies” are consolidated, the propagandists begin to arrange details for the actual “struggle.”

#### *“To Transform Grievance into Power” — An Important Formula*

A discussion of the Communist tactical principles would not be complete without reference to the psychology of hatred or grievance. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole course of Communist propaganda is based upon the manipulation of this psychological element.

“To transform grievance into power” has now become a working formula for all Communist propagandists. This approach to explore the people’s grievances and turn them into a driving force is used by all the Communist committees, propaganda corps, study groups, neighborhood clubs, army units, and all organizations designed to indoctrinate the masses.

As an illustration of the use of grievance in Communist propaganda, let us read a story narrated by an oral propagandist, who is constantly at work among people in their homes, quarters, and daily activities, and seizes every opportunity to carry on propaganda, even at meal time. The following story appears in a book specially compiled for the use of oral propagandists:

#### *Eating Noodles*

. . . On a Saturday we had noodles. . . . At noon time all workmen came to the mess hall. While paying for his meal, one worker said in great delight: ‘We have noodles to eat.’

I [the propagandist] immediately added: ‘That’s right. Yesterday we had bread, today we have noodles. . . . We are no longer in the days of the Japanese occupation, when we had *hsiang-tze-mien* day in and day out.’<sup>55</sup>

Because I mentioned this, all the people around me began to remember the days in the past. Who had not suffered? Who wanted to live again the life of those days? Then I [the propagandist] said:

‘Now there are still people who will not let us eat this [noodles]!’

‘Who?’ people asked, before I had finished my sentence.

‘Who? The American devils!’ I answered, and then continued:

‘The American devils started the war of aggression in Korea because they wanted to invade China. Unless we eliminate all the American devils, we shall have no good days in the future. In order to drive away the American devils, we have to speed up

<sup>54</sup> One woman propagandist spends several days aboard the boat of a fisherman’s widow in order to bring out the latter’s grievance against landlords, the Kuomintang, and despotism. See *Nan Fang Jih Pao*, (Canton), March 3, 1952.

Another woman propagandist moves into the home of a poor peasant woman and successfully “educates” the latter to be an “aggressive element” in accusation meetings against landlords. See *Nan Fang Jih Pao*, (Canton), February 14, 1952.

These illustrations are all referred to by the Communists as “model examples” for the propagandists to follow. Such stories receive prominent treatment in the Communist press and are frequently referred to in the handbook for propagandists.

<sup>55</sup> “*Hsiang-tze-mien*” is a kind of food of the poor people during years of famine or war. It is made of chestnut oak.



our production and support the front! Every additional truck we produce means additional strength for resisting America and aiding Korea!’

All workmen, after hearing this were excited and expressed their decision to work harder in production and to consolidate national defense.<sup>56</sup>

It goes without saying that there are few completely contented human beings in the world and that there are fewer such people in China. Social injustice, economic misery, and outworn traditions are sufficient to produce, with or without outside instigation, recalcitrant feelings among the people in a country like China. When given a proper outlet, these suppressed feelings can generate a tremendous power, although they often lead to disastrous or terrifying results.

The Chinese Communists today have made considerable gains by the manipulation of this power. In fact, they depend upon this psychological element of grievance or hatred to make the common people realize that they are an oppressed or exploited class and to prepare them to fight the class war. The accusation meetings or “grievance-telling meetings” are often referred to by the Chinese Communists as the “self-education in class consciousness” and the “best, living education to ideologically distinguish between enemies, allies, and ourselves.”<sup>57</sup> Fu Cheng-sheng, the Party’s propaganda chief in the Northeast, writes:

The reason that the accusation meeting is an effective method of educating the masses is because it educates and mobilizes the masses by their own experiences, sufferings and interests. . . . Through the accusation meeting, the masses are able to concentrate their old and new hatreds, to unite their today with tomorrow, to connect their individual interests with the interests of the country, and to understand the greatness of People’s China and the preciousness of the new life. They can therefore increase their love of the fatherland, develop their selfless spirit of sacrifice, oppose decidedly the aggression of the American imperialists, and struggle for the defense of the country. Therefore, accusation meetings can educate the masses most deeply and definitely; they can also mobilize the masses most powerfully.<sup>58</sup>

Designed to manipulate the mass sentiment to the favor of the Party, all accusation meetings are dextrously controlled and staged with precise coordination. The Chinese Communists generally follow two main principles in exploring the people’s grievances: (1) to transform personal hatred into public or mass hatred, and (2) to transform individual hatred to class hatred. The operational pattern of the accusation meetings is indeed very simple. Everyone in the group is asked first to tell about his life, family, and work. While a person is doing the story-telling, the propagandist or cadre is careful to note the highlights of each person’s grudges and grievances. Comes the accusation or complaint meeting and the “aggressive elements” or “activists,” already carefully briefed by the propagandists, start to “pour out their bitterness.” In the meantime, the propagandist or cadre begins to “dig out the root of bitterness” of the people in his group. This is to convince the people that their suffering is not because of fate, but because of the Kuomintang reactionaries, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the landlords, the secret agents of Chiang Kai-shek, feudalism and, most important of all, American imperialism. The propagandist knows exactly when to demonstrate his own anger and contempt to suit the mood of the crowd. He may shed tears when a peasant tells of his daughter raped by a landlord; he may shout for revenge when a workman reports his brother’s death at the hands of the Kuomintang police. After a few such meetings the propagandist usually succeeds in getting the group to shout for revenge against the exploiters and thus in creating a state of mass hysteria. When this stage is achieved, the mass movement is pushed one step further: actual attack

<sup>56</sup> Editorial Department of the People’s Publishing Co. (ed.), *Tsen Yang Tso Hsüan Ch’uan Yüan (How to be a Propagandist)* (Peking: Jen Min Ch’u Pan She, 1951), p. 11.

<sup>57</sup> *Ch’ang Chiang Jih Pao (Yangtze Daily, Hankow)*, July 14, 1951.

<sup>58</sup> Fu Cheng-sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

on the enemies. In land reform, this means the open trial of landlords; in factories and mines, this means the punishment of undesirable foremen or officials; and in schools, this calls for demonstration or parades. In later chapters the specific methods or techniques used in the accusation meetings will be examined.

The accusation or complaint meeting is, of course, only one instance in which the psychological element of grievance or hatred is clearly manipulated. As a matter of fact, this psychological element is present in almost every phase of Communist propaganda. Since the Communist revolution is interpreted basically as a class struggle, the Communists play up the inequalities between classes in order to make the masses realize that they are an oppressed class and should fight against the exploiting classes represented by "feudalism" and "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" at home and "American imperialism" abroad.

### *General Operational Pattern of Communist Propaganda*

In order to understand the procedure in Communist propaganda, an attempt is made here to study how a mass movement is carried out from its beginning to the end. It is true, of course, that tactics of the Chinese Communists vary in different movements and that no cut and dried formula is followed. A study of the articles in the propaganda handbooks and the Party newspapers and magazines reveals that Chinese Communists have seemingly followed a general operational pattern in their propaganda. This pattern has at least been followed in the Party's major campaigns such as land reform, suppression of "counter-revolutionaries," Resist-America Aid-Korea, production-increase and austerity, and the recent three-anti and five-anti campaigns.

Generally, there are four stages in a campaign. The first stage is attention-attraction; the second stage is ideological preparation; the third stage is action-taking; and the fourth stage is a review of the campaign. Briefly stated, the operational pattern of Chinese propaganda is as follows:

#### *Stage I: Attention Attraction*

1. The main objective to be achieved in this stage is to get the people acquainted with the campaign. In other words, people mobilized for the campaign must understand the basic issues involved, the necessity of carrying out the campaign, the enemies to be eliminated, the friends or allies to be won over, and the outcome or gains to be expected from the campaign.
2. The general principle to be followed by all propagandists in this stage is to carry out the campaign "with fanfare," which literally means "in the open, with banners and drums."
3. Methods:
  - a. Responsible local authorities go out to speak to the masses. In the areas where the system of "reporters"<sup>59</sup> is established, periodical lectures are given to huge audiences. Local propagandists or cadres "mobilize" the people to attend meetings to hear such lectures.
  - b. All local propagandists are required to make clear the policies of the government and Party to the people in their "surroundings"—homes and villages, quarters and factories. In most cases, propagandists choose their own methods, which range from casual conversation to serious group discussions or lectures. It is not unusual for propagandists to call on people in their homes to indoctrinate them.
  - c. All mass media, including newspapers, radio, pamphlets, posters, comic strips, "blackboard bulletins,"<sup>60</sup> "wall papers,"<sup>61</sup> plays, operas, movies, vaudeville, and magic-lantern shows are used to focus attention on the campaign.

<sup>59</sup>For a discussion of the system of "reporters," see Frederick T. C. Yu, *The Propaganda Machine in Communist China*, pp. 61-64. Preliminary hectographed edition, Series I, No. 3, 1951, "Studies in Chinese Communism," produced under Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 through the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (Supply exhausted. To be published in re-edited form by the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center.)

<sup>60</sup>"Blackboard bulletin" is a kind of information bulletin hand-copied on blackboard.

<sup>61</sup>"Wall paper" is a hand-copied newspaper posted on walls.

- d. Local "activists" are discovered who are in turn used to serve as a bridge between the Party and the masses.
  - e. People are sought who can be identified as victims of the "enemies" to be eliminated in the campaign and used as "living examples." This is generally considered the most important propaganda method and approach because it makes the propaganda not only understandable but also real to the broad masses. This is in keeping with the Party's tactical principle to "combine the general and the particular."
4. Content of Propaganda:
- a. To understand the enemies: To expose thoroughly the "crimes," "tricks," and "evil intentions" of the defined enemies. In other words, try to paint as black a picture as possible of the "enemies" or the classes to be eliminated.
  - b. To understand the "source of sufferings": To emphasize that all sufferings of the masses today are due to the "crimes" of the "enemies" and that no compromise can be made with the "enemies" except to eliminate them.
  - c. To understand the Party and government: This is to convince the masses that the Party and government always stand behind the masses in whatever they do in the struggle against the "enemies." The main themes in this connection are praise of Mao Tse-tung and Communist leaders, glorification of the Party's victory over the Kuomintang regime, and promise of a bright, hopeful future.
  - d. To understand the current conditions: This part is what the Chinese Communists call the "propaganda of current affairs," which is an interpretation of the major international, national, and local affairs according to the Party's viewpoint. It ties in the campaign being carried on with all the Party's policies as well as with other "campaigns."

### *Stage II: Ideological Preparation*

After sufficient publicity is given a campaign launched by the Party or government, propagandists immediately move on to the second stage: to mobilize the masses to actually participate in the campaign. The Chinese Communists are shrewd enough to try to see to it that what ought to be known to the people IS known and what should be felt by the people IS felt. They do not believe that it is enough simply for the masses to know about the campaign but insist that the masses should take part in the campaign and thus gain actual "fighting experience" from the struggle.

Three steps are involved in this stage:

1. Study of Policies: This means the study of the directives, announcements, important speeches, or editorials of newspapers with regard to the campaign being carried out. The study is done in study groups, newspaper reading groups, production teams, or whatever group that is designed for the purpose of indoctrination. Propagandists who lead such study are armed with directives from higher authorities and with reference materials, such as handbooks for propagandists. Individuals are asked not only to read the assigned readings but also to discuss them.
2. Thought-revealing: This is the point where the masses actually start the so-called "internal mental struggle." The expression of the word "revealing" in Chinese is *ch'i fah*. Actually these two Chinese characters mean more than just to reveal; they mean "to draw out"; they convey the sense of enticement, of seduction. An inflexible rule in this step is to have everyone talk. This is to expose the mental processes of all participants and, psychologically speaking, talking helps one indoctrinate himself. It remains for the propagandists or the political workers to give a "correct interpretation" of the ideologies existing in the minds of the masses. In more exact terms, it is the propagandists who make the people understand *why*, *whom* and *how* they should fight.
3. Grievance-telling: This is to intensify hatred of the people against the "enemies" (either persons or systems) defined by the Party, and to transform the hatred into a fighting force. The methods used in this connection are generally as follows:

- a. "From far to near": This means to attack first the things in the past and then the happenings at present. Take the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign, for instance. The grievance-telling meetings can be started by condemning the atrocities of the Japanese during World War II; the suffering of the people because of the corruption and inefficiency of the Nationalist government; the "crimes" of the American soldiers in China during wartime, such as the much-publicized raping of a college girl by American GI's and traffic accident deaths caused by American jeeps; the present "aggression" of the American imperialists in Korea; the discrimination against Negroes in America, and other stories of this nature. While such "grievances" are poured out, the propagandists skillfully identify the Nationalist government as the "running-dog" of the American imperialists, compare the atrocities of the Japanese with the "crimes of the Americans," and finally trace all the evils in China today to the Nationalist government, which is charged with representing landlords, secret agents, murderers, exploiters, feudalists, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and militarists, and the United States, accused of representing imperialism and aggression.
- b. "From few to many": This means to have a few persons do the accusation to whip up the hatred of the group until everyone rises to "pour out his grievances." The Communists' slogans are: "Spit out all your bitter water," and "Scoop out all bitter roots." The ones who initiate the accusation process are mostly the "activists" or the "aggressive elements" who are already trained.

### *Stage III: Action-Taking*

This is generally the climax of the "mass movement." When hatred of the masses reaches its height and a state of mass hysteria is created, actual struggle or action begins to take place. In land reform or the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries," the people are asked to inform on the guilty landlords or the "wicked Kuomintang agents," many of whom are often shot or executed on the spot. Public trials are also held "as an answer to the request and demand of the people." In the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign, actions taken consist of protests against America's aggression, demonstration parades, pledging of more donations to buy airplanes or artillery, increasing of production, or whatever other action that is desired by the Party. In the three-anti and five-anti campaigns, employees are asked to "settle with" the employers, clerks are urged to inform on the "treacherous merchants," and children are encouraged to expose the "crimes" of their parents.

### *Stage IV: Review of the Struggle*

There are four major tasks at the closing stage of a campaign.

1. To study possible remaining "enemies,"
2. To study the level of "political consciousness" achieved by the masses,
3. To study the strength of the masses in carrying out the campaign, and
4. To study the appropriateness or correctness of the policies concerning the campaign.

This stage generally starts shortly after the people engage in actual struggle in a campaign. Newspapers and magazines begin to publish reports of the experiences gained elsewhere and recommend the use of such experiences in other areas. Such information is also made available in the handbooks or other publications specially prepared for propagandists.

By a thorough review of the struggle, the Party attempts: (1) to see how much success it has gained, (2) to discover its failures and the reasons for them, (3) to appraise the sentiment of the masses, and (4) to use the experience as a basis for forthcoming propaganda plans. One very important by-product of every campaign, as emphasized by most Communist propagandists, is the discovery of new "activists" whom the Party may call upon for service.

The above discussion, of course, gives only the general operational pattern of the Communist propaganda. In the following chapters the Communist propaganda strategy and tactics applied in different campaigns will be discussed in more definite terms.

THE HSUEH HSI (OR STUDY) MOVEMENT

Immediately after the Chinese Communists established the new regime in 1949, they launched a nation-wide *hsüeh hsi* or "study" movement which has become the Party's most important means of indoctrination. Everyone in China has to "learn" or "study." In Peking all government workers spend an hour and a half every morning in "study."<sup>62</sup> One of China's best hospitals, the Peking Medical College Hospital, has to close its out-patient department on Friday afternoons "in order to strengthen political study."<sup>63</sup> Factory workers have to "take advantage of the off-hours" to "study"; students have to "study" in addition to doing their regular studies; and even illiterate peasants have to go to "winter schools" or other indoctrination classes to "study." White-haired college professors, too, have "to study from the beginning" under the guidance of Party members.

*What is Hsüeh Hsi?*

The word *hsüeh hsi* has a meaning entirely different from what it used to mean in China or anywhere else. It no longer means learning or study in general. In Communist China today it means mainly one thing: to study Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought. Marxism-Leninism, according to Liu Shao-ch'i, "is the only correct ideological weapon to guide our Party and the Chinese people in uniting ourselves and triumphing over the enemy," and Mao's Thought is "the highest expression of the intellect and the highest theoretical attainment of the Chinese people."<sup>64</sup>

An official definition of *hsüeh hsi* is given by Ai Ssu-ch'i, who says, "To study is to correspond one's subjective thoughts to objective facts or, briefly, to integrate one's ideas with reality." Actually, *hsüeh hsi* means to "reform" the mind of man. This process of "mind-reform" is often referred to as "political education" or "liberation of thought." A succinct expression is "brain-washing" or "brain-cleaning." The people are urged to "study," to eradicate all "reactionary" and "feudal" ideologies, to "hate, despise and condemn imperialist America," "to appreciate, follow and love Russia," to cooperate and help in whatever task is assigned by the government, and, above all, to accept as truth Marxism-Leninism and Mao's ideology.

<sup>62</sup>The Central People's Government announced a daily working and "study" schedule for all government offices in Peking, effective April 5, 1952:

Season	Month	"Study" hours	Working hours
Spring	3,4,5.	7:00 - 8:30 a.m.	8:30 - 12:00 1:30 - 6:00
Summer	6,7,8.	6:30 - 8:00	8:00 - 12:00 2:30 - 6:30
Autumn	9,10,11.	7:00 - 8:30	8:30 - 12:00 1:30 - 6:00
Winter	12,1,2.	7:30 - 8:30	8:30 - 12:00 1:00 - 5:30

*Ta Kung Pao* (daily newspaper in Hong Kong), April 15, 1952.

<sup>63</sup>A formal announcement of the hospital published in the *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), November 26, 1951.

<sup>64</sup>Liu Shao-ch'i, "Address on 30th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China," *The Communist Party, Leader of the Chinese Revolution* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951), p. 4.

<sup>65</sup>Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party*, p. 34.

<sup>66</sup>Ai Ssu-ch'i, "The Question of Study," *Ta Kung Pao* (daily newspaper in Shanghai), April 2, 1950.



Regardless of the Communist interpretation of *hsueh hsi*, to study or learn is to gain or increase knowledge. The question here is what knowledge do Chinese Communists want the people to acquire. It is important to note that Chinese Communists have a very different conception of knowledge. Asks Mao:

What is knowledge? From ancient days down to the present time, there have only been two kinds of knowledge: one kind is knowledge of the struggle in production; the other is knowledge of the class struggle, including the knowledge of national struggle. Is there any other type of knowledge? No. Natural science and social science are simply the crystallization of these two kinds of knowledge. Philosophy is then a generalization and summary of natural and social sciences. Besides these, there is no other kind of knowledge.<sup>67</sup>

Thus class struggle and production constitute the major content of the "mass study movement." In other words, the Chinese people are to "study" how to succeed in the class warfare and how to produce more or to do a better job in one's own field.

According to Ai Ssu-ch'i, there are generally four kinds of study: (1) the study of theories of social development, (2) the study of history, (3) the study of revolutionary policies, and (4) the study of work or occupation.<sup>68</sup>

1. The study of the theories of social development is generally considered by Chinese Communists as the first major step in any study program. Stalin's *Dialectic Materialism and Historical Materialism* and *A Brief History of Social Development* edited by the Chieh Fang She (a company publishing important political readings for cadres) are designated by Ai Ssu-ch'i as the basic reading materials.<sup>69</sup> Three fundamental theories are emphasized in the study of social development, namely: (a) the theory that labor creates the world, (b) theories of class struggle, and (c) Marxist theory of state.

The main objective in this part of "study" is to establish the "viewpoint of labor" and the "viewpoint of class" in the minds of the masses. It is to elevate the working class and peasants, generally of low social standing in China, to a level of respect. This theoretical study is to eradicate such ideas as "God creates the world," or "wisdom creates the world," a belief reflecting the claim of the intellectuals to a favored position in society.

2. In the study of history the emphasis is placed on China's modern history after the Opium War in 1839. An authoritative book used in this part of the study is Fan Wen-lan's *Chinese Modern History*, which is written from the Communist viewpoint. The Chinese Communists have taken great pains to show that all history is the story of class struggle. They have rewritten Chinese history in this light; rebels heretofore held in disrepute are now hailed as "people's heroes in revolution" while many respected historical figures are now condemned as "reactionaries" or "tools of feudalism."

3. The study of the so-called revolutionary policies covers a vast field. Almost every important government directive or law is studied. In the early stage of the *hsueh hsi* movement, such documents as the *Organic Law of the Central People's Government*, *Common Program*, *Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party*, and many others were to be thoroughly studied. Important speeches by government officials, editorials of the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*, and decisions of the government on various matters all constitute study material.

4. The study of work or occupation, according to the Communists, means "to learn whatever you do." This does not mean that one simply has to improve himself occupationally or technically. The political flavor is still heavy here. Ai Ssu-ch'i says: "Our techniques cannot be separated from politics; we must all obey the politics of the New Democracy." He further explains that many technical people still have the sense of dependency upon the techniques of "imperialist" countries, and that they do not know how

<sup>67</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Reform in Learning, the Party, and Literature" in *Cheng Feng Wen Hsien (Documents of the Party's Ideological Remoulding Movement)*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>68</sup> Ai Ssu-ch'i, "The Question of Study," (part II), *Ta Kung Pao* (daily newspaper in Shanghai), April 9, 1950.

<sup>69</sup> Loc. cit.



to solve their problems independently.<sup>70</sup> American-educated engineers have been ridiculed for thinking in terms of American technological methods and materials. An important method of learning in this field is to become familiar with the experience of "model workers." When Ch'u Yao-i, a cotton planter, was hailed as a "labor model" for his record-breaking amount of cotton planting, all cotton planters in the country were told to study Ch'u's methods and try to surpass the mark reached by the cotton hero. Moreover, all people were urged to be "creative" in thinking out methods to improve the quality of their work and to increase production. For instance, journalists in Peking initiated a campaign to eliminate errors in the press.<sup>71</sup> This was supposed to be an outcome of the study of work.

It must be pointed out here that the four kinds of study discussed above are designed for people who can read and write, and especially for the intelligentsia. Another very important kind of "study" is the so-called "cultural study" for peasants, workers, and soldiers. The term "cultural study" is misleading because it is actually a literacy campaign. The use of the word "culture" instead of "literacy" is typical of the Chinese Communists' love of playing on words and of using double-talk in their propaganda. It must also be noted that the Chinese Communists are interested in more than just teaching the illiterates how to read and write, because Vice-Minister of Education Chien Chun-jui explicitly states that literacy and political classes are coordinated with actual struggles and work of the masses.<sup>72</sup>

Even "accusation" or "grievance-telling" has a part in "cultural study." A typical story used to agitate the peasants as well as workers and soldiers to engage in "cultural studies" is as follows:

The loan terms seemed satisfactory, so peasant Wang Teh-tsai picked up the brush pen and drew a big cross on the contract. One year later, the landlord creditor came to Wang and demanded that he move away from his house. 'The contract provides that you'll give me back the money in one year, or you'll hand over the house to me in repayment,' said the usurer. 'Wasn't it a two-year term? Didn't you tell me and my wife . . .' the bewildered peasant argued. 'It's written on the contract,' the landlord cut in sharply. And the Wang family was evicted.

Peasant Wang related his story at a village meeting held to recall the past sufferings due to illiteracy. Then Wang added: 'Comrades, you know I am illiterate. Although I had eyes, I was cheated just like a blind man. Now I am going to open my eyes. I am determined to learn to read and write.'<sup>73</sup>

The Chinese Communists never miss a single chance to attack "feudalism" and "imperialism," which are often cited as the "root of mass illiteracy." One can readily see that "cultural study" provides an outlet for the Party to disseminate its ideology, besides enabling the illiterates to "open their eyes" so that they can later read what the Party has prepared for them.

A detailed discussion of how "cultural study" is carried out for peasants, workers, and soldiers would have to be several times the length of this paper. Suffice it to say that "cultural study" is the first requirement of the Communist regime in its indoctrination program of peasants and workers, the leading classes of the society. Chien Chun-jui writes: "Our people's education is first for workers, peasants and soldiers, second for the petty bourgeoisie, and third for the patriotic and democratic circles."<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>71</sup> *Ta Kung Pao* (pro-Communist daily newspaper in Hong Kong), December 8, 1951.

<sup>72</sup> Chien Chun-jui, "The Policy of Educational Construction in Present Day China," *Culture and Education in New China*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, undated), pp. 27-8.

<sup>73</sup> "The Blind Open Their Eyes," *People's China* (English-language magazine, Peking), Vol. I, No. 8, April 16, 1950, p. 22.

<sup>74</sup> Chien Chun-jui, "To Study and Carry Out Chairman Mao's Educational Thoughts," Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs, Kwangtung Provincial People's Government (ed.), *Ai Kuo Chu I Chiao Yu Ts'an K'ao Tzu Liao* (Reference Materials of Patriotic Education), (Canton: Hua Nan Jen Min Ch'u Pan She, 1951), p. 76.

### *Study of Current Affairs*

This is a study which is now required of all people in Communist China. It is closely integrated with the studies of theories, of history, of policies, and of work. Even illiterate workers, peasants, and soldiers engaged in "cultural study" have to study current affairs through radio-listening, newspaper-reading groups, films or other means in which illiteracy is not a handicap.

The Communists believe that the study of current affairs is the best approach to enable the masses to get a realistic understanding of Marxism-Leninism, to keep in touch with the policies of the government and Party, and to participate in political, economic, and cultural construction. Chen Han-po, vice-president of the Peking Journalism School and chairman of the Journalists' Training Institute of the Hsin Hua News Agency, explains the objective of the study of current affairs as follows:

Class struggle takes many forms. There are military forms, economic forms, political forms, and cultural forms. The whole picture of class struggle in society is obtained by piecing together all these forms of struggle. To understand the various forms of class struggle at present is to know the direction of class struggle, to be firm in standpoint, to participate in the struggle, and to fight for the success and victory that are beneficial to people. This is our objective in the study of current affairs.<sup>75</sup>

Current affairs or news, as interpreted by the Chinese Communists, are mainly of two kinds: those concerning class struggle and those concerning struggle in production.<sup>76</sup> This interpretation is in tune with Mao's idea, as pointed out previously, that class struggle and struggle in production are the only two kinds of knowledge in the world. Thus a large part of the study of cultural affairs concerns the experiences of production in different parts of China. The Communists' emphasis on such experiences is mainly to establish "the standpoint of labor" in the minds of the Chinese people. As Chen Han-po points out:

. . . Many people have not yet established the standpoint of labor. They do not understand that labor creates the world; they do not understand that the history of social development is the history of productive power and changes in production. Therefore, they do not understand the news concerning struggle in production and have no interest in such news.

Furthermore, many people have not yet established the standpoint of class. . . . They do not sympathize with laborers; on the contrary, they look down on laborers. . . .

The intellectuals are strangers to the news concerning struggle in production. This is mainly because they have not yet established the standpoint of labor and class.<sup>77</sup>

A very important function of the study of current affairs is to acquaint the masses with the situation of class struggle on an international scale. To be brief, this is to make the people hate America and love Russia. This has become a major objective of the mass study movement since the Korean War.

The major contents of international news at present are: (1) to propagate the growth of the power or strength of the democratic countries in the world headed by the Soviet Union, the various kinds of construction and experiences in these countries, the Soviet foreign policy and its contribution to peace, and the struggle in these countries against American imperialism and its running dogs; (2) to expose and attack the plans of aggression and war plots of the reactionary camp headed by the American imperialists and to propagate their inward weakness behind the bold front and their eventual destruction.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>75</sup>Chen Han-po, "On Study of Current Affairs," *Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking), Vol. 1, No. 2, October, 1949, p. 35.

<sup>76</sup>*Loc. cit.*

<sup>77</sup>*Loc. cit.*

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 37.

## How To Study

In conducting the "mass study movement," Chinese Communists do not follow any rigid or established rules because the differences among groups in terms of cultural, political, economic, and professional background necessitate a certain degree of flexibility. Generally speaking, however, study of the theories of Marxism-Leninism usually precedes the study of work. It seems apparent that the Party is interested first in establishing the "correct viewpoint of class" in the minds of people before it attempts to improve the work the people engage in.

Ai Ssu-ch'i points out that the first step in any study program is to realize the existence of "reactionary ideas" in one's mind. As an illustration of this point, Ai says that when the Chinese Communists first arrived at Peking they were frequently confronted with the question: "Why should the Russians occupy Port Arthur and Dairen?" Such questions are termed by Ai as "clearly anti-Soviet ideas." "Anti-Soviet ideas are reactionary ideas, because those who hate and want to destroy Russia are the imperialists and reactionaries in different countries. Those who have anti-Soviet ideas are, if not reactionaries themselves, ideologically influenced by reactionaries."<sup>79</sup> To realize the existence of such ideas in one's mind, Ai continues, is the first step in study.

Generally, *hsüeh hsi* is done in small units. There are the so-called "central or nucleus groups" and "small study groups." The former are for the responsible cadres who are familiar with Communist political theories. Under the *hsüeh hsi*, or learning, committee organized at every geographical and administrative level, the "nucleus groups" organize and direct the study of "small study groups."

In the initial stages of every study program, the "nucleus groups" carefully plan every stage of study, contents, requirements, fundamental documents to be studied, reference materials, distribution of time, methods of study, and other points of importance. They examine all problems and opinions which arise in the study and analyze and classify them according to contents and degree of urgency and importance.

Every "small study group" contains about 10 to 15 members. It is subdivided into "mutual-aid groups" with four to five people in each group. In every "mutual-aid group" a leader is elected to conduct study according to instructions from above. He is also responsible for reporting the degree of progress and the ideological state of the members in his group to the "nucleus groups."

The main forms of study in the "mutual-aid groups" are: (1) reading of assigned documents, and (2) informal discussion. Members of the group take turns in reading aloud and carefully go over every paragraph and every sentence of the assigned documents. The guiding principles for informal discussion are (1) to integrate realistic situations with the documents, and (2) if possible, to relate problems of oneself to the documents or questions under discussion. Everyone has to talk because "all erroneous ideas have to be exposed." From the Party's viewpoint, informal discussion is an important step in study because this is the stage in which one's subjective ideas are supposed to be exposed. During this same stage cadres can detect to what extent the members have actually accepted the doctrines and also discover the "activists" in the group.

Problems that are unsolved in "mutual-aid groups" are discussed again in "small study groups." When the cadres feel that members of each "small study group" are familiar with the documents required for reading or the nature of a task that is assigned, they organize a general discussion meeting attended by members of different "small study groups." In such meetings there are always a few elected speakers representing different "small study groups." It is at this stage that well-staged accusation meetings or complaint meetings are often conducted. This is especially true if the subject under study concerns "American imperialism," "Kuomintang reactionaries," or "exploitation by the reactionary classes." For instance, in the study programs concerning land reform, Resist-America and Aid-Korea, and the recent three-anti and five-anti campaigns, accusation meetings are generally considered by the Communists as the most effective methods of study.

What goes on in a discussion meeting is recorded by a cadre or group leader, who has to report all details to the "nucleus groups" or local Party authorities supervising the study program. An

<sup>79</sup> Ai Ssu-ch'i, "The Question of Study."

essential part of these reports concerns the questions that remain unsolved in discussion meetings. Such reports, needless to say, describe the actual ideological state of the members of the "small study groups," and are used as a basis for the Party authorities to answer the unsolved questions.

After the unsolved problems are "clarified" by Party authorities, the "small study groups" enter the final phase of a study program. This phase is generally referred to as "study conclusions." Sometimes it is called "ideological conclusion" or "thought conclusion."

In ideological study or thought reform, this is considered the most important part. In the thought training institutions such as the North China Revolutionary University in Peking or the Nan Fang University in Canton, one's fate is to a large extent determined by his thought conclusions. He can be offered a job or approved for graduation if his conclusions are accepted; otherwise, he is recommended for further study or to "study anew."

"Thought conclusion" is not simply to put down what one has learned from the assigned readings or discussions. It is a self-confession exposing one's "erroneous ideas and crimes" in the past in the light of the Communist ideology. One Chinese writer explains: "Thought conclusion is to understand and evaluate the past and honestly present one's life history; its purpose is to use the new ideology one has learned as a weapon to seriously and systematically analyze and criticize, improve and reform himself."<sup>80</sup> In writing thought conclusion one has to pay attention to the following points: his ideologies before participating in study, how he looked at problems in the past and how he does now and why, the ideological problems that are solved in the study and those that are not solved, why they are not solved, and what he plans to do in the future.

In the official *Hsüeh Hsi* magazine, Professor Fei Hsiao-t'ung of Tsing Hua University, one of China's most famous universities, gives a very vivid, though possibly exaggerated, description of the "battle of thought conclusions" on the Tsing Hua campus.<sup>81</sup>

Before the "D-Day" (a date scheduled for the beginning of "thought conclusion"), records Professor Fei, the "headquarters of the chief-of-staff" was organized by cadres in the university, who worked day and night to make plans, schedules, and other preparations for thought conclusion. A special study bulletin was published for this purpose. As a prelude to the actual "struggle," the university invited the Party's highest authority on Marxism-Leninism, Ai Ssu-ch'i, to the campus to speak. Ai's talk, which actually touched off the ideological battle, criticized the "wrong ideologies" existing in the minds of the Tsing Hua students.

The cadres in the university, Professor Fei continues, were given special training to make them "ideologically prepared" to lead the forthcoming battle. They were organized to visit the exhibition rooms in the Revolutionary University (near Tsing Hua) to "understand the process of reforming intellectuals." In the meantime, "directives and telephone calls from the Ministry of Education flooded the University," asking the cadres to be "cautious."

Then the cadres made a final analysis of the ideological state of the students in Tsing Hua. Their analysis revealed that "about half of the students are progressive or aggressive; one-fourth are interested in progress but have too many worries and lack determination; and one-fourth are simply indifferent to politics." It was repeated that "about three or four per cent of the students resist 'ideological reform.'"

Came the "D-Day." First the members of the Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps held meetings to initiate the thought conclusion. In the afternoon of that day, relates Fei, Ai Ssu-ch'i came again to lecture on the campus. "His speech is full of fighting spirit," declares Fei. Thus the "battle of thought conclusion" formally began.

In each mutual-aid group students were asked to re-examine themselves to determine whether or not they had the following ideologies: liberalism, sadism, heroism, sentimentalism, narrow nationalism, intellectual superiority, contempt of labor, "pure technical viewpoint," concept of exploitation, etc. Students were urged first to "compare" their present ideologies with the old and to "ana-

<sup>80</sup>Liang Tang-tsin, "How to Engage in Thought Conclusion," *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), June 5, 1950, p. 5.

<sup>81</sup>Fei Hsiao-t'ung, "One Corner of the Ideological Battlefield," *Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking), Vol. II, No. 1, March 16, 1950, pp. 17-19.

lyze" whether they have ideologically progressed. If so, why? If not, why? Results of the informal discussions in the mutual-aid groups formed the preliminary part of thought conclusion. The whole campus was full of bulletins and "wall papers" reporting that certain individuals had or had not made progress in thought conclusion. Famous professors like Fung Yu-lan "contributed" articles telling of their present progress and cursing their "old, erroneous thoughts." Some Tsing Hua alumni then attending the Revolutionary University also came back to the campus to talk.

Within a few days, reports Fei, the battle reached its climax. Many students worked late after midnight to prepare their conclusions. "One student got up at midnight to start writing. Dawn came. He rode on a bicycle around the campus. Someone noticed that on his paper only the words 'Thought Conclusion' appeared. Weeping was heard from every corner of the dormitory!" Fei admittedly states that this was a very "painful process."

One student, according to Fei, was on the horns of a dilemma. He had cheated in his entrance examination and was not sure whether he should confess, because to reveal the information might have brought suspension from school. He suffered, couldn't eat nor sleep. "He cried, and cried pitifully."

"Model examples" were discovered and publicized in the group discussions. "One by one the enemies fell down," and all students began to confess.

A few days later Ai Ssu-ch'i came to speak for the third time. And Fei concludes his story by saying that the Tsing Hua students had a "small victory on the ideological battlefield."

### *The Present State of the Hsüeh Hsi Movement*

Since its beginning in 1949 the mass *hsüeh hsi* "movement" has always been closely integrated with the other campaigns such as land reform, Resist-America Aid-Korea, suppression of "counter-revolutionaries," world peace, "increase production and austerity," Marriage Law, and many others. The fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, Mao's Thought, and the important policies of the regime are, of course, always included in the curriculum of study. Since the Korean War, the study of "American imperialism" has become a major topic of study at all times. At the time when this report is prepared, the "germ warfare waged by the American imperialists" is the center of attention in the anti-America studies.

In January 1952, the Executive Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council in its 34th session passed the "Resolution Concerning the Development of the Ideological Reform Study Movement of People of all Circles."<sup>82</sup> With this resolution the "mass study movement" became a more formalized institution than before.

According to this resolution, the basic content of the study of ideological reform should consist of: (1) study of theories, i.e., the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought, (2) study of policies, i.e., the Common Program and important documents and directives of the Central government and the Great Administrative Regions, (3) ideological remoulding, i.e., the use of criticism and self-criticism "in order to correct any erroneous ideas and behaviors that are detrimental to the interests of the government, people, and revolution."

An important aspect of the resolution is the decision on "ideological remoulding" (*cheng feng*). According to the resolution, there is to be an "ideological remoulding" every year requiring about one to two months each time. During the "ideological remoulding" period regular studies are to be temporarily discontinued so that people "can concentrate on the study of related documents and on criticism and self-criticism." The content and methods of "ideological remoulding," states the resolution, are to be decided according to the actual situation.

For the "ideological remoulding" program in 1952, the PPCC\* selected "anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-bureaucracy" as the major themes of study. On January 5, 1952, the PPCC issued a

\*The (Chinese) People's Political Consultative Conference. It was the "supreme instrument of political power" from 1949 to the establishment of the "National People's Congress" in 1954. Initially patterned after the earlier PPC of the Kuomintang Nationalist government, which had some real independence, the new CPPCC has been under the firm control of the Chinese Communist Party.—Project Officer.

<sup>82</sup>*Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), January 8, 1952.



special announcement calling upon all the people, "and especially the people in business and the industries" to engage in the study of the three-anti campaign in ideological reform.<sup>83</sup> The materials to be studied include Mao Tse-tung's "On Corruption," an editorial of the *Jen Min Jih Pao*, and reports of important government officials. The methods to be used include two favorite tricks of the Chinese Communists: criticism and self-criticism.

### *Criticism and Self-criticism*

These two methods of political control deserve special attention because they play a very important role in Communist society. In principles and methods this system of criticism and self-criticism in China is no different from what is known as *kritika* and *samokritika* in the Soviet Union. There is little doubt that in introducing this system to China the rulers in Peking have followed very closely the examples of their "big brothers" in Russia. Take for instance a Chinese booklet on this very subject entitled *On Self-Criticism (Lun Tse Wo P'i P'ing)*.<sup>84</sup> It contains seven articles, of which only two are taken from Chinese newspapers. The other five are all Soviet materials. They include: Stalin, "On Self-Criticism"; Stalin, "To Oppose Vulgarizing Self-Criticism"; A. A. Zhdanov, "Concerning Criticism and Self-Criticism"; Lenin, "On Our Newspapers"; and the "Resolutions of the Eighth National Congress of the Bolsheviks Concerning the Soviet Newspapers and Publications." All these articles are considered "classic studies" on criticism and self-criticism. The only two Chinese articles are an editorial of the *Tung Pei Jih Pao* (*North East Daily*, Mukden) and an editorial of the *Ta Chung Pao* (*The Masses Daily*, Peking). All these articles are frequently quoted and referred to in the Chinese Communist literature and considered as guides for Chinese Communists. Stalin's article, "On Self-Criticism," is even included in the official *Cheng Feng Wen Hsien* (*Documents of the Party's Ideological Remoulding Movement*) and assigned as required reading for all Communist cadres.

Since the practices of Chinese Communists in criticism and self-criticism are patterned after the system in Soviet Russia which has already been formalized and elaborated into a major social institution, it is not necessary in the present study to make a detailed presentation of the methods used by Chinese Communists in this field.<sup>85</sup> Professor Alex Inkeles' comments on self-criticism in Soviet Russia may be used here to indicate the intentions of the Chinese Communists in engaging in such practices.<sup>86</sup> Inkeles writes:

... First consideration should be given to the way in which self-criticism acts as a device for releasing tension and channeling aggression in Soviet society. ... it is clear that the institution of self-criticism provides a channel for the expression of popular feelings that is not only relatively harmless to the existing social system but is actually designed and operated to support it.

The aggressive tendencies produced by the frustrations of daily life in the Soviet Union, especially those resulting from the gap between expectations and reality in the consumption of goods and the provision of comforts, could be expressed in the form of hostility toward the regime and toward the Party leadership. Whatever value judgment one might make of such expressed hostility, it must be recognized that this would be disruptive to the basic pattern of Soviet life as it now exists, and that in particular it would hinder the effective leadership of the Party.

By placing the symbol of the bureaucrat as a screen between itself and the masses, however, the Party is able to deflect much of this aggression against an object

<sup>83</sup> *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), January 8, 1952.

<sup>84</sup> *Lun Tse Wo P'i P'ing (On Self-Criticism)*, (October Publishing Co., 1950). Note: the location of the publication company is not given. The book is distributed by The Southern Bookstore in Kowloon, Hong Kong.

<sup>85</sup> For a description of the methods of "self-criticism" by the Chinese Communists, see Edward Hunter, *Brain-Washing in Red China* (New York, The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1951).

<sup>86</sup> Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 194-222.



other than itself. And it is able to do so without the necessity of undertaking to suppress or discourage all popular criticism, for it is well known that open criticism of the leaders or the Soviet regime is most harshly treated. On the contrary, the Party places itself in the role of champion of popular criticism, as the group that encourages it and holds the objects of criticism accountable for their deeds. At the same time, popular *samokritika* serves more than simply this negative function of harmlessly draining off hostile energies which might otherwise be directed against the Party leadership. It serves a positive function as well, in that it contributes to controlling the bureaucracy and helps the Party in keeping that bureaucracy on the line dictated by the nation's formal leadership.<sup>87</sup>

Professor Inkeles also mentions some of the aspects of the operation of self-criticism that may be dysfunctional for the Soviet system: (1) self-criticism has great potentialities for getting out of hand, and (2) self-criticism may have a boomerang effect on Soviet public opinion, "for it would appear likely that insofar as the Soviet citizenry is encouraged to criticize its public officials and administrators, that citizenry also develops certain expectations about the results to be obtained from this criticism."<sup>88</sup>

One might perhaps think that criticism and self-criticism can be likewise dysfunctional for the Chinese Communist system. Such possibilities, of course, cannot be completely ruled out. On the other hand, one must note that, despite the similarities in methods and theories, there is considerable difference between the present state of the system of criticism and self-criticism in Communist China and that in Soviet Russia. The system of criticism in Communist China has not yet been developed to the point that public officials or administrators are criticized, as is occasionally done in Soviet Russia in a limited sense. Criticisms in China have mostly been concentrated on the "enemies of the people" and the "reactionaries," "feudalists," "exploiters," and "imperialists" disapproved by the Party. There have been cases in which high Communist officials were criticized, as in the case of unfair treatment of a Party member in Hankow which caused the suspension of the mayor and several other Party leaders.<sup>89</sup> However, such cases are very rare.

It is fair to say that up to the present moment at least the system of criticism and self-criticism is still an effective method of thought control by Chinese Communists. First, by asking the people to expose themselves to mutual criticism or self-criticism, the Party is in a position to obtain a general picture of the ideological as well as sentimental state of the people. It is a principle of the Communist strategy and tactics, as we have noted, that the Party must not run too far ahead of or lag too far behind mass thinking. Says Liu Shao-ch'i: "We should start from the level already attained by the masses in developing their consciousness and lead them forward."<sup>90</sup> Second, in the hands of Chinese Communists, criticism and self-criticism are powerful weapons against an arch foe of the Communist society, namely, individualism, which is a traditional characteristic of Chinese people. Individualism, according to the Communists, is closely related to such ideologies as liberalism, heroism, and democracy, none of which can be approved by the Communists. Furthermore, the Chinese people by tradition have the craving for "face." They are not accustomed to exposing their mistakes or defects in public. The system of criticism and self-criticism is designed to destroy all individualistic characteristics of a human being and make him entirely subject to the social group. A pro-Communist professor in Shanghai writes: "...toleration of egoistic individualism would be tantamount to throwing a monkey wrench into the machinery," and the "New Democracy can never be expected to play foster-parent to individualism, which by this latter day has become not only rugged but terribly threadbare."<sup>91</sup> Third, by keeping the system of criticism and self-criticism under

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 217-8.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.

<sup>89</sup> *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao* (Yangtze Daily, Hankow), February 19, 1952.

<sup>90</sup> Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party*, p. 66.

<sup>91</sup> Chen Ren-bing, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

control, Chinese Communists are always able to shift blame from the Party or government to the "enemies" who are doomed to be eliminated. For instance, landlords are always blamed for difficulties in land reform; "American imperialists," Kuomintang reactionaries, and feudalists are forever responsible for all the troubles of the Chinese Communists.

### *Two Hsüeh Hsi Magazines*

In order to guide and assist the mass *hsüeh hsi* movement, the Party has published two magazines, the *Hsüeh Hsi (Study)* magazine and *Hsüeh Hsi Ch'u Chi Pan (Study Primer)*. The former is edited for the use of the intellectual and educated class; the latter is put out mainly for people of lower educational level.

The *Hsüeh Hsi* magazine first came out in September 1949 as a monthly. Six months later, it became a fortnightly. It was published simultaneously in Peking, Shanghai, Chungking, and Canton, and in 1950 the Chinese Communists claimed that it had a circulation of 300,000, "a record never before nearly approached by any periodical in China."<sup>92</sup>

*Study* magazine's triple aim is to help its readers master the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism, the problems of the Chinese Revolution, and the policies underlying all the vast constructive work that is being carried out in New Democratic China. In addition to its articles, it also advises on methods of study and publishes commentaries and specialized information to supplement the 12 books which have been prescribed by the Chinese Communist Party as "required readings" for cadres.<sup>93,94</sup>

Unfortunately, limitations of space and time do not permit an extended discussion of the distinctive features of this top policy magazine of the Chinese Communists. As a substitute for a general discussion, however, it may perhaps suffice to present in some detail the contents of a single issue of the *Hsüeh Hsi* magazine. The issue for November 16, 1951 (Vol. V, No. 2) has been selected, more or less at random.

This special issue was published shortly after the Third Session of the First Conference of the PPCC was held, at a time when the Party was starting the ideological education of intellectuals. It starts with two editorials: (1) "To Study the Documents of the Third Session of the PPCC," and (2) "To Engage in Self-reform by the Methods of Criticism and Self-criticism." Immediately following the two editorials are three reports delivered by high government officials at the PPCC meeting: (1) Premier Chou En-lai, "Political Report," (2) Chen Yun (Chairman of the Committee of Financial and Economic Affairs and Minister of Heavy Industry), "Report on Financial and Economic Tasks"; (3) Kuo Mo-jo (Chairman of Cultural and Educational Affairs and Vice-Premier), "Report on Cultural and Educational Tasks". An article by Stalin follows, "The Proletarian Class and the Proletarian Political Party," which was written in 1950. Then a Chinese writer reviews Engels' "On Housing," and he is followed by another writer discussing "the serious meaning of austerity in national construction." Li Ta, a frequent contributor to *Hsüeh Hsi*, has an article entitled "Concerning the Problem of Thought Reform of Teachers in College." A professor of the Wuhan University writes a review of Mao's "An Analysis of the Classes in the Chinese Society," and tells of his methods of criticism and self-criticism in studying Mao's "classic works." Four short comments follow the review: (1) "To Develop the

<sup>92</sup> *People's China* (Peking), Vol. II, No. 6, September 16, 1950, p. 25.

<sup>93</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> The twelve books are: *The Communist Manifesto*, by Marx and Engels; *The Ideology and Methodology of Marx and Engels*, compiled by the Liberation Press; *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, by Engels; *The State and Revolution*, by Lenin; *Left-wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder*, by Lenin; *Foundations of Leninism*, by Stalin; *Lenin and Stalin on China*, compiled by the Liberation Press; *Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, edited by the Central Committee of the CPSU; *Political Economy*, by Leontiev; *The History of the Social Development*, compiled by the Liberation Press; *Lenin and Stalin on the Socialistic Economy* (two volumes), compiled by the Liberation Press; and *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, by Lenin.

Habit of Being Brave in Criticism and Interested in Public Welfare"; (2) "To Severely Criticize Those Who Suppress Criticism"; (3) "To Pay Attention to the Struggle Against Feudalistic Ideas"; and (4) "To Engage in the Propaganda of the System of State and Power."

These short comments precede a regular feature of the magazine, a series of lectures on "Fundamental Knowledge in Social Science," contributed by three theoreticians of the Party: Hu Sheng, Yu Kuang-yuan, and Wang Hui-teh. In this issue appears Lecture No. 24 of the series, entitled "The Development and Consolidation of the Strength of Peace, Democracy and Socialism." Kuo Ponien, another regular contributor to the magazine, has a series of articles introducing Engels' *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*. Then there are two book reviews: (1) *Zhdanov's Revision of the Party Statute of the CPSU*, and (2) *False Socialism of Britain's Labor Party*, by an English writer. Then there is an article on "Criticism and Self-Criticism Among Geographers in Soviet Russia," by Chen Yuan. A column called "Short Comments on Theoretical Education," follows and it consists of two short unsigned articles: (1) "To Seriously Engage in the Policy Education Among Cadres"; and (2) "To Train Teachers for Theories in Different Ways." The experiences of the directors of the mass study movement in the Northeast area are related by Wang Peh-chuan, head of the Section of Education of Theory of the Propaganda Department of the Party's Northeast Bureau. Another article contributed by the Department of Studies of the School of Party Members of the Party's North China Bureau discusses the methods of teaching biographies of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Then there is a group of 11 short articles reporting the current situation in the field of ideological education, mostly about the methods and experiences of study in different areas in China. The issue ends with "The Editor's Mailbox," which includes three letters from readers, two of them expressing their "gratitude" for the opportunity of studying *Works of Mao Tse-tung* and one complaining that many cadres do not read newspapers.

The contents reviewed above are fairly representative of the various issues of the *Hsüeh Hsi*, which always includes important documents for study; speeches or articles by influential government officials or famous Communist writers; articles on the methods or experiences of study; reviews of classic Communist writings by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Engels, and Mao; and articles concerning orthodox Party theories. It seems that the editors of *Hsüeh Hsi* pay considerable attention to the theories of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought. A brief review of the magazine since its first issue reveals that in almost every number there are articles discussing different aspects of Marxism-Leninism and introducing important works on Russian communism. This is in contrast with the *Study Primer* (*Hsüeh Hsi Ch'u Chi Pan*), which will be discussed later.

Of significance to the mass *hsüeh hsi* movement is the recent temporary suspension of the publication of *Hsüeh Hsi*. The April 10, 1952 issue of the magazine carried an article signed by the entire editorial board, which stated:

After an initial review of previous *Hsüeh Hsi* issues, we gain a feeling that. . . there have been many articles characterized by bluffing and emptiness and lacking concrete analysis of concrete problems. . . . Some articles on the question of the bourgeoisie committed the mistake of one-sidedness. . . . The work done by *Hsüeh Hsi* magazine has great shortcomings and shows great mistakes. . . . The Editorial Board is now conducting a thorough check-up and will inform our readers of the results of the check-up. . . .<sup>95</sup>

Immediately following this statement is an announcement that the magazine will suspend publication until June.

One statement quoted above deserves some attention: "Some articles on the bourgeoisie committed the mistake of one-sidedness." This probably refers to the articles by Ai Ssu-ch'i and several others who, from the viewpoint of the Party, are still rather lenient with the bourgeoisie. In the March 16, 1952 issue of *Hsüeh Hsi*, Ai painfully criticizes himself for failing to see clearly the basic reactionary nature of the bourgeois class. Self-criticism is, of course, not uncommon in Communist China

<sup>95</sup>*Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking), April 10, 1952, p. 19.

today; but for a person like Ai Ssu-ch'i, who is generally considered as the Party's No. 1 brain-washer, to come out with a confession, should be regarded as something very significant. Ai writes:

The most important lesson one should learn in the recent three-anti campaign is: to see clearly the reactionary, corrupt and ugly nature of the bourgeois class and to seriously criticize this class with the ideologies of the working class, Marxism-Leninism, and Mao's Thought.

Many people still do not have a clear understanding of this problem. Similarly, I did not clearly see this point and made several errors in viewpoint in my article 'On the Problem of Ideological Reform' (*Hsüeh Hsi*, Vol. III, No. 7, January 1, 1951) and my other articles dealing with the ideology of the bourgeois class. It is an error to believe that the bourgeois class is in a way 'progressive' and 'aggressive,' or to say that although the bourgeois ideology is not completely good, in the revolutionary period of New Democracy, it is still partially 'progressive' and 'aggressive.' This means that in the revolutionary period of New Democracy, the ideology of the bourgeois class does not have to be thoroughly criticized by the world viewpoint of the working class and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought and that it is enough simply to use the attitude of 'reformism' to develop the partial progressiveness and aggressiveness of the bourgeois class.

This viewpoint is to deny fundamentally the decisive meaning and the unique position of leadership of the ideology of the working class, Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought in the Chinese revolutionary movement.<sup>96</sup>

Shortly after Ai wrote this article of apology, *Hsüeh Hsi*, before its two-month temporary suspension of publication, reprinted an article by Fung Ting, a Communist writer.<sup>97</sup> In reprinting this article from the *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (*Liberation Daily*, the Party's mouthpiece in Shanghai), the editors of *Hsüeh Hsi* inserted a note stating that Fung's article had the "fundamentally correct viewpoints" with regard to the bourgeois class. The major themes of Fung's article are: (1) The bourgeois class rises with bloody hands; nevertheless, it has its historical glory; (2) bourgeois classes in the capitalist world have lost their revolutionary nature and are walking on the road of the counter-revolutionaries; (3) bourgeois classes in colonial and semi-colonial countries still have certain revolutionary functions; (4) the Chinese bourgeois class vacillated and rebelled during the period of the revolutionary crisis in 1927; (5) during the period of Japanese aggression, national crises compelled the bourgeois class to work for the nation; (6) after the war was over the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie took different roads; (7) since the "liberation" the bourgeoisie have used the policy of "evil for good" against the new government; (8) to attack the "aggression" of the bourgeois class does not necessarily mean the complete elimination of the bourgeois class at present; and (9) the present three-anti and five-anti campaigns are measures to clean out the poisonous ideology of the bourgeois class that is detrimental to the development of socialism.

All this fuss may mean that the Chinese Communists are ready to take a new turn in their propaganda strategy. The period of wooing the national and petty bourgeoisie is over. Although the Chinese Communists still insist that they are not ready to eliminate the bourgeois class completely at the present time, worse days are yet to come for the bourgeoisie. The Party will never be short of excuses or reasons for eliminating this "allied" class when the day comes.

The other magazine deserving mention here is the *Hsüeh Hsi Ch'u Chi Pan* (*Study Primer*), which, as we have noted, is designed for people of a low cultural level. This magazine is under the same editorship as *Hsüeh Hsi*. It first came out in May 1951 as a fortnightly. In format it is smaller

<sup>96</sup> Ai Ssu-ch'i, "To See Clearly the Reactionary Nature of the Capitalist Ideologies," *Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking), March 16, 1952, p. 1.

<sup>97</sup> Fung Ting, "Concerning the Grasping of the Nature of China's Bourgeois Class and the Problems of Engaging in Struggle against the Erroneous Ideologies of China's Bourgeois Class," *Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking), April 10, 1952, pp. 20-27.



than *Hsüeh Hsi*, about the size of *Reader's Digest* in the United States. The average volume contains about 50 pages.

A distinctive feature of the *Study Primer* is its emphasis on the policies of the government and the Party rather than on theories of Marxism-Leninism. It seems that in emphasizing practical knowledge about the Party and government rather than a pure ideological or scholastic approach for common folks, the Chinese Communists are again following the example of their Soviet "big brothers." Professor Alex Inkeles reports that in the late 'twenties and early 'thirties in Russia, Marxist indoctrination was regarded as a value or end in itself but that Marxist schooling was later "sharply restricted in scope, limited to those whose ideological training could be viewed as promising practical returns."<sup>98</sup> "The average Party member was no longer expected to master Marxism; it was enough that he understand the Party's program and policies and work to secure their attainment," continues Inkeles.<sup>99</sup> It is true, of course, that the low educational level of cadres and common people in China makes it necessary for the Party to feed them with practical political knowledge rather than high-brow talks on Marxism-Leninism. This does not mean, however, that Marxism-Leninism is ruled out in the *Study Primer*; the fundamental Marxist-Leninist theories are still often referred to in a popularized or easy-to-understand manner. It is only true that in comparison with its parent magazine, *Hsüeh Hsi*, the *Study Primer* contains far fewer discussions of such ideologies.

#### *Ai Ssü-ch'i—Technician of the Hsüeh Hsi Movement*

A discussion of the mass *hsüeh hsi* movement in Communist China cannot be considered complete without some specific reference to its leader, Ai Ssü-ch'i, whose name has frequently appeared above. The official *People's China* in Peking has this to say about him: "He has made a tremendous contribution in popularizing the revolutionary theories through lectures, radio talks and articles. . . and is taking an outstanding part in developing, organizing and instructing this urge to study that is remoulding an entire nation."<sup>100</sup> Another source names Ai as the "only professor in the Revolutionary University of the Party's North China Bureau," where he lectures only once a week and speaks at length. "Ai spoke before a microphone, and four loudspeakers broadcast his words. The lecture was often broadcast to learning groups elsewhere."<sup>101</sup>

Until the Communist regime was established in Peking in 1949, the name of Ai Ssu-ch'i was not well known in China. Although one of the most highly authoritative theoreticians on Marxism-Leninism, Ai is not a member of the Party's Central Committee. He is a member of the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council but he holds no cabinet positions. Even today he is known only to intellectuals or educated people, especially college students. Strangely enough, his name is not even included in the *People's Year Book, 1950*<sup>102</sup> or *Who's Who in New China*,<sup>103</sup> both published by Chinese Communists.

Very little is known about Ai's personal and political life.<sup>104</sup> He was at one time a leftist writer in Shanghai and frequently contributed articles to newspapers and magazines. His articles in the *Tu Shu Sheng Huo (Intellectual Life)*, a leftist periodical in Shanghai, brought him some publicity but his name was still relatively unknown to most of the Chinese people. During the war Ai was mostly at Yen-an. There are evidences indicating that late in 1942 Ai was still studying in the Central

<sup>98</sup> Alex Inkeles, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-3.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>100</sup> *People's China*, (Peking), Vol. II, No. 6, September 16, 1950, p. 25.

<sup>101</sup> Edward Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>102</sup> Sheng Sung-fang (ed.), *Jen Min Nien Chien (People's Year Book, 1950)* (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Shu Chü, 1950).

<sup>103</sup> *Hsin Chung Kuo Jen Wu Chi (Who's Who in New China)* (Hong Kong: Min Chu Wen Hua Ch'u Pan She, 1950).

<sup>104</sup> In Walter E. Gourlay, *The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control*, a monograph published by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, Ai Ssu-ch'i's thoughts and works are discussed. See Chapter V, "Ai Ssu-ch'i and 'Thought-Changing,'" pp. 40-68.

Research Academy at Yen-an.<sup>105</sup> He also wrote a large number of articles for the *Liberation Daily*, then published at Yen-an.

Ai first won his fame by his *Ta Chung Che Hsueh (Popular Philosophy)*, which was written in 1936 and revised in 1947. This book, having been reprinted several times, has become very popular among college students and intellectuals. Its main feature is the popularization of Marxism. It is written in very simple Chinese language and uses common anecdotes, old sayings, and familiar jokes. Such features make the book distinctly different from most philosophy books expressing vague ideas with difficult words.

Strictly speaking, Ai has not originated any new ideas or philosophy. His major contribution to the Party is his presentation and interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. He skilfully relates philosophy to one's daily life and makes it easy for the public to receive a Marxism-Leninism which is heavily sugar-coated. In fact, in his *Popular Philosophy* the names of Marx, Lenin, and Engels are seldom mentioned, but their essential ideologies are completely presented. His major task as leader of the mass study movement in China today is to state the Party line to the masses, to organize and supervise the nation-wide movement. His other important task is ideological indoctrination of the cadres. This is done by lecturing in the Party's indoctrination schools and by supervising personnel and the selection of material to be used for indoctrination purposes.

Whatever Ai preaches, therefore, follows strictly the Party line. This suggests that if the Party chooses to change its policy, Ai must quickly adjust his preachings to the new policy or he will be severely reprimanded by the Party. This is exactly what has happened to Ai in the three-anti and five-anti campaigns. As we have noted, the Party's "get-tough" policy with the bourgeois class has compelled Ai, a brain-washer himself, to wash his own brain because of his previous lenient comments concerning the bourgeois class before the class came to be in disfavor. *Time* magazine, in reporting the recent suspension of publication of *Hsüeh Hsi*, cynically but correctly remarks: "An occupational hazard in the life of the Communist dialectician is the Party line itself; he never knows when it will be changed without notice."<sup>106</sup>

It is interesting to note that Ai's articles in *Hsueh Hsi* have decreased in number and that his name has also appeared much less frequently in the press. In the first volume of *Hsüeh Hsi*, Ai wrote four long and important articles in six issues of the volume. In Volume II of the magazine (12 issues in the volume), Ai contributed only one article (Vol. II, No. 1). In Volume III (also 12 issues) only three articles by Ai were printed. Only three of Ai's articles appeared in Volume IV and two of these are reviews of Mao's works. Ai contributed no articles in Volume V. He wrote only one article in 1952 and that was his apology for his "erroneous thoughts" concerning the bourgeois class. Whether the decrease in the number of Ai's articles in *Hsüeh Hsi* is indicative of his decline in prestige is hard to determine. It will be very interesting to watch what is to come to Ai and what *Hsüeh Hsi* will look like when it resumes publication.

<sup>105</sup> Ai wrote a *hsüeh hsi* conclusion in October 1942 when he was in the Central Research Academy at Yen-an. The conclusion was included in one of Ai's books, *Yu Ti Fang Shi Chi Chi Ta (To Shoot With An Aim and Others)* (Shanghai: Hai Yen Shu Chü, 1951), pp. 77-95.

<sup>106</sup> *Time*, May 26, 1952, p. 41.



## CHAPTER IV

### PROPAGANDA FOR THE WORKERS

The objectives of propaganda for workers in factories, mines, and business enterprises are explained by Li Tso-Yuan, propaganda chief of the Party's Northeast Bureau, as follows:

The Party's propaganda and agitation in factories, mines and business enterprises are aimed at stimulating and elevating the political consciousness of the working class with regard to Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought, to develop the workers' enthusiasm and creativeness in production, to maintain the working discipline and order of production in factories, to struggle against waste, extravagance, or any happening which is detrimental to the wealth of the nation, to encourage engineers, technical personnel, and all staff members to devote themselves in service, to learn their jobs well, to unite labor with scientific techniques and to fight for the completion of the nation's production plans or, if possible, the completion of the plans before schedule.<sup>107</sup>

To achieve these objectives the Party depends mainly upon two measures: (1) a specially-designed "educational" program to raise both "the cultural and political levels" of the workers, and (2) a large-scale propaganda program to stimulate and agitate the working masses constantly. How these two measures are carried out will be discussed in this chapter.

#### *Communist Educational Program for Workers*

According to the Chinese Communists, political education for the workers is, in a way, a more serious problem than that for the peasants. This is because the workers, though assigned the role of the leading class in the proletarian revolution, have not reached the political and ideological level desired by the Party. Some Communists complain that workers are even behind the peasants, so far as class consciousness is concerned. Chien Chun-jui, Vice-Minister of Education writes:

After the defeat of the revolutionary war in 1927, the Chinese Communist Party, the vanguard of the Chinese working class, correctly shifted the centre of its activities from the cities to the countryside. Until the liberation of the leading cities in 1949, the vanguard of the Chinese working class had for 22 years been separated from its own class in a geographical sense. Although the working class itself rendered much help in the different revolutionary stages, it did not have the same opportunity to receive education as its vanguard. . . .

Consequently, during the initial stages of liberation, the ideological level of the workers of the cities was generally lower than that of the peasants in the old liberated areas, who had gone through the trials of revolution and agrarian reform.

The way to alter such a state of affairs is by no means to lower the level of the peasants, but to push the working class forward so that it may catch up with the

<sup>107</sup> Li Tso-yuan, "Speech delivered at the Northeast Conference of Propaganda and Agitation in Factories, Mines and Enterprises on May 26, 1950," in *Tseng Yang Kao Hao Ch'i Yeh Hsüan Chuan Ku Tung Kung Tao* (How to Do a Good Job in Propaganda and Agitation in Enterprises), (Hankow: Hsin Hua Shu Tien, 1950), pp. 1-5.

peasantry. This is the tremendous responsibility of the working class itself and its vanguard. It is also the tremendous responsibility of those engaged in the work of people's education. . . .<sup>108</sup>

The Chinese Communists realize that they cannot raise the "class consciousness" of the workers to a higher level merely by exposing the workers to the propaganda literature or by forcing their attendance at indoctrination meetings or their participation in demonstration parades. A more systematic program of indoctrination is needed. This program, however, meets with a serious obstacle: the illiteracy of the workers. According to the Communist estimate, more than 50 per cent of Chinese workers are illiterate.<sup>109</sup> The Party's solution to this problem is the program of spare-time education which takes advantage of the off hours of the workers.

On 1 June 1950, the Government Administrative Council issued "The Directive Concerning the Development of Spare-Time Education for Workers."<sup>110</sup> Signed by Premier Chou En-lai, this document was immediately adopted by the All-China Federation of Labor on 13 July 1950 and was given wide publicity in the Communist press.<sup>111</sup> In December of the same year, the Communists claimed that a total of 1,064,736 workers had already joined the spare-time education classes, and it was then estimated that in 1951 about 1,500,000 workers would participate in the program.<sup>112</sup>

According to the above-mentioned directive, there are several kinds of classes planned for industrial workers: (1) elementary classes, (2) cultural classes, (3) political classes, and (4) technical classes.

1. The elementary classes are designed for the common factory workers, and their first aim is to end illiteracy. It is specified in the directive that the government plans to make all existing "cultural-blinds" (meaning illiterates) recognize at least 1,000 Chinese characters and to be able to read, to write, and to do elementary arithmetic within three to five years. This does not mean, however, that the Party is solely interested in wiping out illiteracy among workers. The Party's political doctrines find their way even into the lessons for the workers beginning to recognize Chinese characters.<sup>113</sup>

2. "Cultural classes" are planned for the workers who have had some education. These classes are divided into two groups: first, the intermediate classes for those whose education is equivalent to graduation from elementary schools and, second, advanced classes for those with some high school education. The period of education is three years for intermediate classes and five years for advanced classes. Regular diplomas are given by the Ministry of Education upon graduation.

3. Political education is carried out in factories, mines, and business enterprises through lectures on current affairs. Some factories or business enterprises hold regular political classes to give systematic political and theoretical training. The major subjects in the political classes are: history of social development; Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party; New Democracy; the

<sup>108</sup>Chien Chun-jui, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>109</sup>"To Openly Develop the Spare-Time Education of Workers," The Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the All-China Federation of Labor, (ed.) *Tseng Yang K'ai Chan Chih Kung Yeh Yü Chiao Yü (How To Develop Spare-Time Education for Workers)*, (Peking: Kung Jen Ch'u Pan She, 1950), p. 12.

<sup>110</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 1-5.

<sup>111</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

<sup>112</sup>Li Chu-sheng, "Education for Workers and Peasants," *People's China*, (Peking) Vol. III, No. 6, March 16, 1951, pp. 12-14.

<sup>113</sup>An analysis of the textbook used in the elementary classes reveals that Chinese Communists manage to indoctrinate even in the elementary readings. The textbook analyzed is *Kung Jen Wen Hua K'e Pen (Cultural Readings for Workers)*, published by the official Hsin Hua Bookstore in Fukien. There are four books in a series; each book takes about 60 hours in actual study. After the study of the four books, a worker is supposed to have reached the level of an elementary education.

Book 1 consists of 19 lessons. A total of 246 Chinese characters is introduced in each lesson. The book starts with the simple character *jen* (man) and in the 19 simple lessons the editor manages to acquaint readers with the following political doctrines: all workers in the world belong to one family; workers must learn to read in order to be masters; reactionaries should never be given a chance to rise again; labor creates the world; labor unions must be organized by workers; production is important; workers must learn to be "model heroes"; cooperatives are important; and Mao Tse-tung is the savior of China.

Common Program of the PPCC;<sup>114</sup> brief history of the world revolution; Soviet achievements; labor policy and labor laws. All these courses are scheduled for completion in two years.

4. Another form of the spare-time education for workers is known as technical classes. There are no definite methods of study for such classes. The Communists claim, however, that two methods are found to be very effective in the Northeast Region: first, evening and morning technical classes and, second, the master-apprentice system. The master-apprentice system was first tried in the Northeast and is now commonly adopted all over the country. According to this system, "masters" or veteran workers sign a "contract" with an individual or a group of inexperienced apprentices. The contract specifies the skill to be mastered by the latter in a certain length of time. In some factories there are "guarantors" who see to it that such contracts are actually fulfilled by both masters and apprentices.<sup>115</sup>

There is no doubt that such technical classes can help improve the skills of the apprentices and accelerate production. But these are not the only reasons for the Chinese Communists to organize such classes. There are also political reasons. Before the "liberation" of China, the Communists explain, engineers and workers belonged to two different classes. The former as well as staff members were all of the "white-collar" class and considered themselves superior to the workers. There was little unity or cooperation among workers. Veteran workers were reluctant to teach their skills to newcomers because of the competition of labor. By organizing the technical classes the Communists can achieve several political objectives. First, engineers and senior workers are brought together with common workers. They are both taught to realize that they belong to the class "exploited" by the capitalists. As teachers of the technical classes, the engineers have to learn and respect the "wisdom" of the workers and are indoctrinated in the belief that they are no longer superior to workers. Second, veteran workers and beginners can reach a much higher degree of unity than before. They are told to form a consolidated front against the capitalists who, the Communists charge, have always utilized the veteran workers to oppress the apprentices.

Thus, by uniting the engineers, veteran workers, and apprentices, the Communists can greatly facilitate their plan of production. When a new directive or call is issued by the government, the technical classes immediately respond to the call under the guidance of the union workers or members of the New Democratic Youth Corps, who play an important role in the life of the factories, mines, and business enterprises.

### *The "Democratic Reform Movement"*

The so-called "Democratic Reform Movement" in factories, mines, and other business enterprises was initiated by the Party's Central-South Bureau in May 1951. The main objectives of this campaign, as announced officially by the Party, were "to mobilize fully the working masses, to eliminate all feudalistic, reactionary forces, to reform thoroughly the enterprises and thus lay a solid foundation for industrial management and democratic administration."<sup>116</sup> Behind these glittering slogans the Party had two important political intentions in the campaign: (1) to provide a chance for workers to practice their new leadership and authority in Communist society, and (2) to weed out "undesirable elements" as well as "feudalistic traditions" in factories, mines, and business enterprises.

In a previous chapter it was pointed out that the Chinese Communists follow two strategic principles in their propaganda warfare: (1) "to attract as many people as possible into actual struggle by offering things to meet the most urgent needs of the masses and by using the slogans that can best be perceived by the masses of a certain level of consciousness in different places and at differ-

<sup>114</sup>People's Political Consultative Conference.

<sup>115</sup>Department of Young Workers' Affairs of the Northeast Branch of the All-China Federation of Labor and Northeast Committee of the New Democratic Youth Corps (ed.), *Tsen Yang Pan Hou Kung Jen Yeh Yu Chi Shu Hsieh Hsi (How to Successfully Carry out the Spare-time Technical Studies for Workers)* (Mukden: Kung Jen Ch'u Pan She, 1951), pp. 1-2, and pp. 42-51.

<sup>116</sup>*Nan Fang Jih Pao (Southern Daily, Canton)*, August 11, 1951.



ent times"; and (2) "to assist, participate and lead all revolutionary or mass movements that can contribute to the 'liberation' of the working class."<sup>117</sup>

In planning a propaganda campaign for workers the Communists therefore have to consider these questions: What are the urgent needs of the workers? What kind of slogans can best be perceived by workers, most of whom are of low educational standard? What kind of campaign can make the workers believe that they are being "liberated"?

The Chinese Communists were cognizant of the fact that under the Nationalist government the life of workers was one of considerable hardship, that there existed despotism in factories, mines, and business enterprises, and that many workers actually suffered from the exploitation of powerful underworld racketeers generally known in China as figures in the "black societies." Thus they greatly exaggerated the miserable sufferings of the workers and pledged to do everything possible to bring happiness to them. The Communists could very well keep on playing their old tune that all sufferings of workers are due to the evils of capitalism. But there are limitations to the effectiveness of this theme, in addition to practical difficulties. In the first place, capitalism is a vague word and hard for common workers to understand. Secondly, workers had very little direct contact with industrialists, managers, or high-ranking factory officials and thus had little personal hatred of them. Thirdly, the Communists could not launch a campaign to attack the national bourgeoisie in the early years of their control of the country because they still were dependent upon the cooperation of this class. Therefore, instead of firing accusations against capitalism and the bourgeois class, the Communists directed the attack on the various forms of despotism and against certain individuals who were supposedly responsible for despotism in factories, mines, and business enterprises.

An official directive issued by the Party's South-China Sub-bureau concerning the Democratic Reform Movement states:

. . . To convert a city long controlled by imperialism and bureaucratic bourgeoisie into a city of the people and a city of production, we must thoroughly eradicate the remaining feudalistic influences (including the feudalistic foremen, despots, gangster groups, chiefs of 'black societies,' etc.) and the various systems designed to control workers (including the search system, the beating and scolding system, the feudalistic headman system and practice of personal favor in appointments).

. . . In order to accomplish this historic mission, we cannot merely depend upon administrative orders. We have to mobilize the working masses and lead them to *tou cheng* (this means to start the movement with fanfare and by ideological mobilization).<sup>118</sup>

The Communists shrewdly related the mistreatment of workers in factories to the Kuomintang government, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and imperialism. They charged that the Kuomintang government controlled workers by the use of secret agents and by collaborating with the figures in the black societies. They further charged that Kuomintang secret agents as well as gangsters of the "black societies" were still active among workers, but pretended to be "progressive" or to support the new regime.

It must be pointed out here that, in order to win the support of workers, the Communists have actually abolished certain practices which they claimed were "feudalistic" or "reactionary." An illustration is the abolition of the "search system" which required every worker to be searched by guards or foremen before he left the gate of the factory. The Communists considered this system an "insult" to the dignity of workers and abolished it shortly after the new government was established. This change was hailed as an example of the improvement of the life of workers under the New Democracy.

<sup>117</sup> Hsüeh Hsi (Peking), No. 1, 1952, February 10, 1952, p. 42.

<sup>118</sup> Propaganda Department of the South China Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (ed.), *Wei Kuan Ts'ao Min Chu Kai Ke Yün Tung Erh Tou Cheng (To Struggle for the Carrying Out of the Democratic Reform Movement)* (Canton: Hua Nan Jen Min Ch'u Pan She, 1951), p. 18.

The very first task of the Party in the movement was to publicize widely the program in the country. High-ranking officials as well as local cadres went out to speak to large gatherings of masses. All mass media, including newspapers, magazines, films, cartoons, street posters, "wall papers," etc., concentrated their effort on this issue. All engineers, technicians, clerks, workers, and people from all walks of life were required to study the documents concerning the movement in their regular *hsüeh hsi* groups.

In every factory, mine, wharf, or industrial unit an intensive propaganda campaign was conducted to dispel fears or worries from the minds of workers, technicians, and Party cadres with regard to the movement. Members of local Party branches and the New Democratic Youth Corps in every industrial unit were given intensive indoctrination to assure them that the Democratic Reform Movement would definitely help rather than hinder production. In many of its directives or announcements the Party repeatedly cited different cases illustrating the contributions made by the movement in production. According to the Communists, the hesitancy of the cadres to carry out the movement was the most serious problem to be solved.<sup>119</sup>

The major objectives of propaganda during the initial stage of the movement, according to one Communist writer, were:

1. "To understand the enemies" — this means to do everything possible to expose the crimes and treacherous plots of the reactionaries and feudalists.
2. "To understand the self," — this is to enable the workers to understand the source of their sufferings in the past and to realize their leadership and strength in the country today.
3. "To understand the government and Party" — this is to point out that the Communist Party is the political Party of the working class and that the people's government belongs to the people themselves.
4. "To understand the current situation and the responsibilities and policies of the major movements including Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement, Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries Movement and Democratic Reform Movement."<sup>120</sup>

While the campaign of publicity and indoctrination was going on, cadres and operational propagandists went out to discover "activists" or "aggressive elements" as well as those who "had bitterness to pour out." They were setting the stage for accusation meetings, which were conducted as soon as the responsible Party members felt that the main ideas of the Party were understood by the masses and that adequate preparation for accusation meetings had been made.

All Communist cadres were instructed to pay great attention to the so-called "individual contact chains" before accusation meetings were held. This method of organizing and consolidating the masses is used today in almost all campaigns initiated by the Party.

The first step in establishing the "individual contact chains," to use the Communist expression, is to lay down the *Ken tzu*, or foundation. This means to organize the first group of "aggressive elements." After being thoroughly educated and indoctrinated, each member of this group is supposed to go out to contact and influence certain individuals. Thus the second group of "aggressive elements" is formed. By the same method, the third, fourth, or tenth group (depending upon the requirement of the Party) is organized. Through these chains, the Party can be assured of the result that its messages are transmitted to the masses. One Communist writer describes the "individual contact chains" as follows:

To lay the *ken tzu* (foundation) of the Democratic Reform Movement—that is, to discover the first group of aggressive elements—is very important. In the past, the aggressive elements in factories and business enterprises were selected mainly

<sup>119</sup> *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao* (Yangtze Daily, Hankow), July 20, 1951.

<sup>120</sup> Wan San, *Min Chu Kai Ko Yün Tung Chiang Hua* (Lecture on the Democratic Reform Movement) (Canton: Hua Nan Jen Min Ch'u Pan She, 1951) p. 26.



because of their record in production and not by 'individual contact chains.' Furthermore, they were not given actual tests in *tou cheng* (struggle) after they were selected. Therefore, we knew very little of their political background, their social experiences, their motives of being aggressive, the level of their consciousness and their relationships with the masses. When we try to organize the first group of aggressive elements, we must look for the following three required characteristics: being (1) politically innocent and historically unquestionable, (2) long experienced in labor and aggressive in production, and (3) high in class consciousness and close in contact with the masses . . . .

After the first group of aggressive elements is educated and well briefed with regard to the Party's policies as well as working methods, they are instructed to contact certain individuals in different production units. Then we have our second group of aggressive elements, who, in turn, go out to discover the third group of aggressive elements after sufficient education and cultivation. . . . When aggressive elements reach a certain number, they are organized into different sections according to the production units to which they belong. The promising and capable members of the Party and Youth Corps will be appointed leaders of the sections, who will be directly responsible to the Party branch or Youth Corps to which they belong . . . .

. . . Before every accusation or struggle meeting is held, all aggressive elements should meet together for conference to discuss the major tasks of *tou cheng*. After a *tou cheng* or struggle meeting, aggressive elements meet again to review their experiences as well as the accomplishments and weaknesses. They should be praised or criticized according to their merits or defects. This will greatly help their understanding, fortify the fighting force, eliminate backward members and replace them with new blood.<sup>121</sup>

It was the scheme of the Party in the first stage of the movement to do its very best to stir up the hatred of workers and to overcome their timidity. During this stage the Party did not expect the masses to inform on the "enemies" on their own initiative. The Communists probably realized the fact that most workers were still timid. To start the accusation meetings, it was the general practice of the Party to select a few individuals who had really bad records in their past and who were generally disliked by workers. One Party secretary in Honan stated: "The accusation campaign in the first stage of the movement is started from the top down. The Party authorities at the top arrest some reactionaries whose crimes are already widely known among workers. This will greatly encourage the workers and eliminate the major obstacles in the mobilization of the masses."<sup>122</sup>

According to the Communists, workers should be courageous enough and willing to inform on and accuse the "reactionary" and "feudalistic" elements on their own initiative, if the accusation meetings in the first stage of the Democratic Reform Movement have been successfully conducted. When the movement reached its second stage, the Party was careful to see whether the workers had attained the required level of political consciousness. The main tasks in this second stage were the study of the Law of Labor Insurance, the registration of labor insurance cards, and the registration of members of "reactionary organizations." On close scrutiny, one can easily discover the real political intentions of the Party and readily appreciate the shrewdness of the Communists in control. To require the study of the Law of Labor Insurance, according to the Communists, is to acquaint the workers with the rights and privileges to which they are entitled. If the workers actually understood the "enemies" and were no longer afraid of the reactionaries and feudalists, they would oppose the latter's sharing the profits of the laboring class. "They (the workers) would want to distinguish

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.

<sup>122</sup>Propaganda Department of the South China Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 78.

between those who are qualified for the labor insurance and those who are not. If they were well handled, the workers could be inspired and stimulated to inform on and accuse the remaining feudalists among them."<sup>123</sup> By asking the "reactionary" and "feudalistic" elements to register voluntarily, the Communists could make some other political gains. First, certain "reactionary" or "feudalistic" individuals, if they voluntarily registered, would be exposed. Second, the promise of the Party not to punish the accomplices encouraged the registration of those who had connections with secret societies. Third, those who did not voluntarily register could be discovered either by the "aggressive" elements or by common workers. The main form of education in this second stage of the movement was criticism or self-criticism, which required every worker to "confess" his past frankly. Such confessions were undoubtedly valuable to the Party both in understanding the workers and in consolidating its power by eliminating those that were "undesirable."

The third stage of the movement was to purify the membership of the labor unions and consolidate the unity among workers. After the "undesirable" elements and former "despots," many of whom were union leaders, were weeded out, the Communists began to reorganize the labor unions. "New blood was instilled." The term "new blood" naturally refers to the capable Party members or the "aggressive elements" who have proved themselves useful for the Party. "Unnecessary personnel" were removed from the payroll.

The final act of the whole show of the Democratic Reform Movement in every industrial unit was generally a mass meeting to celebrate the success. Such meetings followed the traditional Communist style with long speeches by important officials, speeches of thanks by selected workers, resolutions to "thank" Mao Tse-tung for his guidance in the proletarian revolution, shouting of slogans, and other standard Communist practices.

To a casual observer the celebration meetings might mean the completion of the Democratic Reform Movement in a factory or mine. This was not true, so far as the Communist cadres were concerned. They had more important missions to accomplish. As pointed out previously, one of the objectives of the movement was to speed up production. The Chinese Communists were interested not merely in the "gratitude" expressed by workers in the mass meetings. They were more interested perhaps in the workers' expression of their "gratitude" by deeds. An analysis of the Communist press reveals that almost every Democratic Reform Movement in the factories, mines, business enterprises, or industrial units was followed by two actions that were "volunteered" by workers: (1) signing new "Patriotic Pacts" or revising old pacts, and (2) developing new emulation drives.<sup>124</sup> Each worker was to make a new plan to improve the quality or increase the quantity of production. Engineers pledged that they would learn more about the "wisdom" and "creativity" of laborers and that they would work harder than before. These pacts were not supposed to be vague promises. They were discussed in small group meetings and submitted to the cadres who were instructed to make periodical checks upon workers.

Communist cadres have initiated various kinds of labor emulation drives in different production units. Under the constant propaganda and agitation of the propagandists, workers have to set new records of production and to "challenge" other workers to match them. Sometimes one unit of the machine shop "challenges" another unit, either to speed up production or to turn out products of superior quality.

The Chinese Communists use many different methods to keep the workers on their toes. An officially approved booklet reporting the work of propaganda and agitation in the factories or business enterprises in Northeast China describes nearly 60 different forms of propaganda.<sup>125</sup> Many of them are,

<sup>123</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>124</sup>For a detailed discussion of the "Patriotic Pacts" and "emulation drives," see Wen-Hui C. Chen, "Mass Movements" in *Communist China—A Study of Nation-wide Campaigns in Support of the Korean War*, chaps. III and IV. Preliminary hectographed edition, Series II, No. 4, 1952, "Studies in Chinese Communism," produced under Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 through the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (Supply exhausted. To be published in re-edited form by the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center.)

<sup>125</sup>Hsin Hua Current Affairs Publishing Association (ed.), *Tsen Yang Kao Hao Ch'i Yeh Hsüan Chuan K' Tung Kung Tso (How to Conduct Well Propaganda and Agitation Tasks in Enterprises)* (Hankow: Hsin Hua Shu Tien, 1950).

of course, similar in content but they acquire different, fancy names. Among these propaganda forms are: slogans, red flags (for those with outstanding achievement in production), exhibitions, black-board bulletins, pictorial papers, production diagrams, broadcasting, "express pamphlets," cartoons, rolls of heroes, letters of congratulation, clippings of newspapers, newspaper reading, "correspondents network" among different units of machine shops, *yang ko* dances, "challenge" letters, "wall papers," "glory bulletins," honor lamps, prizes and punishments, family interviews, small group discussions, engine-room meetings, one-act plays, films, agitation by example, political classes, etc.

It seems that the Communist propagandists are always on the lookout for new methods of agitation. In the Communist newspapers there are thousands of letters or articles contributed by local propagandists telling of their new "inventions" of ways to carry on propaganda and agitation tasks. Let us take a look at some typical examples. In the Sian Mine in the Northeast, there was the method of "red flag delivery." Accompanied by music bands, members of the pithead which had the lowest amount of production had to deliver a red flag to the pithead with the highest amount of production. Different pitheads were encouraged by propagandists to "win the red flag."<sup>126</sup> Another mine found it profitable to use the "Fast Production Board." On this board (in the form of a huge poster) were an airplane, a train, and an oxcart. The name of the pithead which accomplished the tasks before the scheduled time appeared on the airplane, and members of the pithead were praised for "taking a ride in the airplane." The name of the pithead that accomplished the tasks on time appeared on the train. The pithead which failed to finish the assigned task had its name on the oxcart and members belonging to the pithead were teased and laughed at as "riding on oxcarts." Foremen of all pitheads were constantly under pressure to "ride on the airplane" rather than in "oxcarts."<sup>127</sup>

Almost every factory, mine, or business enterprise has some kind of system similar to the one described above to stimulate workers. The forms may be different but the principle is essentially the same. Penalties are also used; workers who fail to respond to the labor emulation drives or the call of the Party may be penalized by public ridicule, lowering of ranks, reduction of salary, or even dismissal. Take the Yuan Tien Glassware Factory in Northeast China, for instance. According to the propagandists in this factory, jointly owned and controlled by Soviet Russia and Communist China, penalties for failure to finish assigned tasks on schedule because of personal mistakes or negligence range from oral warning to dismissal and punishment by the court.<sup>128</sup>

The system of reward and penalty in factories, mines, and business enterprises is, of course, no invention of the Chinese Communists. It had been in practice in China long before the Communists came into power. The important feature of the Communist system of reward and penalty is its close association with propaganda. Perhaps never before in China had any case of reward or penalty been so widely publicized. Traditionally, reward and penalty were handled by those responsible for personnel problems. In Communist China the propagandists take a part in these matters. There are propagandists and agitators in almost every unit of a factory, pithead, wharf, or any other unit of production. They are members of the propaganda networks working under the supervision of Party branches.<sup>129</sup> They use every possible medium and method to publicize widely the records of those who have done a superior job in production and take pains to "educate" those who lag behind in production. The Party's Department of Propaganda in the Northeast Railroad Bureau reports that in one small engine division at Ling Kao there is a so-called "agitation-comfort corps," organized by members of the personnel, business, and engineers' offices. This corps engages in a great variety of propaganda activities, one of which is to "comfort" the worker on the locomotive performing a superior job. Members of the corps make use of lunch time or off hours to "pay tribute" to the meritorious workers and serve them tea, cigarettes, watermelon seeds, and other things. Sometimes responsible officials of the unit, includ-

<sup>126</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>127</sup>*Loc. cit.*

<sup>128</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>129</sup>For a detailed description of the Party's propaganda networks, see Yu, *The Propaganda Machine in Communist China*, 1955, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.

ing the Party's secretary and chairman of the union branch, are all on hand to greet the workers. Occasionally the corps will stage a show to entertain the workers. Another form of "comfort" offered by this corps is to conduct interviews with the families of the workers. According to the same report, when members of the corps noticed that Kao Chao-kuei, a locomotive engineer, was low in spirit, they made an investigation and discovered that he had too much housework to do when he was off duty. He had to take care of the baby in addition to other miscellaneous household duties. The corps immediately sent a woman worker to tell Kao's wife that her husband needed rest when he finished his work on the railroad. The result, so the story went, was that Kao's wife became "progressive" and no longer let her husband do much housework.<sup>130</sup>

Stories of this nature are numerous in Communist literature. A very common practice of propaganda in factories, mines, and business enterprises under Communist China today is the report of the progress made in every production unit in the media available to workers. Such media include "blackboard newspapers," "wall papers," bulletin boards, public-address systems, daily announcements through propagandists or cadres, and many others. The copy for blackboard papers or wall papers is generally edited and put out by the Department of Propaganda of different Party branches and the stories are supplied by propagandists who are present in every production unit. According to the Communist documents, one regular task of all propagandists is to serve as "correspondents" reporting on all activities of the workers in their own surroundings. Since many of these propagandists are illiterate, they make oral reports to the Party members or other officials to whom they are held responsible.

The success of the Party's propaganda-agitation work among workers is not easy to ascertain. That every worker in Communist China today has no escape from the Party's propaganda and indoctrination program is a hard fact. It seems that every minute of a worker's time is under the control of the Party. He is constantly under pressure to work hard and fast while he is on duty. He is required to participate in the "spare-time educational program," which is supposedly designed "for the welfare of the workers." He has to attend all kinds of "cultural" activities such as lectures, films, plays, *yang-ko* dances, and newspaper-reading groups, which are all heavily seasoned with propagandic flavor and arranged at off hours. He is constantly being exposed to the colorful slogans, posters, and other propaganda materials that can be found almost everywhere in factories, mines, or business enterprises. Even after he goes home, he may be visited by propagandists or cadres who want to talk about topics of political significance.

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<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 67-8. Also in *Tung Pei Jih Pao*, (daily newspaper in Mukden), June 7, 1950.

## PROPAGANDA FOR THE PEASANTS

To win over the huge masses of the Chinese peasants and to organize them into a powerful "revolutionary force," the Communists have depended mainly upon two measures: (1) a specially-designed educational program which aims to raise both the "cultural" and the "political" levels of the peasants, and (2) the land reform movement. The former is chiefly concerned with political indoctrination and elimination of illiteracy; the latter has much to do with agitation.

*Communist Educational Program for Peasants*

In principle the Party's educational program for peasants is similar to that for workers. In fact, the hyphenated expression "peasant-worker education" indicates that it is actually one unit of the Communist educational program. There are, however, certain differences in practice between the Communist educational program for peasants and that for workers. As we have already noted, the spare-time education in factories, mines, and business enterprises is conducted during the off hours of workers. The peasants, of course, do not work just eight hours a day and have no regular working schedule. They work hard during the season of harvest and generally are not too busy in winter months. In adjustment to this particular situation of peasants, the Communists have devised the so-called "winter school movement." Another difference lies in the subject matter used in teaching. Generally speaking, Chinese peasants are less informed and more superstitious than workers. Many of them still believe in fate and God. Therefore, eradication of superstitious beliefs and popularization of scientific knowledge receive more attention in the educational program for peasants than for workers.

Started in 1949, the "winter school movement" spread quickly. One official Communist publication discloses that in 1951 about 35,860,000 peasants participated in the movement.<sup>131</sup> The figure for 1949 was reported as 13,000,000.<sup>132</sup> If these figures were accurate, they would indicate considerable success on the part of the Communists in the expansion of the "winter school movement."

It is the plan of the Communists that the "winter schools" will eventually be developed into regular "mass schools." In fact, all cultural and educational cadres of the Party, mostly propagandists themselves, are instructed to encourage the expansion of winter schools into regular "mass schools" operating throughout the year. In Hopei, for instance, the Commission of Education announced that 2,194 "mass schools" had been established in 35 *hsien* or villages "on the foundation of winter schools."<sup>133</sup>

To a casual observer the "winter school" seems primarily an agency to wipe out illiteracy among peasants. This is not entirely true. The purpose of these winter schools, as specified in an official directive from the Ministry of Education, is "to interest the people in the patriotic Resist-America Aid-Korea education, to accelerate such campaigns as the increase

<sup>131</sup> *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), January 15, 1952.

<sup>132</sup> *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao* (*New China Monthly*, Peking), Vol. IV., No. 4, August, 1951, p. 897.

<sup>133</sup> Commission of Cultural and Educational Affairs, Honan Provincial People's Government (ed.), *Tung Hsüeh Yu Ming Hsiao* (*Winter School and Mass School*) (Honan: publisher not mentioned, 1950), p. 1.



of production and the patriotic pact, and to publicize major government policies such as land reform, democratic reform, mutual assistance in production, and the marriage law."<sup>134</sup>

Take a winter school in the province of Shansi, for instance. Wang Shih-tse, the "model teacher" of this school, is cited in an official publication of the Government Administration Council because he "clearly understands the policy of winter schools—to emphasize literacy but to integrate it with central tasks and to engage in political education as well as education of current affairs."<sup>135</sup> According to this article, Wang successfully ties his teaching materials in with whatever tasks are prescribed by the Party or government at different times.

When a bubonic epidemic broke out in Chahar and the government called for the nation to take preventive measures, Wang immediately made this the central topic of study in the classes for current affairs and hygiene. He first explained the horror of bubonic plague.... Then he used scientific theories to eradicate such superstitious beliefs as 'fatalism' or 'God's punishment of mankind.' Then he mobilized the masses to catch rats.... In the meantime the committee on winter schools in the village, through public addresses and blackboard newspapers, gave publicity and paid tribute to Wang and immediately organized the whole village to participate in the movement of catching rats. In seven days, more than 360 rats were killed....

[In winter schools] women not only were taught to recognize characters but were specially educated to do a good job in production....<sup>136</sup>

There are numerous stories in the Communist newspapers and especially in the educational periodicals dealing with the experiences of the so-called "model teachers" or "outstanding winter schools." A brief survey of these stories reveals that almost every "model teacher" is praised because of his success "in raising the political consciousness of the peasants to a higher level." It is also found in these stories that the majority of the teachers in the peasant schools are either propagandists themselves or cultural-educational cadres in villages. Running these schools is only one phase of their daily tasks. Their other jobs include reading newspapers to individuals or groups, editing various kinds of publications or propaganda materials, organizing mass meetings, conducting *hsüeh hsi* discussions, supervising recreational activities that are heavily seasoned with propaganda, and assisting in whatever tasks are prescribed by the Party.

#### *Land Reform Movement<sup>137</sup>*

Many know that land reform is an important economic policy of the Chinese Communists and that it has brought drastic changes on the mainland. Few are cognizant, however, of the fact that the real objective of the Communists behind land reform is mainly political, not economic. A definite proof of this point is the following statement which is included in a proposal prepared by the propaganda authorities of the Party's South China Sub-bureau concerning the "ideological mobilization tasks" in land reform:

...We request all government agencies responsible for land reform and all members of land reform work teams to fully understand: we reduce rent not simply for the sake of

<sup>134</sup> *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (Liberation Daily, Shanghai), November 13, 1951.

<sup>135</sup> Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs, Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government, *Wen Chiao Ts'an K'ao Tzu Liao* (Reference Materials on Culture and Education), No. 9, pp. 107-12.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

<sup>137</sup> For a detailed study of Communist land policy thus far, see Shao-Er Ong, *Agrarian Reform in Communist China*. Preliminary hectographed edition, Series I. No. 2, 1952, "Studies in Chinese Communism," produced under Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 through the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (Supply exhausted. To be published in re-edited form by the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center.)

reducing rent and we divide land not merely for the sake of dividing land. Our fundamental objective is to make use of this (land reform) movement (and forthcoming movements) to raise the peasants' ideological and political understanding to the level of opposing feudalism and imperialism and thus to form a powerful class army to struggle for this political objective. In order to achieve this objective we have to give the peasants some actual benefits or profits, on the one hand, but, on the other hand and at the same time, we have to develop fully the ideological and political education among workers.... We must, from our first day of making contact with peasants, pay great attention to the propaganda-education tasks among peasants.<sup>138</sup>

In his keynote speech on land reform Liu Shao-ch'i also explicitly states that "the ultimate objective of land reform is not purely the relief of poor peasants," but the "elimination of the landlord class" and "the abolition of the feudalistic land system."<sup>139</sup> Ma Ming-fang, chairman of the provincial government in Shensi, is quoted as saying: "The whole process of land reform is one of mobilizing the masses. It is a process through which the broad masses of peasants engage in *tou cheng* (struggle) against the landlord class and through which the peasants ceaselessly elevate their class consciousness to a higher level."<sup>140</sup>

The Chinese Communists apparently do not believe that peasants can be "sufficiently educated" merely by attending "winter schools," listening to lectures of propagandists, or participating in *hsieh hsi* meetings. They insist that peasants, in order to be thoroughly indoctrinated, must actually participate in *tou cheng* (struggle) themselves. The Communists strongly oppose what they condemn as "peaceful land reform." They say that it is better not to divide land among poor peasants at all than to divide it by peaceful methods.<sup>141</sup> Their explanation for the necessity of "fierce struggle" in land reform is well summarized in a statement by Premier Chou En-lai, who says: "No exploiting class will voluntarily make its exit from the stage of history and the Chinese landlord class, which has a history of several thousand years, is no exception."<sup>142</sup> What this statement actually implies is that the elimination of the landlord class must be made only after a systematic and fierce *tou cheng* (struggle) by the peasants. This *tou cheng*, according to the Communists, is the "best form of education of the masses." Jao Shu-shih, a member of the Party's Central Committee, openly admits: "Land reform is a revolution, so far as landlords are concerned; it is an educational reform, so far as peasants are concerned."<sup>143</sup>

#### *Propaganda Agitation Tasks in Land Reform*

Land reform, according to an eyewitness story, is conducted in five stages: (1) publicity and education, (2) differentiation of class status, (3) confiscation and requisition, (4) distribution of land, and (5) inspection and winding-up.<sup>144</sup> Propaganda work is by no means completed after the first stage. Propagandists are constantly at work; they have different propaganda and agitation tasks at different stages.

<sup>138</sup> This proposal was prepared and passed by the South China Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. The complete title is: "The Proposal Concerning the Strengthening of the Ideological Mobilization Tasks Among Peasants in Land Reform." Every member of the land reform work teams is supposed to have one copy of this proposal and to put it into practice. The full text of the proposal is published in the December 26, 1951 issue of *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton).

<sup>139</sup> Liu Shao-ch'i, "Report on the Problem of Land Reform," *T'u Ti Kai Ke Ch'ung Yao Wen Hsien Hui Chi* (Collection of Important Documents on Land Reform) (Peking: Jen Min Ch'u Pan She, 1951), pp. 11-28.

<sup>140</sup> Wu Ching-chao, Yang Jen-ken, Lai Hai-tung and Others (ed.), *T'u Ti Kai Ke Yu Sau Hsiang Kai Tsao* (Land Reform and Ideological Reform) (Peking: Kuang Ming Jih Pao She, 1951), p. 30.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>142</sup> Chou En-lai, "Fight for the Consolidation and Development of the People's Victory," *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao* (Peking), Vol. II, No. 6, October 15, 1950, pp. 1218-22.

<sup>143</sup> Wu Ching-chao, Yang Jen-ken, Lai Hai-tung, and others, (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>144</sup> Kiang Wen-han, "Land Reform in Shanghai Suburbs," *China Monthly Review*, January, 1952, pp. 18-29.

According to an official Communist publication, the cadres generally use two major methods to organize and mobilize the peasants. One method is what the Communists call "to work from top to bottom," and another method is "to work from bottom to top." The two methods are explained and used as follows:

The main method of working from top to bottom is to mobilize and organize peasants through the peasant congresses at different levels. (The peasant congresses, of course, have other functions than these. They are the authoritative agencies responsible for land reform.) 'To work from bottom to top' is mainly to depend upon the 'brewing' and 'individual contact chains' among peasants. The main forms of 'brewing' and 'contact chains' are 'pouring out bitterness,' 'clearing accounts' with landlords and discovering the root of poverty (of peasants).... For a short period after a movement is initiated, it is generally advisable to use the method of working 'from top to bottom.' This is because peasants at this period...do not quite understand policies of land reform and lack the determination to carry out land reform.... Once the masses have reached a certain level of (class) consciousness and after a certain number of activists or aggressive elements have been discovered among peasants, then the method of working 'from bottom to top' should become the main form of operation. Only in this way can we form a mass movement based on the consciousness of peasants.<sup>145</sup>

The Communists find most peasants to be hesitant and indifferent to land reform before they have contacts with the land reform work teams. They do not know just what the land reform work teams are going to do. They are afraid that the work teams may enlist the assistance of local bandits, rogues, or rascals, and that land reform may require too much of their time and thus affect production. They are afraid that "the weather may change," that is, Chiang Kai-shek may return to power.<sup>146</sup> Land reform teams are instructed to dispel such misgivings on the part of the peasants. The land reform cadres in South China, for instance, are ordered by the Party to engage in the following propaganda tasks when they first enter a village.

(1) To announce, with fanfare, the policies of the government and express the determination that the work teams will not leave unless land reform is successfully carried out. (2) To state clearly that work teams will not listen to anyone who does not represent the views of the majority of poor peasants and farm laborers, and that comments from poor peasants are welcome. (3) To explain the problems of looking after the (economic) production and livelihood of peasants. It is advisable to actually solve some of these problems. (4) To develop with fanfare the political offensive by intensive propaganda on current affairs. Don't wait till the completion of the land reform tasks to explain on current affairs. (5) To publicize, also with fanfare, the laws such as those on punishing counter-revolutionaries and unlawful landlords.<sup>147</sup>

Most of these tasks are done by holding mass meetings. Usually Communist cadres call a few mass meetings of the whole village; they also call meetings of all poor peasants, meetings of farm laborers, meetings of the Peasant Association, meetings of women, and small discussion groups. In addition to attending these meetings, the peasants are also exposed to a tremendous amount of propaganda materials including "blackboard newspapers," "wall papers," colorful slogans, public address announcements, films, etc.,—all put out by the Party's "cultural-educational" cadres or propagandists. Very often there are shows to entertain as well as to indoctrinate the peasants.

<sup>145</sup> Yu Chia, "How to Mobilize and Organize the Masses in Land Reform Tasks," *Hsüeh Hsi* (Peking), Vol. IV, No. 12, October 1, 1951, p. 33.

<sup>146</sup> *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton), December 26, 1951.

<sup>147</sup> *Loc. cit.*

In the meantime members of land reform work teams and local cadres begin to "discover good people" and "dig out the root of bitterness." By "good people" the Communists refer to poor peasants who work hard, suffer from poverty, and are generally well-liked. The Party cadres take great pains to win over these people and make them turn against their "masters."

The procedure of winning over these "good people" consists in talking with the poor peasants or farm laborers in order to convince them that their "masters" are responsible for all their sufferings and that a better future is possible only if they follow the Communists. Sometimes a cadre may even move into the house of a peasant and stay with him in order to win him over.

As an illustration of the techniques used to win over the "good people," the following story is selected from the much-publicized book *How the Tillers Win Back Their Land*, by Hsiao Ch'ien, one of China's most famous novelists. The book, according to its author, is an eyewitness story of land reform in a village in Hunan.<sup>148</sup>

On the evening of November 28, Fu-chuan [the peasant whom the Party wants to win over] had just come back from where he had been filling his water buckets when he found Comrade Lu of the Work Team waiting for him right there in the kitchen.

The thought immediately occurred to Fu-chuan: someone in uniform, making another arrest perhaps?

'How many buckets of water have you fetched, Fu-chuan?' asked Comrade Lu with a smile. He talked as though they were old friends, and his voice showed both intimacy and concern....

'With only the three of us around these days, four or six buckets would do,' said Fu-chuan, untying the rope around the buckets.

'Where do you have to go to get the water?' Here Comrade Lu helped Fu-chuan move the buckets and stood the pole against the kitchen's blackened wall.

'Three *li* away at the reservoir.'...

'Three *li*?' Lu looked surprised. 'How many buckets a day did you have to fetch before liberation?'

'Those were hard times. Fourteen or sometimes 16 buckets, two at a time, I had to fetch,' sighed Fu-chuan....

'That means seven or eight trips. Three *li* per trip,' calculated Lu Yang. 'So you had to cover over 20 *li* a day merely fetching water. Did you have other jobs as well?'

'Oh, lots!' That he should have so light a load now appeared to Fu-chuan almost a miracle. 'I had to feed the pigs, the cattle, and a foreign-breed dog. I had to spread fertilizer and cultivate some land too.'

'How much land did you have to work on?'

...By adding up individual pieces of land, he [Fu-chuan] finally arrived at the total. 'One *tan* and eight *tau* of land.'

'Let's see,' said Lu Yang, counting rapidly on his fingers. 'That would produce around 70 piculs of grain, wouldn't it?'

'Only in a good year.... But the river is not so obliging. In times of flood, you would consider yourself lucky if you could bring in 50 piculs.'

'How much out of that did Peng Erh-hu give you?' [Peng Erh-hu was the landlord and Fu-chuan's master.]

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<sup>148</sup>Hsiao Ch'ien, *How the Tillers Win Back Their Land*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951).



'Depending on the year, ... sometimes ten piculs. Sometimes seven or eight. I didn't begin to earn full wages until I was 20.'

'Only ten piculs, did you say?' Indignant, Lu Yang climbed off the oven [sic]. 'Tell me, in collecting rent, did he go according to the year too?' he asked sarcastically.

This question left Fu-chuan at a loss for words. Somehow the thought had never occurred to him.

'How long have you been working for him?' went on Lu Yang.

'I started out at six as a cow-herd.' Bitter memories were surging up in his breast. 'Then I began taking on other odds and ends. When I was 14, father died and I became a regular farmhand. I am now 24.'

'You're 24,' repeated Lu Yang. 'You should get a wife.'

'I have no special skill. How could I support her?' sighed Fu-chuan.

'No special skill?' said Lu Yang in disagreement... 'You fetched 14 or 16 buckets of water a day, covered 20 *li* and fed cattle and pigs. You cultivated one *tan* and eight *tau* of land with a yearly output of 60 or 70 piculs of grain. And you talk about not having any skill?'

'Well, no skill and no luck.' He really had not been getting his due, thought Fu-chuan vaguely. 'Take the Second Master. He could write and do arithmetic. So there he was eating and drinking his fill every year without even having to cross the threshold.'

'Brother, you really are silly,' exclaimed Lu Yang with a mixed feeling of bitterness and sympathy.... 'It wasn't because of his skill or his 'luck,' as you put it. Land and feudal influence were what turned the trick. He had been exploiting you.'

'Exploit?' The meaning of such a term was entirely lost on Fu-chuan.

'Yes, exploit. A mixture of open robbery and pocket picking,' explained Lu Yang, accompanying his words with suitable gestures. 'Now you, for example, turned out 70 piculs. He gave you only ten. That means he had exploited 60 piculs from you. You have worked for him 18 years. Say he gave you ten piculs every year (actually you often got less) and we still have the staggering sum of 1,080 piculs of grain—the amount he exploited from you.'

'But,' said Fu-chuan in a feeble voice, 'the land was his.'

'Indeed? Now tell me. How did he get his land in the first place?' Lu Yang and Fu-chuan stood up simultaneously at this point.

'The land was left behind by his grandfather. First Master and Second Master each got a portion.' Fu-chuan was trying to defend the Pengs [the landlords], but he could not help feeling that perhaps he had not been treated right after all.

'And how did his grandfather get the land? Come, tell me.' Lu Yang's voice now sounded almost as though it were edged with steel. The cross-examination was proving too much for Fu-chuan.

'Well, his grandfather was a magistrate in the Manchu days,' was all that Fu-chuan could answer.

'Right you are.' The answer seemed to have furnished additional proof of Lu Yang's argument. 'And all that a magistrate loved was to hear money clink. The money was squeezed from your grandfather by Peng Erh-hu's grandfather, and then used to buy land so that you in turn could be exploited.'



Fu-chuan was struck speechless....

That evening Lu Yang returned with his quilt. Fu-chuan had willingly agreed to his staying there and the two of them spent the better part of the night in a heart-to-heart talk, lying side by side in a narrow bamboo bed.<sup>149</sup>

As the story went, Lu and Fu-chuan became friends and Lu successfully indoctrinated Fu-chuan until the latter became a very "bold" and "aggressive" peasant, accusing and "clearing accounts with" his masters in the mass meetings.

After the cadres have won over a certain number of such poor peasants or farm laborers as Fu-chuan and after they have rounded up a sufficient number of "activists," they train these people to influence other peasants. This is what they call "individual contact chains," which we have discussed previously.

In the meantime the Communist cadres try to solve certain ideological problems of the peasants before accusation meetings are started. One official directive from the Party states:

Before *tou cheng* is formally started, most of the poor peasants and farm laborers encounter the following ideological problems: (1) They feel reluctant to participate in struggle against their masters.... (2) They have the courage to struggle against only secondary enemies and are afraid of the influential despots or powerful landlords.... (3) They are concerned with their own clans. For instance, members of the Li clan are more anxious to struggle against those of the Chang or Wang clans than against those of their own clan. (4) Some of them go to extremes in the struggle because they are afraid of any possible comeback of their enemies. The result is indiscriminate slaughter or beating...<sup>150</sup>

When the Communist cadres feel confident that the "class consciousness" of the peasants has reached a certain level, accusation meetings begin to take place. There are accusation meetings in different stages of land reform in a village. First, there are accusation meetings in small group discussions. Then there are accusation meetings held among poor peasants and farm laborers. There are also mass accusation meetings of all peasants, including middle peasants and even rich peasants. When land reform reaches the stage of differentiating class status, accusation meetings again are held. Then there are accusations in the bloodiest "struggle meetings" against landlords and "counter-revolutionaries."

There are many tricks employed in these accusation meetings. These tricks have acquired different names in different parts of China. This is because the Communists like to express their terms or methods in a colloquial manner that may be easily understood by the common people.

However, the methods that are commonly used in accusation meetings before actual struggle or action against the landlords or "counter-revolutionaries" include the following:

1. "To report on sufferings"—The Chinese expression for this technique is *pao shang tang*, which literally means "to expose experiences of being cheated, deceived, or victimized." Peasants are urged to recall their experiences of being "used as tools" by the landlords to achieve the latter's "treacherous" objectives. According to the Communists, landlords are all desperate to save their properties before they are openly accused and condemned; they usually ask their tenants or farm laborers to hide their properties in different homes or in concealed places.

The campaign 'to report on sufferings' before the differentiation of class status is a political attack, so far as the enemies (landlords) are concerned. Its main purpose is not to demand the return of properties (from landlords) but to enrich the political meaning of class differentiation, to expose the shameful and criminal behavior of the landlord class and to isolate and attack this class. So far as the

<sup>149</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 42-7.

<sup>150</sup>*Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton), December 26, 1951.

peasants are concerned, this campaign is the most powerful political mobilization before actual fighting starts.... It is also the best method to test to what extent the cadres follow the 'mass line' policy.<sup>151</sup>

2. "To compare living"—This is to ask the peasants to describe how their own living is different from that of their "masters," and to make the peasants feel that the "luxurious life" of the landlords is built upon the peasants' hardships. Peasant Chang may speak about his experiences of walking 50 miles merely to buy the particular kind of food which his master especially likes. Peasant Li may complain about his experiences of starvation while his master's dogs eat beef and his cats have fish. Some other peasants may compare their children, who serve as cowherds, with those of their masters, who have the privilege of going to school. A very common complaint is that sons of peasants were "drafted" into the armed forces during the Kuomintang days but that sons of wealthy families always had ways of getting out of the army. With the "clever direction" of cadres it is possible that a class hatred can be stirred up among peasants.

3. "To compare sufferings"—This is a favorite trick of the Communist cadres to "sharpen the class hatred among peasants." When one peasant finishes "pouring out his bitterness," another peasant is urged to speak out to show that his sufferings are indeed worse than those of the other one. If one peasant complains that his father had once been beaten by landlords, another peasant may assert that his mother was actually hanged by "Kuomintang officials," working in cooperation with "landlords." As one peasant outdoes another in describing past experiences of suffering, the cadres see to it that the mass sentiment is kept at the "boiling point."

4. "To dig out the root of bitterness"—This is generally considered by the Communists as the most important part of the accusation meeting. A capable cadre, according to the Communists, is one who can "ably and cleverly conclude" all the experiences of bitterness of the masses and thus lead them to discover the root of all their sufferings—evils of "feudalism," "imperialism," "Kuomintang regime," and other "enemies of the people."

In one *hsiang*, the cadres even planned a memorial meeting in commemoration of the dead, trying to make the whole *hsiang* "weep for the sufferings of the peasants who died in the hands of the landlords." One cadre described it thus:

Wreaths and commemorative scrolls were sent in by the peasants' associations, the local branch of the Trade and Industry Association, the Association of Medical Workers, and the Land Reform Work Teams. An epitaph was read:

You toiled like cattle while the landlords rolled in wealth at their ease.  
The Kuomintang robbed and killed you.... The devilish American  
imperialists dragged you away to build airfields, whence their planes  
rose to bomb your own people.... High rent, heavy usury, and death  
was the 'fate' of peasants....<sup>152</sup>

After these words were recited, a wave of bitter hatred for the murderous regime of the past filled every heart. Cadres and peasants wept together. But out of that deep sorrow came new strength to continue the struggle for a happy future.<sup>153</sup>

After a series of accusation meetings in the initial stage of land reform in a village, cadres generally meet together to discuss to what degree the "evils of landlords" have been exposed and understood by the peasants. When they feel confident that farm hands, poor peasants, and middle peasants are "closely united," that rich peasants are "neutralized," and that "landlords" are "isolated," the cadres begin to proceed to the next stage—the differentiation of class status.

In small and large meetings peasants are taught the meaning of class, and of class differentiation and how to "make a clear demarcation line between enemies and ourselves

<sup>151</sup> *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton), February 27, 1952.

<sup>152</sup> It is significant to note that in this short epitaph, the Communists list all the "enemies" defined by the Party. "American imperialism," too, is brought in here.

<sup>153</sup> *People's China* (Peking), May 16, 1952, p. 26.

[peasants] in land reform as a class struggle." Then they are led to discuss how to differentiate classes in the countryside and then to apply the Party's policies to concrete cases.

The differentiation of class status, according to the Communists, is an important phase of the propaganda warfare, because it is at this stage that the peasants are seriously indoctrinated about the concept of class and about the policies of the Party. Comments one Communist cadre:

Determining the class status of the rural population was an impressive political lesson, not only to the peasant masses who learned to recognize the faces of their enemies and friends, but also for the landlords and other reactionary elements. Self-recognition of their reactionary class nature was essential if they were to remould themselves to live honourably in the new society.<sup>154</sup>

Accusation meetings are again held during this stage of differentiating class status. The first task in this stage is generally "first to differentiate the enemies (landlords) and then the friends (poor peasants, farm hands, middle peasants)." In other words, landlords are singled out first. Needless to say, this is to create the obvious "enemies" or "foes" for the peasants to "struggle" against.

A commonly used method against the landlords on these occasions is what the Communists call "three examinations." First, the peasants are led to examine the "political and economic crimes of the landlords in the past." These "crimes" according to the Communists, include usury, high rent on land, past association with the Kuomintang government, etc. Second, the peasants are told to examine "the reasons for the landlords' getting wealthy." In other words, how did a landlord become a landlord? If he inherited the land, how did his parents or ancestors get the land? Third, the peasants are urged to examine the "unlawful behavior of the landlords after liberation." If a landlord had shown any sign of reluctance or expressed any skepticism concerning land reform, he could be charged as "plotting against the new government" and his skeptical words could be regarded as "poisonous rumors" designed to influence the peasants.

One can readily see that no landlord can possibly clear himself after the "three examinations." Even if a landlord happens to get his land from inheritance, he can at least be charged as "reaping the harvest of exploitation in the hand of his ancestors."

Following is a description of how one landlord is "differentiated" in one village in Chung Shan, a *hsien* in Kwangtung, where Dr. Sun Yat-sen was born. The story is reported in the Party's official organ in Canton.<sup>155</sup>

...Landlord Yuan, who was lame, was extraordinarily cunning and stubborn. When the peasants asked him about his history of getting wealthy, Yuan said: 'I established myself by my two bare hands.'

Angrily, the peasants protested: 'There is no such thing as establishing oneself by his bare hands. You had better tell the truth. Hurry.'

[Yuan answered] 'You probably remember that I once sold *won ton* [a kind of Chinese food similar to ravioli]. I established myself that way.'

That was a fact and the peasants temporarily became silent. After some 'brewing' [this means some discussion among peasants], one peasant stood up and asked:

'Where did you get your capital for selling *won ton*?'

'My mother gave it to me.'

'What was your mother?'

'Landlord.'

<sup>154</sup> *People's China* (Peking), No. 11, June 1, 1952, p. 24.

<sup>155</sup> *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton), December 26, 1951.

'Where did the landlord get her money?'

[The peasants] 'Your mother got her money by exploiting us peasants. Since you got your money through the hands of your mother, you actually established yourself by exploitation too.'

Yuan had nothing to explain and the peasants won the first round of the battle. Then the peasants accused him of exploiting the peasants.

Yuan defended himself: 'First, I did not have any employed labor. Second, I did not lend out money for interest. Third, I collected no rent. How could I exploit?'

One peasant immediately stood up: 'I once worked for you, remember?'

[Yuan] 'That was temporary help for a couple of days. You could not call that exploitation.'

The peasants were at a loss for words for a while....

After some more 'brewing' in small group discussions, more than ten people stood up and asked: 'Hello, Yuan, do you recognize us? We all worked for you once.'

At this time Yuan had nothing to say. The peasants had already calculated that Yuan had employed a total of 72 months of labor from outside....

The story went on to describe how the peasants "settled their accounts" with Yuan. Yuan's lame foot was not considered as an acceptable excuse for his not engaging in manual labor. When Yuan explained that his wife could not work too much in the farm because she had six children, he again was "refuted." One woman peasant said: "I have eight children. I too worked." The result was that Yuan was "differentiated" as a landlord and the peasants won a complete victory over the case of the lame Yuan.

It is significant to note that the Communist cadres would not allow the omission of a "fierce struggle" against a landlord even if he immediately admits to being one. He has to "confess" why he is a "landlord" and how he became one. This practice, according to the Communists, is to "shatter the power and prestige of the landlords before the peasants" and "to give the peasants a chance to personally understand the evils of the landlords as the latter themselves confess them."<sup>156</sup>

With regard to the differentiation of class status among farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, the Communists have adopted a very different approach. According to the Communists, these people are all "brethren" and members of the "united front" so that they should not "struggle" against themselves; instead, they differentiate their class status by "criticism and self-criticism." The treatment of rich peasants is much milder than that of landlords, but much more harsh than that of poor or middle peasants.

When the task of the differentiation of class status is completed in a village, land reform moves on to its climax—"struggle meetings" or "public trials" of the "unlawful landlords." Here again are accusations. One after another the peasants, who are already briefed by the cadres, "pour out their grievances" against the landlords and "demand" severe punishments. Then the cadres "sum up" all the "crimes" of the landlords and report the "debt of exploitation" which the "guilty landlords" owe the peasants. Very often this part of the show ends with the on-the-spot execution of the landlords "in answer to the popular demand of the masses."

Then comes the stage for the distribution of land among peasants after the landlords have been "settled with" and their land and properties have been confiscated and requisitioned. Here again Communist propaganda is at work. According to one official Communist directive,

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<sup>156</sup> *Loc. cit.*

there are several "ideological problems" among peasants at this stage.<sup>157</sup> First, the "activists" tend to feel that they have worked hard in land reform and particularly in "struggling" against landlords and that they should deserve a large share in the division of land. Second, many peasants are reluctant to accept the Party's standard of dividing land; they believe that land should be divided according to their "contributions" to the Party. Third, the peasants who are given land consider it "extra income earned with no effort," and do not take good care of it. Another very serious "ideological problem," according to the Communists, is to make the peasants understand why "rich peasants" are preserved and how they are "differentiated." To solve these "ideological problems," Communist cadres often work long hours, both in group discussions and personal interview, to "educate" the peasants.

The final stage of land reform is "inspection and winding-up." After all left-over problems are solved, a mass meeting is called to celebrate the conclusion of land reform. At this meeting, the old title-deeds are burned in public, and long speeches are made by cadres urging peasants to show their "appreciation" to the Party by working hard and producing more. "Activists" again take the lead in speaking of the greatness of the Party and expressing their gratitude to Mao and his cadres. "From then on, the peasants are to work out their plans to increase production and to enter into a period of political reform."<sup>158</sup> These plans, generally in the form of a "pact," are again "agreed upon" in small and large group discussions and approved by the cadres who see to it that the plans are actually carried out.

Propaganda work continues even after the land reform. In most cases the "activists" in land reform are organized to form "propaganda networks" to carry on propaganda work among peasants "in all places and at all times."

This is a general sketch of the political or propaganda tasks in land reform in order to show that political indoctrination is one, if not the most, important aspect of land reform. To see how the Communists feel about their land reform, let us read the following passage taken from the diary of a Chinese Communist land reform cadre:

Gathered for the homeward journey at the *hsiang* work team headquarters, Kuo Ping, the team leader, assessed the work of the twelve 'Peking comrades.' He pointed out our particular success in two things. We had successfully helped in rousing the political consciousness of the peasants. The fact that the accusation meetings against the counter-revolutionary despots were effective, had a decisive influence in mobilizing the masses and dealing successfully with the landlords. The other good point was that we had strictly performed our duty as propagandists of government policy and had encouraged the peasants to do what they could and ought to do, instead of doing things for them. We had also effectively helped the peasant representatives to set up systematic methods of work and the correct practice of criticism and self-criticism....<sup>159</sup>

<sup>157</sup> *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton), December 26, 1951.

<sup>158</sup> Kiang Wen-han, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>159</sup> *People's China*, No. 11, June 1, 1952, p. 26.



## PROPAGANDA FOR THE INTELLIGENTSIA

The Chinese Communist Party accepts, in addition to workers and peasants, two "allies" of the proletarian revolution: the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The characteristics of these two classes and their position in the Communist society have already been discussed in a previous chapter in connection with the Party's united front policy. How the Party deals with the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie of the industrial and business circles is taken up in another study on the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns.<sup>160</sup> This chapter is limited to a discussion of certain groups of the petty bourgeoisie, mainly the intelligentsia; it gives special attention to the Party's propaganda program concerning the intellectuals.<sup>161</sup>

### *Treatment of the Intelligentsia*

The Communists recognize the importance of the intelligentsia in Chinese society. Early in 1939 Mao Tse-tung wrote: "The organization of revolutionary forces and the accomplishment of revolutionary tasks cannot succeed without the participation of the intelligentsia."<sup>162</sup> The Party's need for the intelligentsia has become increasingly acute today because it has to depend upon the educated people to help carry out its programs. In 1948, when the Communists were well on their way to the control of the Chinese mainland, the late Jen Pi-shih declared: "At present, we do not yet have enough educated people and experts; we must try our best to win over the existing intelligentsia, particularly the experts, to work for the people."<sup>163</sup>

The Communists believe that educated people possess certain qualities that are extremely useful or helpful to the Party. First, these people are much more ready than workers or peasants to accept new ideas. Said Mao: "The intelligentsia first accepted and spread the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism in China."<sup>164</sup> Second, the intelligentsia are more interested in social changes than workers or peasants. Mao also said: "They [the intelligentsia] were among the early groups that became class-conscious in the revolution; this is proved by both the May Fourth Movement and the Chinese Revolution in 1911."<sup>165</sup> Third, many, if not most, of the intelligentsia were unhappy under the Nationalist government and anxious for a change. The Communists were certainly exaggerating when they said: "The majority of them [intelligentsia] were in financial difficulty and politically oppressed under the Kuomintang regime; most of them were disillusioned with the corrupt behavior of Chiang Kai-shek and American imperialism and, to a certain extent, sympathetic

<sup>160</sup> See Wen-Hui C. Chen, "Mass Movements" in *Communist China—A Study of Nation-wide Campaigns in Support of the Korean War*, chaps. VII and VIII, Preliminary hectographed edition, Series II, No. 4, 1952, "Studies in Chinese Communism," produced under Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 through the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (Supply exhausted. To be published in re-edited form by the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center.)

<sup>161</sup> See footnote 2 for the operational definitions of the words "intelligentsia" and "intellectuals" used in this report.

<sup>162</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "On Intelligentsia and Students," in Chieh Fang She (ed.), *Chih Shih Fen Tzu Yü Chiao Yu Wen Ti (Intelligentsia and Educational Problems)* (Canton: Hsin Hua Shu Tien, 1949), p. 6.

<sup>163</sup> Jen Pi-shih, "The Problem of Intelligentsia," *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>164</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "On Intelligentsia and Students," *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>165</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "May Fourth Movement," *Ibid.*, p. 3.

with revolutionary movements.”<sup>166</sup> Nevertheless, it is a fact that students and intellectuals were extremely critical of the Kuomintang regime shortly before the Communists took over China.

So far as the Chinese Communists are concerned, these qualities of the intelligentsia do not necessarily mean that the intelligentsia can therefore be trusted without being “thoroughly re-educated.” According to the Communists, the educated people have many “weaknesses,” which over-shadow their “aggressiveness” or “progressiveness.” A Communist writer summarizes the weaknesses of the intelligentsia as follows:<sup>167</sup>

1. They (the intelligentsia) are strong in the sense of class superiority and look down on workers and peasants whom they consider “stupid, clumsy and disgusting.”
2. They find it hard to understand that the Communist revolution is led by the proletarian class. They agree that the revolution is led by Mao and the Communist Party but refuse to accept that it is led by the working class. Their arguments: (a) The Chinese working class is a minority group which is educationally backward; it is inconceivable that this class should have the leadership in the revolution. (b) Very few of the Communist leaders—including Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and many others—belong to the proletarian class. (c) Traditionally, leadership in revolutionary movements belongs to the intelligentsia.
3. They are “hopelessly poisoned by capitalist education.” They “misunderstand” the Soviet Union; they “blindly worship” America; they have “ridiculous notions” concerning “state,” “people,” “government,” “politics,” and “democracy.”
4. They are mostly “sentimentalists” and “reformists.” “They disliked the corruption of the Kuomintang and hoped for a change; but they did not want the change to be bloody.... They favor land reform but are afraid of *tou cheng* (struggle)... They always hoped for a ‘compromise’ between Communists and Nationalists.”
5. They have “complicated relationships” with various parties, cliques, or organizations.
6. They are often “contradictory” in their own thinking.
7. Those with a student background are “too eager” about communism in the beginning and “easily discouraged” when they see any “imperfection” in the new regime. They love freedom, resent discipline, and hate to hear the words “reform” or “re-education.”
8. Those who were formerly in the educational field or government have a strong sense of “self-respect” and “dignity.” They hate to openly “criticize” others or be “criticized.” “They love to talk about theories but do not care to integrate them with reality.”
9. Those who were formerly low-rank government employees lack “initiative” in doing things. They are accustomed to taking orders from above.
10. Those of a landlord or rich peasant background mostly have a low respect for Party cadres and resent those in their home towns. They cannot understand why their law-abiding parents should be made to suffer from *tou cheng*. Many of them favor the idea of dividing land among the poor, but they can not appreciate the necessity of a “bloody struggle.”
11. They resent participation in physical labor. They do not object to hard work, but they prefer to use their brains instead of their hands.

To “correct” these “erroneous beliefs and behaviors” is the central task of Communist propaganda with regard to the intelligentsia. In other words, Communist propaganda work in this regard emphasizes ideological indoctrination, which is now commonly referred to as “brain-washing.”

When the Chinese Communists first came into power on the mainland in 1949 they adopted a lenient policy toward the intelligentsia. The slogan at that period was “to win over, unite, reform and cultivate all educated people,” convince the intelligentsia that their position and leadership in the Communist society would not be challenged, that their services to the new regime were earnestly solicited, and that their professional freedom would not be molested. The Party even went so far as

<sup>166</sup>Jen Pi-shih, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>167</sup>Hsiao Yun, “Experiences of Reforming High-class Intelligentsia,” *Jen Min Chiao Yü* (People's Education, a professional monthly on education published in Peking), Vol. I, No. 3, July 1, 1950, pp. 42-46.

to promise "academic freedom" and "religious freedom" and to invite intellectuals to participate in the administration.

A somewhat converse aspect of Communist policy of propaganda concerned with the intelligentsia at that time, however, was explicitly expressed in an official directive issued by one of the Party's central bureaus in October 1948.<sup>168</sup> The directive specified that the main form of "reforming" the intelligentsia was "to train them in actual struggle" but that preliminary steps must be taken to indoctrinate them. The directive stipulated that government agencies or institutions at all levels were to "utilize all opportunities (such as lectures, mass meetings, cultural, and recreational activities) and use all mass media (such as newspapers, bulletins, slogans, pamphlets, cartoons, and others) ... in order to explain the Party's policies concerning the intelligentsia, point out the correct road for them to follow, eliminate their worries and make them understand us and come close to us." Short-course schools and indoctrination classes were to be opened to mobilize all intelligentsia to participate in *hsüeh hsi* or study. In such schools or classes, lasting about three or four months for each term, the main courses to be studied were current affairs, fundamental problems concerning China's revolution, and the Party's major policies. In each locality the "people's government" was to sponsor and organize different kinds of discussion meetings for political re-education of the intelligentsia.

The directive even instructed the Party cadres not to be too harsh to the intelligentsia, so far as their daily lives were concerned. It stated: "Toward the intelligentsia who are new in an indoctrination program, it is better to be slightly generous concerning their food, clothing and equipment. Ideologically, however, they must be taught to learn to be thrifty and to appreciate hardship." The directive also warned against any drastic or severe measures, such as "three examinations" or "ideological remoulding" in the non-Party schools or indoctrination classes. The recommended methods were group discussion, debates, bulletin boards, and group activities.

To a certain extent the Communists were probably quite successful in creating a favorable impression among the intelligentsia during the early period of the Communist regime. In the Communist press the intelligentsia were reported to have come to the Party "in flocks." Even Western missionaries and reporters, until they were forced out of China later, agreed that the intelligentsia, particularly professors, school teachers, and students, were quite "enthusiastic" about the Communist regime.

Immediately after the Communists took over the control of the Chinese mainland there were three noticeable changes in the life of the intelligentsia: (1) participation in political education, (2) participation in group activities, and (3) participation in physical labor. By a careful examination of these changes one can easily detect some of the real intentions of the Communists in regard to their propaganda.

The so-called "political education" came in the form of *hsüeh hsi* or study. Here the intelligentsia began to have their first taste of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's ideology, and an introduction to the Party's fundamental principles and policies. They were also taught their first lessons in criticism and self-criticism. The methods of *hsüeh hsi* for the intelligentsia were not fundamentally different from those used among workers or peasants, except that the intelligentsia were given a much heavier dose of Communist theories than either workers or peasants. One Communist writer remarks: "The intelligentsia (especially the intellectuals) are brain workers; they love to talk about theories. Once they are defeated in the realm of theory, all other problems can be solved."<sup>169</sup>

Participation of the intelligentsia in group activities was not "required" but strongly "urged." Extra-curricular activities have become unusually heavy in colleges and schools for both professors and students. They are asked to take part in "current affairs discussions," "newspaper-reading groups," "study groups," "literary soirees," "yang ko dances," and many other forms of the so-called "cultural and recreational activities." Even shop owners or managers of private firms have to "study" together

<sup>168</sup> "Directive issued by the Central Plain Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Winning Over, Uniting, Reforming, and Cultivation of Intelligentsia," in Chieh Fang She, (ed.) *op. cit.*, pp. 34-9.

<sup>169</sup> Hsiao Yun, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

with their employees, including their apprentices. In addition, there are numerous occasions calling for celebrations, parades, demonstrations, or other mass gatherings that are attended by all people.

There are several political reasons why the intelligentsia are mobilized to participate in group activities. First, the Communists are apparently trying to erase the line of class distinction between the intelligentsia and common workers or peasants. The intelligentsia are forced out of their exclusive circles to "join the masses." In a way this is to eradicate the sense of class superiority on the part of the intelligentsia and to boost the "feeling of equality" on the part of common laborers who, according to the Communists, have suffered much from an "inferiority complex." Second, the Communists want to make use of the intelligentsia in propaganda work. Take the newspaper-reading groups, for instance. In many factories, engineers, draftsmen, technicians, clerks, or other literate workers of the white-collar class are "requested" to read newspapers to illiterate workers and help the workers in their "cultural studies." In this way the Communists can get not only the free service of the literates but also expose them to the propaganda materials which they would probably throw away if they were not required to perform the reading role. Third, these group activities that are heavily seasoned with propaganda have occupied almost every spare moment of an intellectual when he is off duty and left him with practically no time for other thinking.

Participation in physical labor is an entirely new experience for the intelligentsia, particularly the intellectuals. Professors and students are now asked to plant vegetables, feed pigs, clean buildings, scrub floors, or build houses. Sometimes a "group project" is undertaken under the "stimulation and encouragement" of Party cadres or activists.

The Communists believe that the intelligentsia must, through participation in physical labor, get a "living education" in the important Communist doctrine: labor creates the world. Chien Chun-jui says: "Above all, we must endeavour in our educational work to cultivate the viewpoint and habit of honouring and loving labour, and we must eliminate the viewpoint and habit of despising labour and workers."<sup>170</sup>

An important method of political education for the intelligentsia is to organize them into teams to participate in land reform. These teams have served several functions for the Communists. First, the intellectuals were given a chance to witness the "crimes of feudalistic landlords and counter-revolutionaries" as well as "the enthusiasm of peasants" as they were staged by the Communist cadres. Second, intellectuals were taught by actual examples the methods of "class struggle." Third, after each team of intellectuals returned from a village, each person was asked to write his "thought conclusions." The "conclusions" that were accepted by the Party were published in the press for obvious propaganda purposes. At one time when the land reform movement was in full swing, the Communist newspapers and magazines were practically flooded with articles written by professors, scholars, and men of note. Many of these articles were edited and appeared in the form of books or booklets.<sup>171</sup> The "conclusions" that failed to satisfy the Party were also useful to the cadres. They helped indicate the "ideological weaknesses" of the writers, most of whom were then scheduled for "further re-education."

Participation in land reform is a form of "learning by doing" for the intellectuals. Besides, the intelligentsia as well as people of all other walks of life are "mobilized" and "organized" to participate in many other campaigns. Take the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign, for instance. Medical doctors and nurses "voluntarily" organized "medical and surgical corps" to serve on the Korean front; American-educated professors "enthusiastically" exposed the "crimes" of the "American imperialists" as they had experienced and observed them; playwrights and novelists wrote about the "heroic deeds" of the North Koreans and "Chinese volunteers." By such active participation, the Communists believe that ideological indoctrination will be more effectively carried out.

The Chinese Communists probably realized in 1951 that after two years of intensive political propaganda they had not advanced very far in reshaping the minds of the intelligentsia,

<sup>170</sup> Chien Chun-jui, "The Policy of Educational Construction in Present Day China," *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>171</sup> Wu Ching-chao, Yang Jen-ken, Lai Hai-tung & Others (ed.), *op. cit.*

particularly the intellectuals. It may be easy to lead illiterate workers and peasants to believe that Marxism-Leninism is the "truth" which can save the world, that Soviet Russia is today a paradise on earth, or that Mao Tse-tung is a savior who never errs. The Party cadres probably found out that it was much more difficult to convince the intelligentsia, especially the professors and scholars of these things.

Vice-Minister of Education Chien Chun-jui openly complained of the failure of university professors to co-operate with the People's Government. He wrote in 1951:

The experience of these two years has shown that if the professors still maintain their reactionary mind and their English-American capitalist class mentality, if they persist in sticking to their individualism and their objectivism and their various branches of thought, and do not endeavour to reform their minds, then all the work of educational reform, the reorganizing of the faculties and departments, the reform of teaching schedules and methods, will be difficult to achieve; and the regulations for the reform of higher education must inevitably remain a dead letter. Have not the slowness and the lack of progress of the great majority of professors in the past two years been a sufficient proof of this?<sup>172</sup>

When the vice-minister of education admitted that the "great majority" of professors were "slow in progress," one can be assured of strong resistance of the educational workers to the Communist propaganda. But the Communists, as we now know, are no defeatists. In order to tighten the screws of thought control and stamp out all resistance to the Party's propaganda program, the Communists initiated in September 1951 a series of campaigns to "ideologically remould" the intelligentsia, particularly the intellectuals.

#### *"Ideological Remoulding Campaign for Professors"*

This campaign, according to an authoritative educational monthly, was touched off in September 1951 when more than 3,000 teachers of higher educational institutions in Peking and Tientsin were "mobilized" to participate in the "remoulding courses."<sup>173</sup> About 20 universities and colleges, including the famous Peking University, Tsing Hua, Nan Kai, and the Peking Union Medical College were involved in this program. To stress the importance of the program, Premier Chou En-lai delivered the opening speech, which lasted five and one half hours.<sup>174</sup> He stressed the importance of "remoulding" one's ideas so that they can be "fit" for serving the people.<sup>175</sup> A special committee, headed by the Minister of Education Ma Shu-lun, was organized to guide this work of remoulding the professors.

The campaign in Peking and Tientsin was the beginning of a nation-wide movement. "Ideological remoulding campaigns" were soon launched in Shanghai, Hankow, Canton, Chungking, and other major cities. Mao Tse-tung emphasized the importance of the campaign when he declared at the third session of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference: "Ideological remoulding, especially of the intelligentsia, is the most important requirement for the realization of democratic reform and industrialization."<sup>176</sup>

The objective of the so-called "ideological remoulding campaign," according to Teng Tsu-hui, a top-ranking leader in the Central-South Area, is "to correct one's standpoint, views and methods." In other words, one should have the "standpoint of serving the people, the views of materialism,

<sup>172</sup> Chien Chun-jui, "Key to the Reform of Higher Education," *Hsueh Hsi*, (Peking), Vol. V, No. 1, November 1, 1951, pp. 10-11.

<sup>173</sup> *Jen Min Chiao Yu* (People's Education, Peking), Vol. IV, No. 1, November 1, 1951, p. 11.

<sup>174</sup> Chen Ren-bing, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

<sup>175</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>176</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Opening Speech," *Chung Kuo Jen Min Chen Chih Hsieh Shang Hui I Ti I Kai Ch'uan Kuo Wei Yuan Hui Ti San Tz'u Hui I Wen Chien* (Important Documents of the Third Session of the First Conference of the National Committee of the PPCC), (Peking: Jen Min Ch'u Pan She, 1951), p. 2.



and the methods of dialectics."<sup>177</sup> These vaguely phrased remarks are, in fact, similar to the themes that are repeated day in and day out in all Communist indoctrination. One really has to go beneath the surface of these statements to discover the political intentions of the Communists in the "ideological remoulding campaign."

In the first place, in the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns the Communists have indeed openly declared war against the national and petty bourgeois classes, supposedly "allies" in the proletarian revolution. It is true, of course, that the fiercest battles of the war have been fought against the national bourgeoisie in the industries and business. It is also true, however, that the bourgeoisie as a whole are now under fire. The Communists have not yet bothered to make a differentiation between the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. A recent book, entitled *How the Bourgeois Class Have Ruthlessly Attacked Us*, contains 12 articles previously published in newspapers.<sup>178</sup> The theme of all these articles is essentially the same: the bourgeois class is guilty. This shows that the Communists are no longer tolerant of the bourgeoisie, nor of the standpoints, views, or methods associated with the bourgeoisie. Since the intelligentsia, especially the intellectuals, are a part of the bourgeoisie, their thoughts have to be completely changed in order to "be fit for serving the people."

Secondly, very few of the Party leaders and even fewer of their cadres, are educated enough to command the respect of the intellectuals. Since the intellectuals are in no position to engage in any academic argument or discussion of the orthodox Party doctrines, they tend to retreat into silence. To break the silence, the cadres attack it as "aloofness from politics." Furthermore, instead of engaging in any argument with the intellectuals, the Communists have invented a much better way to fight the ideological battle. They make the intellectuals "confess" their own "mistakes" and "crimes" and denounce the "poisonous ideology of the bourgeoisie."

Thirdly, the intellectuals, as we have pointed out, have always commanded respect in Chinese society. Until 1951, their leadership had not been seriously challenged by the Communists who had to solicit their services. It is apparent that the Party could not tolerate any type of leadership other than its own. Therefore, by carrying out the "ideological remoulding campaign" which requires every scholar to "remorsefully renounce" his past, the Communists can achieve a political victory: to crush the prestige of the intellectuals before the Chinese people.

Fourthly, the Chinese Communists want to use the intellectuals as examples to influence the common people. When professors and scholars praise the "correctness" and "usefulness" of Marxism-Leninism, the Communists hope that the common people will be more inclined to accept the new ideology.

The methods of the "ideological remoulding" of university professors fall under three main headings: (1) *hsüeh hsi*, (2) criticism and self-criticism, and (3) integration of theory with practice. Chien Chun-jui recommends in a speech three points concerning the methods of organizing and directing *hsüeh hsi* among professors:<sup>179</sup>

1. *Hsüeh hsi* must be integrated with reality. 'Pick up a definite problem and unite it with your own ideology, then analyze and discuss it.'
2. Try out new methods in small groups and then apply them on a large scale if they are successful.
3. Use such methods as the 'nucleus meetings' originated in Tsing Hua University, and the 'mutual assistance meetings' that are practiced in Peking University. Frequently hold meetings of activists, at least once every week. Mobilize staff members, students and workers to offer suggestions to professors for their criticism and self-criticism.

<sup>177</sup> *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), January 15, 1952.

<sup>178</sup> *Tsu Ch'an Chieh Chi Shih Tsen Yang Ch'ang K'uang Chin Kung Ti*, (*How the Bourgeois Class Has Ruthlessly Attacked Us*), (Peking: Kuang Ming Jih Pao She, 1952).

<sup>179</sup> *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), November 11, 1951.

Exactly how the "ideological remoulding campaign" is carried out is seldom discussed in Communist literature. What is clearly known now, however, are the results of the program. Shortly after the professors in Peking and Tientsin were "mobilized" to take part in the program late in September 1951, there appeared a continuous stream of lengthy articles in the Communist newspapers—"confessions" of professors, famous doctors, specialists, and scholars of note. Practically all writers of the articles follow the same pattern: they admit having been influenced by their early "feudal" family background and "imperialistic" education, declare that their whole past life and work have been wrong, apologize for their wrong attitude toward the working class, claim that they have found the "truth" in Marxism-Leninism and Mao's ideology, and express "gratitude" to Mao and the Chinese Communist Party. Almost every such article or "confession" ends with the promise that the writer will improve himself and do his best to serve the people from now on, despite his age and former "mental deformity."

In the month of November 1951, the *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Feking) published a total of 28 articles written by very prominent professors in Peking and Tientsin, including such well-known figures as Dean Chien Tuan-sheng of the Law College of Peking University and Dr. Li Tsung-en, Dean of the Peking Union Medical College. A list of the topics of these articles, together with the names and positions of the writers, follows. Even a quick glance at the topics is sufficient to make one understand the general content of the articles and feel the driving force that motivates every professor to "confess."

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Topic</i>
1951			
11/3	Chou, P'ei-yuan	Dean of Studies (Tsing Hua University)	"What I Understand about Political Study."
11/4	Kin, K'e-mo	Prof. of Oriental Studies (Peking University)	"Political Study Must Solve Practical Problems."
11/5	Sung, Kuo-hua	Prof. of Psychology (Tsing Hua University)	"To Determine to Re- mould Ideology."
11/5	Tsai, Tsu-lan	Prof. of Biology (Tsing Hua University)	"Experiences in Criticism and Self-criticism."
11/8	Ch'ien, Yun-ken	Associate Prof. (Nan Kai University)	"To be Brave in Exposing Errors, To Seriously Remould Ideology."
11/10	Kin, Yo-lin	Head, Philosophy Dept. (Tsing Hua University)	"To Analyze My Ideas Before Liberation."
11/11	Ch'ang Yun-pin	Prof. of Zoology (Peking University)	"My Change in the Past Three Years & My Study in This Ideological Remoulding Campaign."
11/12	Hu, Wei-po	Prof. of Engineering (Hua Pei University)	"I Urgently Need to Study & Be Ideologically Re- formed."
11/17	T'eng, Chia-tung	Prof. of Internal Medicine (P.U.M.C.) <sup>180</sup>	"We Must Criticize Our Past Compromise."

<sup>180</sup> P.U.M.C. stands for Peking Union Medical College, the best-known medical college in China, formerly sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. The Communists have changed its name to Chinese Union Medical College.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Topic</i>
1951			
11/17	Wu, Ta-yuan	Head, Dept. of Foreign Languages (Tsing Hua University)	"To Deny the Past, To Remould Ideology."
11/18	Chou, Fa-chi	Dean of Studies (Hua Pei University)	"My Preliminary Understanding & Experiences in <i>Hsueh Hsi</i> ."
11/19	Ma, Ta-yu	Dean of Engineering College (Peking University)	"My Ideology & the Reform of Peking University."
11/20	Chien, Tuan-sheng	Dean of Law College (Peking University)	"To Study to Improve Myself & Thus Serve Better the Fatherland."
11/22	Hsi, Chia-yang	Dean of Engineering College (Tsing Hua University)	"Our High Industrial Education Must Be Reformed."
11/22	Tai, Fang-lan	Prof. of Agriculture (Peking University)	"To Study from the Beginning; To Work from the Beginning."
11/23	Chou, Yi-liang	Prof. of History (Tsing Hua University)	"Where We Start in Our Ideological Remoulding."
11/24	Liu, Yi-yuan	Prof. of Biology (Nan Kai University)	"Why I Need to Remould My Ideology."
11/24	Lin Ch'uan-ting	Ass. Dean of Studies (Catholic University)	"To Fight for Remoulding; to Demand Progress."
11/25	Li, Tsung-en	Dean (P.U.M.C.)	"The Education We Have Obtained from Our Visit in Hung-hu District in Kiangsu."
11/25	Tung, Wei-chuan	Prof. of Education (Peking Teachers College)	"The Education We Have Obtained from Our Visit in Hung-hu District in Kiangsu."
11/25	Hsu, Hsin-fu	Prof. of Aeronautical Engineering (Hua Pei University)	"To Decidedly Remould Ourselves to Become Real Teachers of the People."
11/25	Chang, Chung-i	Prof. of Economics (Catholic University)	"My First Understandings in <i>Hsueh Hsi</i> ."
11/27	Chang, Wei	Prof. of Mechanical Engineering (Tsing Hua University)	"The Problems I Have Seen in Tsing Hua University."

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Topic</i>
1951			
11/27	Hu, Ching-shun	Prof. of Electrical Engineering (Tientsin University)	"I Decided to Remould Myself to be a Teacher of the People."
11/29	Chang, Kuo-fan	President (Tsing Ku University)	"Ideological Remoulding Must be Integrated with Practice."
11/29	Kin, Hsi-wu	Prof. of Mechanical Engineering (Tsing Hua University)	"How I Solve the Problem of Craving for Face."
11/30	Lu, Pang-lien	Prof. of Political Science (Peking University)	"To Draw a line between Enemy and Self and To Remould My Ideology."
11/30	Ting, Hao-chuan	Asst. Dean of Studies (Peking Teachers College)	"Ideological Remoulding, not Ideological Reform."

All the articles are well written and to an average reader they may even sound quite convincing, because they are not purely theoretical discussions but personal testimonies supposedly based on actual experience. Some concentrate their attacks on "poisonous American imperialistic influences" in colleges and universities; others denounce their "ideological mistakes" in the past. It seems, at least, that the articles are handled by the Communists in such a way as to impress the readers that they are "genuine" and "frank" confessions of the professors rather than hand-outs by the Party. A careful examination of the 28 articles reveals, however, that certain themes, apparently approved and expected by the Party, run through all the writings. Some of them are explicitly expressed and some are indirectly implied. In sum, the themes are essentially as follows:

1. *"I committed serious mistakes in the past."*

Every writer in the 28 articles admits some "mistakes" or "crimes" that he has knowingly or unknowingly committed in his life. The ones that are frequently referred to are:

- a. Indifference to politics.
- b. Contempt for the working class.
- c. "Purely technical viewpoint"—(This means over-emphasis on technical knowledge without consideration of other factors.)
- d. "To study for the sake of study" and neglecting the fact that "to study is to serve the people."
- e. Vanity—such as dreaming of going abroad, studying for the degree of M.A. or Ph. D., and being concerned about professional ranks.
- f. Selfishness—(Prof. Chang Wei of Tsing Hua University even "confesses" that he is reluctant to let his students read his new books.)<sup>181</sup>
- g. Blindly worshipping the United States.
- h. Lack of understanding of, and sometimes contempt for, the Soviet Union.
- i. Past associations with Kuomintang "reactionaries."
- j. Isolation from the masses.

2. *"Why I committed the mistakes or crimes in the past."*

It is not enough for the professors merely to denounce their "guilty past." They have to explain why the "mistakes" were committed. Their "analysis" thus brings out the "errone-

<sup>181</sup> *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (daily newspaper in Peking), November 27, 1952.

ous beliefs and behaviors" that are condemned by the Party. Generally speaking, there are two major reasons given by the professors: (a) their personal background, and (b) their "erroneous" thoughts.

By "personal background" the professors generally refer to two things: (a) their "feudalistic" and "bourgeois" family background, and (b) their academic training in "imperialistic countries, mainly Britain and the United States."

Among the "erroneous thoughts" the following are most frequently cited: (a) individualism, (b) liberalism, (c) the British-American brand of "democracy," (d) class superiority, (e) craving for "face," (f) "narrow nationalism," (g) "reformism," and (h) "traditional feudalistic beliefs." "Individualism" and "liberalism" are especially emphasized in the articles.

3. *"Ideological remoulding is the best way to correct the mistakes."*

Almost all writers "express their gratitude" to the Party and government for the chance to get "ideologically remoulded." Every one tells in his own way how the remoulding campaign has helped him either "to open his eyes to his mistakes" or "to become a completely new and useful man."

4. *"I must seriously correct my mistakes and do my best from now on."*

This is a theme that appears in practically every article written by the professors. Many point out that their "mistakes" are discovered "through the study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought"; others apologetically state with illustrations how their mistakes have greatly "jeopardized" the interests of the people and the country.

Every writer ends his "confession" with humility and hope, promising that he will do his very best in the future. Some writers even list definite plans for their "improvements." Others admit that they are still far from grasping the fullness of the "truth" of Marxism-Leninism and of Mao's Thought; but express their confidence in "progress" because they now know "the correct way to serve the people."

That such articles have been used by the Communists for obvious propaganda purposes is proved by the fact that they are given nation-wide publicity. During the same month when the 28 articles were published in the *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Peking) there also appeared in the Shanghai *Ta Kung Pao* similar articles written by prominent professors. In November 1951, 19 articles of this nature were published in the Shanghai paper, of which eight were reprinted from the Peking paper. The rest were contributed by professors in Shanghai. In addition, activities of the "ideological remoulding campaign" of the professors in the Peking-Tientsin area were widely publicized in *Ta Kung Pao* and other papers in Shanghai.

A question which may be raised at this point is: What will probably be the general effect of these "confessions" of prominent professors? It is possible that many people in China may indeed be influenced by such "confessions" in view of the prestige of the professors. It is equally possible, however, that the Chinese public is by now well aware of the methods the Communists use for extracting confessions and in printing hand-out materials, and that the articles of the professors may have no greater effect than ordinary propaganda materials of the Party. It is hard to know the actual reactions of the Chinese people. However, several things are certain: (1) The traditional prestige and leadership of the intellectuals in Chinese society is crushed. (2) The "ideology of the bourgeois class" is severely attacked. (3) The Chinese Communists are moving one step further to "purify" the camp of the so-called "united front." (4) The theme that China should be led by the working class is stressed once again in a new manner. (5) The Chinese Communists are setting up another "living example" for the nation that Marxism-Leninism IS the "truth," and that the leadership of the Party can NOT be challenged.

Last of all, one has to admit that the Chinese Communists would not waste their effort in a nation-wide campaign of this nature, if it had no effect on the people at all. Commenting on the campaign, a former Catholic missionary in China reports in Hong Kong



... But it is certain that many of the younger generation will be deeply impressed (by the 'confessions'). It is perhaps worth-while to mention that we gave the clipping of the confessions to a University graduate from the North, who is himself far from sympathizing with the Communists. The result was that he himself was deeply impressed and expressed the view that these people (professors) seemed really to have changed their mind. This incident occurring in Hong Kong, shows that the Communist authorities are no fools in publishing this kind of confession, for there will be always fools enough in the world to believe them.<sup>182</sup>

*"Re-education" of Other Educational Workers*

Professors in colleges and universities are not the only educational workers who have to go through the "ideological remoulding campaign." All educated workers, including the teachers of high schools, primary schools, and even "winter schools" are subject to "re-education." Since the whole educational system in Communist China today has become the platform for the Party's political propaganda, it is but natural that the Communists should demand that the mind of all teachers, from the university professor down to the simplest village school teacher, must be moulded in the Communist pattern.

*"Ideological Remoulding" of Workers in Literature and Art*

Poets, novelists, playwrights, essayists, painters, musicians, and all workers in literature and art represent another group of intellectuals to be moulded in the Marxist-Leninist pattern. Before the Communists took control, many, if not most, of these workers were considered "leftists" and far more "progressive" than college professors or high school teachers. Apparently the Communists do not want to take a chance even on these people, who are directly responsible for the production of materials for the masses to read, hear, or enjoy. The Communists, without doubt, have to see to it that only the "correct" kind of "spiritual food" is fed to the masses.

In the winter of 1951, when the professors were being "re-educated," a similar "ideological remoulding campaign" was inaugurated in Peking for all workers in literature and art. Following the favorite trick of making the campaign look as if it were "volunteered" by the writers and artists, the Communists had it "sponsored" and "initiated" by the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers. Director Hu Chiao-mo of the Government Information Administration, a key figure in the Communist propaganda machine, delivered a speech entitled "Why Literary and Art Workers Must Ideologically Remould Themselves."<sup>183</sup> He said

It is commonly felt in China today that we do not have enough works (in literature and art). Many of the existing works do not harmonize with the new life of the laboring class. These works often lack new characters, new events, new loves, and new subject matter. They often present a wrong picture of the laboring people and their struggle.... Along with this situation is the fact that many writers lack connection with the laboring people, become indifferent to the tasks of the latter, lazy in work, and careless in producing new works; or give up writing and become indulgent in administrative affairs and social activities....<sup>184</sup>

Hu's whole speech emphasizes one point: literature and art should serve the masses, particularly the laboring class. This is in tune with the policy concerning literature and art, as formulated by Mao Tse-tung in 1942 in an important keynote speech at Yen-an.<sup>185</sup>

<sup>182</sup> "New School System—Re-education of Teachers" *China Missionary Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 2, February, 1952, p. 125.

<sup>183</sup> *Wen Yi Kung Tso Che Wei Shen Mo Yao Kai Tsou Ssu Haiang*, (Why Literary and Art Workers Must be Ideologically Remoulded), (Peking: Chung Kuo Jen Min Wen Hsiao Ch'u Pan She, 1952). pp. 1-8.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>185</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Tsai Yen-an Wen I Tso T'au Hui Shang Ti Chiang Hua* (Speech Delivered at the Literature and Art Conference in Yen-an), (Shanghai: Hsin Hua Bookstore, 1949).

Vice-Minister of Culture Chou Yang points out that even "the standpoint of peasants" is not enough in literature and art; and even works about peasants must be written from the "standpoint of workers." Chou declares: "It is obvious that in educating the masses we can not use the ideology of the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie or the peasants, but only the ideology of the advanced working class."<sup>186</sup>

Shortly after the ideological remoulding campaign for literary and art workers was initiated late in 1951, there appeared many lengthy articles in the Communist newspapers expressing the "confessions" of famous poets, playwrights, film directors, novelists, writers, and artists. They are similar in nature to the "confessions" of the professors in universities.

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<sup>186</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 13.

## APPENDIX

## APPENDIX A

### *A Resume Of the "Resolutions Of The Central Committee Of The Chinese Communist Party On Methods Of Leadership."*<sup>187</sup>

(These Resolutions were passed on July 1, 1943, by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.)

(1) Two methods must be adopted in accomplishing any task: the first is to combine the general with the particular, and the second is to unite leadership with the masses.

(2) If any work or mission lacks a general, universal slogan, the broad masses can not be moved to action; but if there is nothing more than a general slogan and the leaders do not make a concrete, direct, and thorough application of it with those from a particular unit who have been rallied around the slogan, [if the leaders] fail to break through at some point and gain experience, or fail to use acquired leaders to test the correctness of the general slogan and there is no way for them to carry out its contents; there is then the danger that the general slogan will have no effect.

...In the reform movement of 1943, all Central Committee bureaus and sub-bureaus, cultural committees, and district and local Party committees must not only present general slogans (the reform plan for the entire year); but also acquire experience by selecting two or three units from their own organization, nearby organizations, schools, and military groups (the number need not be large), studying them thoroughly, gaining a detailed understanding of the characteristics of the history, experience, thoughts, etc., the diligence in study and the quality of work of certain specific typical cadres from among these units (the number need not be large), and in addition personally guiding the leaders of these units to come to concrete solutions of the actual problems facing the units.

(3) ... Wherever there are masses, there are in probability three groups: those who are comparatively active, those who are average, and those who are backward.... As a result, leaders must be skillful at consolidating the minority activists to act as a leading nucleus, and must rely on this nucleus to elevate the middle group and capture the backward elements. A truly consolidated, uniform, and united nucleus for the leadership of the masses must materialize gradually from the mass struggle (for example, in reform and study); it can not materialize apart from the mass struggle.

In the process of any great struggle, the leading nucleus in the initial, intermediate, and final stage should not be, and can not be, entirely the same; activists (heroes) in the struggle must be constantly recruited to replace those elements which were originally part of the nucleus, but which have been found wanting on closer inspection, or have degenerated....

... Whether the mission is concerned with war, production, or education (including reform), the investigation of cadres, or any other tasks, we must adopt not only the method of combining a general slogan with particular guidance, but also the method of combining the leading nuclei with the broad masses.

<sup>187</sup> The resolutions are included in the *Cheng Feng Wen Hsien (Documents of the Party's Ideological Remoulding Movement)*, op. cit., pp. 139-144.  
Quotations used here are from *Mao's China, Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944*, translated by Boyd Compton (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952), pp. 176-183.



(4) In all our Party's actual work, correct leadership must come from the masses and go to the masses. This means taking the views of the masses (unintegrated, unrelated views) and subjecting them to concentration (they are transformed through research into concentrated systematized views); then going to the masses with propaganda and explanation in order to transform the views of the masses, and seeing that these (views) are maintained by the masses and carried over into their activities. It also means an examination of mass activities to ascertain the correctness of these views. Then again, there is concentration from the masses and maintenance among the masses. Thus the process is repeated indefinitely, each time more correctly, vitally, and fruitfully. This is the epistemology and methodology of Marxism-Leninism.

(5) The idea that correct relations should be created between the leading nucleus and the broad masses in organization, in the struggle, and in action; the idea that correct guiding views can result only from the process of concentrating from the masses and maintaining among the masses; and the idea of combining a general slogan with particular guidance when the views of the leadership are being carried out ... these ideas must be universally propagated in the current reform movement, so that mistaken views existing among the cadres on these questions can be corrected.... In reform of study, (we must) learn the methods of uniting leadership and the masses and combining the general and the particular, we must then adopt these methods in all our work.

(6) Correct guiding views are those which are concentrated from the masses then maintained among the masses; this is a fundamental method. In concentrating and maintaining, the method of combining a general slogan and particular guidance must be adopted.... From many specific (experiences) of leadership, a general view is formulated (a general slogan); this general view is then tested in particular units (you must not only do this yourself, but must also ask others to do the same); then new experiences can be concentrated (summarized experiences) and established as a new guide for the general leadership of the masses....

(7) In any type of work (military work, production, education, reform and study, supervision, the investigation of cadres or propaganda, organizational work, counter-espionage, etc.), higher-level guiding organs should work through persons in responsible positions in lower-level organs connected with that work, see that they assume responsibilities, bring about a division of labor, and at the same time achieve a unified objective (centralization)....

(8) Although it is possible to have many principal tasks in any one district, organ, school, or military unit, it is possible to have only one pivotal task at a given time, supported by other secondary or lesser tasks.

(9) ... The more bitter the struggle becomes, the more necessary is the demand for close union between men of the Communist Party and the broad masses, the more necessary to Communist Party members is the close union between general slogans and particular guidance, and (the more necessary is) the thorough disruption of subjectivistic and bureaucratic methods of leadership....